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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation investigated the ways that young people in Tallinn, 
Estonia conceptualize citizenships, identities, and belongings in national and 
post-national communities. Focus groups were conducted with 29 students from 
ethnic Estonian and Russophone backgrounds in their final year of secondary 
school; in-depth interviews were conducted with 16 civic education teachers from 
the students’ schools. Theories of citizenship and nationalism, as well as civic 
education research, were used to explore the ways in which young people 
conceptualize the terms of belonging and negotiate cultural difference as they 
move within and through their everyday spaces, particularly in the school.  
The study demonstrated that young people encounter, negotiate, and 
contest multiple and often competing discourses of national, multicultural, and 
post-national citizenships in their everyday lives, and that these coexist and 
interact complexly rather than existing as discrete entities at separate scalar 
hierarchies. The complex interaction of these discourses is thrown in to sharp 
relief in the Estonian context because of the country’s persistent socio-spatial 
division between ethnolinguistic groups at the national level and its membership 
in the European Union. In Tallinn, young people attempt to navigate cultural 
diversity through the liberal democratic framework of multiculturalism but 
concomitantly engage in Othering practices to structure the terms of belonging 
and exclusion in society. The results of this study suggest that future research
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should consider the simultaneity of multiple discourses of citizenships and how 
they produce and are produced by myriad political identities and relationships. 
The findings further imply that while theoretical conceptualizations of divided 
societies should recognize persistent socio-spatial divisions, they should also 
consider the complicated narratives that work to blur the lines of those divisions 
and to create a reality of societal divisions that are not as black-and-white as they 
may first appear.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
“I hope that in the future everything will change and there won’t be 
so much hate in society. For example, I know my friend, an 
Estonian, learns Russian. And it may feel strange, but it is—it’s 
happening. I think that in the future when you speak Russian, this 
won’t draw any special attention because this is the European way 
of treating different nationalities…” 
(Pushkin Boy 3, focus group participant, 
Tallinn, Estonia, 2012) 
  
 This Russian-speaking student’s narrative about belonging and identity in 
Estonia illuminates the complex, multi-sited reality of citizenships for young 
people in contemporary Europe. In a few simple sentences, this young man 
contends with nationalist, multicultural, and post-national discourses as he 
negotiates identity and belonging in Estonian society. His statement is illustrative 
of the multiple configurations of citizenship that young people in Tallinn, Estonia 
are confronted with—and must contend with—on an everyday basis. This 
dissertation explores the ways in which young people in Tallinn, Estonia 
understand societal membership in a nation-state that is both a society divided 
along ethnolinguistic lines and a liberal democratic member state of the 
European Union. In their everyday, mundane spaces, young people in 
contemporary Estonia encounter discourses of national, multicultural, and post-
national citizenships that conceptualize community, and the terms of belonging in
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 that community, in varying and often contrasting ways. Recognizing young 
people as active agents in the construction of their own political subjectivities, 
this study examines the ways that youths in Estonia understand and negotiate 
citizenship, identity, and belonging as they move through and within the everyday 
spaces of their personal geographies. In doing so, this study aims to interrogate 
how politicized identities and multi-scalar citizenship discourses interact to 
structure and re-structure the terms of membership in society. 
 
Theoretical Questions 
What are the everyday contexts in which young people develop an awareness 
and understanding of societal membership(s)? What role does civic education 
play in the citizenship imaginaries of young people? And what is the significance 
of everyday urban space and place in the development of young people’s 
cognizance of belonging and exclusion in the context of a divided society? 
 In this study I investigate conceptions of identity, citizenship, and 
belonging amongst ethnic Estonian and Russian-speaking youths in Tallinn, 
Estonia. In contemporary societies, identity, citizenship, and belonging are bound 
together in multiple ways. Modern citizenship has traditionally established and 
codified the relationship of the individual and the state through a language of 
universal rights and responsibilities; at the same time, it has been understood to 
denote membership in a national community that is defined in terms of particular 
cultural norms and values, and in some cases, historical ethnocultural markers 
(Janoski and Gran 2002; Hall 1996; Heater 1999).  
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While legal status may be universal within a nation-state, individuals or 
groups who are viewed as “unassimilated” or “unassimilable” into the national 
community may have different access to rights, different abilities to participate in 
public life, and a different sense of belonging in the wider community of citizens 
(Isin 2002). Such tensions and differentiations of citizenships are perhaps most 
visible in “divided societies”—those societies characterized by persistent socio-
spatial polarization (Ansorg, Haass, and Strasheim 2012; Dobbernack and 
Modood 2011).  
 Even as patterns of exclusion remain salient, modern citizenship and 
national communities have been reconfigured through a number of pressures 
and processes. Trends in post-World War II Western societies have caused 
citizenship to be both reconfigured at the national level and broadened beyond it 
(Nagel and Hopkins 2010). Multiculturalism has played a steady but contentious 
role in the sociopolitical discourses of liberal democracies as cultural diversity 
and difference have altered the ways that nationhood is articulated and 
negotiated. Furthermore, contemporary processes of transnational migration, 
European integration, and human rights regimes continue to challenge traditional 
notions of citizenship rights and responsibilities, locating identities and spaces of 
belonging above and across state lines and forming “post-national citizenships” 
(Soysal 1997; Benhabib 2007; K. Mitchell 2007). Assessments of these trends 
vary considerably. Some studies, for instance, have couched multicultural and 
post-national citizenships as institutions of universal equality and rights that can 
overcome the exclusionary politics inherent in nationalist projects (Soysal 1997; 
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Kymlicka 2007; Banks 2008) Others, in contrast, have demonstrated that 
particularisms undergird all citizenship regimes and discourses, belying wider 
claims of universal access and status (Laclau 1992; Young 1989; Benhabib 
2002). From this latter perspective, the nation-state remains the primary 
guarantor of citizenship and therefore continues to be a significant focal point in 
theoretical discussions of citizenship (Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003; Desforges, 
Jones, and Woods 2005; Faas 2011).  
 This study takes a different approach to contemporary citizenships—that 
these citizenship discourses have not had fully transformative effects, but rather, 
have formed multiple layers of citizenship discourse that people negotiate in their 
everyday lives. This study aims to examine how multiple citizenship discourses 
circulate within divided societies by engaging with the wider body of citizenship 
literature that has dealt with multiculturalism and post-nationalism, in contrast to 
divided societies literature that has tended to focus solely on the nationalisms 
that mediate socio-spatial divisions (Boal 2002; Yiftachel and Ghanem 2004). 
Furthermore, by engaging with both multicultural and post-national theories, this 
study brings the simultaneity of multiple citizenships in liberal-democratic 
societies.  
Different forms of ideas about citizenship circulate within societies. Layer 
upon layer of citizenship ideals with different rights (or conceptions for rights) flow 
from these discourses. This is particularly true in Europe, where both resurgent 
ethnonationalist projects and European Union (EU) integration processes have 
been present in the wake of collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The youngest 
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generations in Europe’s post-Soviet nation-states have been raised amongst 
competing discourses, particularly within civic education curricula, of 
nationalisms aimed at reasserting titular majority hegemony and European 
multiculturalisms focused on these countries’ “return” to Europe and democratic 
value systems (Delanty 2006; Kolossov 2003; Hughes 2005). Empirical studies 
suggest that in such contexts, young people’s understandings and negotiations 
of belonging and citizenship are highly fraught processes that take place in the 
spaces of everyday life, from schools and neighborhoods to places of work and 
recreation (Sarah L. Holloway et al. 2010; Weller 2003; Reed-Danahay 2007; 
Michaels and Stevick 2009). 
 This study examines the relationships between youth conceptions of 
citizenship and belonging and the multi-scalar discourses of identity. As such, the 
aims of this dissertation are to investigate (1) the ways in which configurations 
and conceptualizations of citizenships are mediated by multiple, varied, and 
sometimes conflicting discourses of identity and belonging; (2) how young people 
encounter, negotiate, and contest the terms of identity and belonging in their 
everyday geographies; and (3) the ways in which young people’s positionalities 
in national communities mediate and inform their ideas of citizenship and their 
citizenship practices. 
The complex interaction of varying discourses of belonging and identity is 
particularly visible in divided societies that experience cleavages along 
ethnonational lines. Estonia is one such divided society. This dissertation 
engages with these theoretical approaches to citizenship through in-depth focus 
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groups and interviews with young people in their last year of secondary school, 
and through interviews with civic educators in Tallinn, Estonia. The study 
participants were recruited from both Estonian-medium and Russian-medium 
secondary schools. Formal focus groups and interviews were conducted over a 
three month period in the autumn of 2012. Participant observation was also 
carried out in secondary schools, where I interacted informally with students and 
gave talks on the 2012 US presidential election, religion in America, and higher 
education.  
 The decision to focus on young people in Estonia was made in order to 
engage with changing modalities of citizenship in a group that has only recently 
generated interest in geographic literatures on citizenship. Traditionally, young 
people have been viewed as “citizens-in-the-making” who are the passive 
objects, rather than active subjects, of the discourses of citizenship and 
nationalism (Weller 2003, 154). But recent research trends in multiple disciplines, 
including geography, have centered young people as political agents who 
construct their own understandings of identity and actively negotiate discourses 
of citizenship (Skelton 2010; Leonard 2006). Young people in Estonia, in 
particular, are in a unique position of encountering and contending with many 
and varied discourses of citizenship, identity, and belonging because their 
society is both socio-spatially divided along ethnonational lines and situated 
within a multicultural, pan-European space that is “united in diversity.” To further 
demonstrate why this generation of young people in Tallinn is a compelling group 
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within which to examine citizenship, identity, and belonging it is necessary to 
briefly discuss the historical contexts in which Estonian society is situated. 
 
Historical Contexts of Belonging in Contemporary Estonia 
On February 24, 1918 the Republic of Estonia declared its independence after 
several centuries under German, Swedish, Danish, and finally Russian rule. After 
fighting a War of Independence against both the Soviet Red Army and German 
forces with the help of British, Danish, Finnish, and Swedish allies, the Republic 
of Estonia was established when its first constitution was ratified and parliament 
elected in 1920. Estonia remained a sovereign nation-state until it was 
conquered by the Soviet Union in 1939 and later annexed, along with the other 
Baltic states, in accordance with the Nazi-Soviet Molotov Ribbentrop Pact, which 
was best known in the West for invading and partitioning Poland. Estonia was 
occupied by the Soviets from 1939-41, followed by Nazi German troops from 
1941-44, and Soviet troops again from 1944-1991 (Raun 1987).  
 During the Soviet era large-scale migrations (forced and otherwise) saw 
an influx of Russians and Russian-speakers into Estonian territory. In the years 
leading up to World War II, Estonia was quite ethnically homogenous, with 
almost 90 percent of the population listed as ethnically Estonian, eight percent 
Russophone, and two percent other nationalities. By the end of the Soviet era in 
1991, however, Estonia’s population was 61 percent ethnic Estonian and 35 
percent Russophone (Statistics Estonia 2013). The in-migrations of 
Russophones was not uniform throughout the territory, however, such that Harju 
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County (centered by the capital city, Tallinn) and Ida Virumaa County in the 
northeast (centered by the industrial city of Narva) were the only areas with 
sizable Russophone populations. Since its re-declaration of independence in 
1991, Estonia has retained a large Russophone minority that constituted 29 
percent of the population in 2011 (Statistics Estonia 2011). Moreover, the socio-
spatial divisions in the country continue to reflect those of the Soviet era. The 
Russophone population almost exclusively reside in Tallinn/Harju County and 
Narva/Ida Virumaa County (Tallinn City Office 2012; Statistics Estonia 2011; 
Statistics Estonia 2013).  
 In addition to the large influx of Russophones during the Soviet era, 
Estonia was also subject to Sovietization and Russification policies and 
processes. Russian became the lingua franca for government, industry, and 
many parts of everyday life. Educational curricula were dictated by Moscow, and 
Soviet histories, policies, and ideologies permeated civics, history, geography, 
and language lessons (Ahonen 2001).  The era also involved attempts to 
suppress local cultures throughout the USSR, and as such Estonian traditions 
and language were relegated to the private realm while Soviet Russian culture 
was reflected in public spaces, places, and landscapes (Raun 1987; Merritt 2000; 
Zeigler 2002; D. J. Smith and Burch 2012).   
 The Soviet era was also marked by physical violence and brutality that 
included exiles, deportations, disappearances, forced conscription into the Red 
Army, and executions. Important to note, however, is that these brutalities were 
inflicted by the Soviet regime on Russians and Russophones just as they were 
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on the titular populations of USSR republics and satellite nations. But for ethnic 
Estonians the Soviet legacy of physical, political, and cultural violence was 
associated with Russophones broadly construed, an outlook that had major 
implications for the Estonian nation-state after the collapse of the USSR in 1991.  
 Upon re-establishing independence in 1991, Estonian nationalist elites set 
about “establishing social structures aimed at perpetuating cultural distinctions” 
between the titular majority and Russophone minority, which was cast as a group 
of interlopers who did not belong—simply a remnant of the illegal Soviet 
occupation (Kolossov 2003, 252; Laitin 2003). The marginalization of 
Russophone culture and language was legitimized by the new Estonian 
government through discourses of righting historical wrongs, acting for the self-
determination and sociocultural preservation of the Estonian people, and 
“stressing the European nature of Estonian identity, a natural westward tilt that 
for 40 years had been forcibly bent to Moscow’s will” (Merritt 2000, 247). The 
socio-spatial division of ethnic Estonians and Russophones very notably 
continues today, for instance, through the country’s school system, which, as 
alluded to above, provides both Estonian-medium and Russian-medium primary 
and secondary education to accommodate the large Russophone enclaves in its 
society. 
 The key elements of the Estonian nation-building project have been 
language policy and citizenship laws. Estonian replaced Russian as the lingua 
franca throughout society, and the use of the Russian language was considered 
a threat to the stability and integrity of the Estonian state (Pavlenko 2008; 
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Kolossov 2003). The new Estonian citizenship laws dovetailed with language 
policy through the new parameters established for naturalization, which included 
an Estonian language exam.  
When the USSR dissolved, so did Soviet citizenship. But citizenship in the 
newly independent nation-states that emerged from the USSR was not 
automatically extended to all residents of these new countries. Estonian 
citizenship, for instance, was automatically extended to any resident who could 
prove that their family resided in the Republic of Estonia before the Soviet and 
Nazi occupations of World War II. This policy immediately legally and politically 
alienated the majority of the Russophone population whose families moved to 
Estonia during the Soviet years (often as a result of forced migration and 
population transfer policies) and therefore were left with no citizenship at all. The 
result was that 32 percent of Estonia’s population in 1992 was rendered 
“stateless” (“Citizenship in Estonia” 2013). Residents of Estonia who could not 
prove their family’s pre-war status would have to go through the naturalization 
process to obtain legal citizenship, which included examinations “demonstrating 
proficiency in the Estonian language and knowledge of the Estonian Constitution 
and Citizenship law” (Feakins and Białasiewicz 2006). Because of the dominance 
of Russian and subsequent lack of need for the Estonian language during the 
Soviet era, the majority of the stateless Russophone population had little or no 
Estonian skills and therefore could not pass such naturalization exams easily or 
soon after Estonia’s redeclaration of independence.  
	   11 
 Estonia’s Citizenship Law and language policies caused great concern in 
international circles, especially in Brussels, (as Estonia was an EU candidate 
country in the 1990’s and early 2000’s), for encroaching upon the rights of the 
Russophone minority (Feakins and Białasiewicz 2006; Brosig 2008). Thus, 
“constrained by international oversight [and] political reality” Estonia began 
making legislative moves to liberalize policy. In 1998, significantly, the Estonian 
parliament amended the Citizenship Act to allow parents who are stateless but 
had lived in the country for at least five years to request citizenship through 
naturalization for any children born after 26 February 19921.  
Shortly thereafter, the Estonian government implemented the first 
Estonian State Integration Programme, which ran from 2000 to 2008 (Laitin 
2003, 197). The chief goal of the first Integration Programme was to address the 
issue of statelessness amongst Estonian residents (“Integration in Estonian 
Society” 2013). Specifically, citizenship and naturalization legislation was altered 
to reduce the amount of time required to process citizenship applications and the 
government made reimbursement for the cost of Estonian language lessons 
available to at least 3,000 people per year. The most significant legislative move 
for young people in Estonia was the bestowal of citizenship at birth to any child 
with at least one Estonian citizen parent. This was followed by the second phase 
of the State Integration Programme, which has run from 2008-2013, and which 
aims to “ensure rapid modernization of society in the context of accession to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Children who are naturalized under this amendment are not subject to the exam requirements 
of the Citizenship Law. 
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European Union, while preserving both stability and commitment to the protection 
and continued development of Estonian culture.”  
While the effectiveness of the Integration Programmes has been debated 
(Brosig 2008; Kulu and Tammaru 2004), the number of naturalized citizens in 
Estonia has increased noticeably since 2000. However, the presence of 84,494 
stateless residents (6.5 percent of the population) in 2011 “indicates the 
persistence of a major unresolved problem” (Feakins and Białasiewicz 2006, 
651). These mixed assessments of the first two phases of the State Integration 
Programme, together with the Estonian government’s announcement of a third 
phase of the State Integration Programme (2014-2018), demonstrates that 
integration in Estonia is an uneven process, subject to the vagaries of individual 
experiences with multiple discourses of identity and belonging and contemporary 
Estonia.  
The Integration Programmes have focused heavily on primary and 
secondary education in Estonia. Although the education system is still divided 
between Estonian-medium and Russian-medium schools, the Integration 
Programmes have implemented a controversial “60 percent” rule that requires 60 
percent of all classes in secondary schools, regardless of language medium, 
must be taught in the Estonian language. According to the Estonian government 
this policy is “demand driven” and necessary to ensure that “all permanent 
residents of Estonia, irrespective of their ethnic origin… are able to lead a 
fulfilling life by participating in the societal, economic, and cultural life of the 
country” (“Integration in Estonian Society” 2013). Furthermore, the policy dictates 
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that all secondary school history and civics courses must be taught in Estonian. 
The “60 percent” rule has caused friction between the Estonian government and 
Russophone population for several reasons. First, many teachers in Russian-
medium schools were pedagogically trained in the Soviet era and therefore do 
not have the Estonian language skills to teach the required courses in Estonian. 
The Estonian government has provided language training for Russophone 
instructors, but the problem persists (Kulu and Tammaru 2004; Brosig 2008; 
Toots 2003). Furthermore, although Russian-medium primary schools are 
required to teach Estonian as a second language to its students, the lengthy and 
uneven implementation of such policies, combined with teacher language skill 
issues, has resulted in many Russophone students entering secondary school 
without the Estonian skills needed to effectively absorb 60 percent of their 
curricula in Estonian.  
Despite Estonia’s efforts to liberalize citizenship laws, promote integration 
of majority and minority populations, and comply with European Union 
regulations regarding minority rights in member states, socio-spatial divisions 
remain present in Estonian society. The complex interaction of varying 
discourses of citizenship, identity, and belonging are particularly evident in 
Tallinn because it is home to 30 percent of Estonia’s entire population and is the 
only city to have sizable numbers of both the Estonian titular majority and 
Russophone minority. Ethnocultural tensions have flared in Tallinn, most recently 
and violently during the Bronze Soldier Crisis of 2007. Riots and looting erupted 
in Tallinn’s city center in the middle of the night on 26 April 2007 when the 
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Estonian government dismantled and relocated the Bronze Soldier War 
Memorial, a Soviet-era monument commemorating the Red Army’s “liberation” of 
Estonia from Nazi Germany. The issue of whether the USSR “liberated” or 
“occupied” Estonia at the end of WWII remains a highly contentious issue 
between the Estonian and Russophone communities. Many, if not most, 
Estonians viewed the Bronze Soldier’s presence in Tallinn’s city center as an 
incorrect, illegitimate public display of Soviet “victory” that was no more than an 
occupation. The Estonian government’s previous discussions of relocating the 
monument, which is also a gravesite for Red Army soldiers who perished in 
Tallinn during World War II, generated intense resistance amongst the 
Russophone community because of the Bronze Soldier’s “importance…as a 
place of Russian national honor and symbol of victory” (Kattago 2009, 159). The 
Estonian government’s decision to relocate the Bronze Soldier in April 2007 to 
the Defense Forces Cemetery, a “less controversial place,” turned out to be an 
extremely controversial decision that highlighted the complex interaction of the 
many and varying discourses of citizenship, identity, and belonging that exist on 
a daily basis in Tallinn. 
These political, cultural, and social histories are the contexts in which 
belonging, identity, and citizenship are negotiated in contemporary Estonia. The 
national conflicts that emerged after the breakup of the USSR have attracted 
significant scholarly attention in the 1990’s and 2000’s (Pavlenko 2008; Megoran 
2004; Kolossov 2003; Berg 2000; Skalnik Leff 1998; G. Smith and Wilson 1997). 
This dissertation builds on that research while broadening the discussion beyond 
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the question of post-Soviet identity. It considers how this process has been 
shaped in part by a wider set of processes in Europe relating to the acceptance 
of multicultural discourse and the reconfiguration of rights and identities through 
the EU. Tallinn’s young people represent fertile ground for addressing theoretical 
issues of belonging, identity, and citizenship within a society that is divided along 
ethnocultural lines, subject to competing historical memories, and negotiating 
nationalism, post-nationalism, and multiculturalism on a daily basis.  
 
The Arguments  
While over nearly of the student respondents and every teacher 
respondent hold Estonian (and therefore EU) citizenship, they exhibit remarkably 
diverse understandings of what identities are associated with substantive 
national citizenship. Broad patterns and similarities in the responses, however, 
can be detected along the ethnolinguistic lines that socio-spatially divide Estonia. 
The conceptual framework developed in this dissertation draws on the 
complexities of the study population’s responses to demonstrate and explain the 
following theoretical points: 
 
1. The tensions between the universalism of liberal-democratic citizenship 
and the particularisms of the Estonian nation-building project permeate, 
and are permeated by, post-national and multicultural modes of 
citizenship. Discourses of post-national and multicultural citizenship, which 
aim to address cultural diversity and alleviate conflicts between majority 
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and minority groups, actually complicate and multiply the particularisms 
that delineate belonging and citizenship. This calls into question whether 
the inherent tensions between universalisms and particularisms can be 
alleviated at all. 
2. Young people are subject to multiple and often contradictory discourses of 
citizenship and identity in their everyday spaces, particularly in the school. 
Teacher attitudes serve to mediate the manner in which discourses of 
nationalism, post-nationalism, and multiculturalism are presented to young 
people in the classroom. Importantly, however, the discourses and 
experiences that young people encounter in their everyday personal 
geographies, such as homes, neighborhoods, and city landscapes, are 
equally influential. Young people are more likely to demonstrate 
internalization of discourses that they have meaningfully experienced in 
multiple spaces rather than what they are taught in school. 
3. Urban space is particularly significant to the delineation of belonging, 
identity, and citizenship in divided societies. Memorialized landscapes, 
displays of banal nationalism, and the ascription of meanings to particular 
neighborhoods perpetuate and mediate the projection of hegemonic 
narratives and identities and the marginalization of minority narratives and 
identities.  
4. Young people’s positionalities within the nation-state as members of the 
majority or minority group affects the way in which European Union 
citizenship and European identity is conceptualized, understood, and 
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asserted. In other words, the sociopolitical inclusion or exclusion that 
young people experience based on their ethnolinguistic identity tempers 
whether EU citizenship, Europeanness, and the attendant rights and 
opportunities are couched in terms of either supplementing or substituting 
for their Estonian citizenships. These varying postionalities of young 
people influence the way they plan for and think about future plans to 
migrate within Europe, implying that citizenships are intersecting rather 
than one form of citizenship simply replacing another. 
 
These theoretical points suggest that national, post-national, and 
multicultural citizenships coexist and interact in complex ways with each other 
rather than existing as discrete entities at different scales. Citizenships, from this 
perspective, are dynamic political relationships, ideals, and discourses that affect 
and are affected by each other. Moreover, this complex interaction indicates that 
individuals’ negotiations of their various citizenships will depend upon their 
unique experiences at and perceptions of the urban, national, and post-national 
levels. Subsequently, theoretical abstractions of citizenship, identity, and 
belonging must consider diverse individual conceptualizations that occur within 
broad patterns identified amongst groups.  
This dissertation focuses on the ways that young people conceive of and 
ascribe identities, conceptualize citizenships, and understand the terms of 
belonging at multiple scales as a result of their movements within and through 
the everyday spaces and places of their personal geographies. The joint 
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examination of the coexistence and interaction of multi-scalar citizenship and 
identity discourses diverges from existing theoretical engagements which tend to 
address national, post-national, and multicultural discourses separately from one 
another and view these as trends that have definitively reconfigured “modern 
citizenship.” This study moves beyond the views of proponents and skeptics of 
these various discourses by showing the simultaneity of multiple forms, ideals, 
and discourses of citizenship, painting a much murkier picture than what can be 
found in some of the contemporary literature. The analysis presented in this 
dissertation suggests that young people’s conceptualizations of various 
citizenships and identities neither develop discretely from each other nor evolve 
in one space, but are established via complicated interactions of multi-scalar 
discourses within and through multiple spaces, including those of the everyday. 
 
Organization of this Dissertation 
Chapter Two of this dissertation reviews theoretical approaches to 
citizenship, identity, civic education, youth geographies, cultural landscape, and 
urban geographies from multi-scalar perspectives including the national, post-
national, supranational, and multicultural. This review of the literature constructs 
the theoretical framework that guides the analysis of this empirical study. 
 Chapter Three provides a methodological overview of the study. This 
chapter discusses the qualitative methods used to gather and analyze the data 
collected during fieldwork. It also discusses the characteristics of the study 
population and the methods used to recruit the study participants. It also briefly 
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addresses researcher reflexivity and power dynamics between the interviewer 
and interviewee(s), and how these issues influence data collection and analysis. 
 Chapters Four, Five, and Six draw on focus groups and interviews to 
examine the ways that young people’s encounters with different discourses in 
different spaces inform and are informed by their conceptualizations of 
citizenship, identity, and belonging in Estonian society. Chapter Four investigates 
the complicated ways that the tensions between discourses of nationalism, post-
nationalism, and multiculturalism manifest themselves in the space of the school 
and in students’ narratives of identity and belonging in Estonia. It pays special 
attention to the teachers’ descriptions of how they present citizenship discourses 
in their classrooms and compares them to the students’ narratives of how they 
understand citizenships and belongings. This chapter discusses how the things 
that students are taught in school about citizenship and belonging are mediated 
by their experiences in other everyday spaces. Chapter Five extends this 
analysis by addressing bordering practices that the student participants engage 
in while navigating everyday spaces. It focuses in particular on how language 
spaces interact with the built environment of the city to shape students’ 
encounters with and negotiations of belonging and citizenship in Tallinn. Young 
people, it is demonstrated, actively conceptualize and contest citizenship and 
identity in Tallinn through their varied experiences in the divided spaces of the 
city. Finally, Chapter Six investigates the student participants’ engagements with 
EU discourses of supranational citizenship and identity. It examines the students’ 
perceptions of their EU citizenships through the lens of their positionalities in the 
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national community as part of either the Estonian majority or the Russophone 
minority.  
Taken together, these three chapters suggest that young people’s 
conceptualizations of citizenships and identities are negotiated in the context of 
inherent tensions between universalisms and particularisms that are present in 
multi-scalar discourses of citizenships and belongings. Although multiculturalism 
(framed as tolerance) is present in the student descriptions of terms of belonging 
and exclusion in Estonia, Europe, and the city of Tallinn, particularisms pervade 
their narratives of everyday negotiation of the spaces of citizenship in a socio-
spatially divided society. While the space of the school is a crucial site for the 
development and understanding of citizenships and identities for young people, it 
must be situated within the wider context of young people’s personal 
geographies outside of the classroom in order to render a comprehensive, 
thorough assessment of youth conceptualizations of belonging at multiple scales. 
In particular, the mediation of young people’s ideas of national and post-national 
citizenships takes place within and through urban spaces on a daily basis, 
indicating that the citizenships at various scales are not neatly stacked in a 
hierarchy, but coexist complexly at many scales. 
 A concluding chapter summarizes the theoretical arguments made in the 
dissertation and draws out suggestions made by this analysis for understanding 
youth geographies of citizenship, identity, and belonging in divided societies
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
This dissertation explores how different modes of citizenship in 
contemporary Europe intersect and shape the lives of young people. I start with 
the premise that despite the language of universalism, the parameters of 
citizenship are defined by particularisms that marginalize and exclude certain 
individuals and groups. The particularisms of a society’s dominant group become 
naturalized and are therefore framed as the “universal” traits of citizens. The 
universalization of the dominant group’s culture and customs creates an impetus 
for minority groups to adopt assimilatory practices or be subject to sociopolitical 
marginalization, exclusion, and alienation. In this dissertation I use this premise 
to investigate the identities of young Estonians not only in terms of belonging to 
their national community, but also to the European community. 
Young people in Estonia, and indeed throughout Europe, are implicated in 
multiple political projects with varying objectives. Discourses of national, post-
national, and multicultural identities and citizenships circulate within and through 
young people’s everyday spaces, especially the space of the school. These 
varied and often contradictory discourses are normally examined as discrete 
processes, but this dissertation argues that discourses of nationalism, 
Europeaness, and multiculturalism in fact operate simultaneously and are thrown 
together in different contexts. As a result, young people must sort through and
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 assemble multiple conceptions of citizenship and social membership. This 
dissertation discusses the nature of the varying discourses of citizenship that 
Estonian young people encounter, the spaces in which they are encountered, 
and the ways in which the interplay of different discourses shape young people’s 
articulations of belonging and identity. The discussion is aimed at contributing to 
wider discussions of young people’s understandings of belonging and identity 
and contemporary modalities of citizenship in Europe. 
In the modern nation-state era citizenship and national identity have often 
overlapped to the extent that the terms are taken to be synonymous. 
Conceptions of nation and national identity have often drawn upon ethnocultural 
markers, accentuating some social divisions while diminishing others already 
present in societies. The granting of citizenship along the lines of such national 
identities has given these societal divisions legal and political dimensions, 
resulting in the further marginalization of non-assimilating minority groups. In 
recent decades configurations of national identity and citizenship have shifted, 
becoming de-coupled from ethnicity. These configurations, developed largely in 
the context of post-World War II Western Europe and America, have increasingly 
tied citizenships to residency, rather than to membership in an ethnocultural 
group. This shift has taken place in the context of the creation of supranational, 
transnational, and global/cosmopolitan identities and citizenships. Policy-makers, 
EU leaders, educational professionals, and scholars assert ideas of 
multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism as essential in a globalized and globalizing 
world. However, ethnonationalisms have never disappeared, compelling scholars 
	   23 
to investigate the ways in which groups, individuals, and states navigate and 
negotiate multiple and, sometimes, conflicting conceptions of belonging, identity, 
and citizenship in divided societies. 
Academic studies of citizenship and identity have often implicitly focused 
on adults and the implications of exclusionary citizenship forms and practices 
affecting access to employment, housing, and social services. In the past 
decade, however, scholars have begun to address more explicitly and 
specifically the active role young people play in the development of their own 
identities and conceptions of citizenships. This small but growing body of work 
argues for the recognition of young people as capable, active agents rather than 
passive ‘citizens in waiting’ that are dictated to by adults. Within the framework of 
political geography theory, studies of youth geographies focus on the sites and 
spaces in which young people learn about and encounter and experience 
identity, belonging, and the meaning of citizenship. The roles of civic education 
and school spaces are, along with the home, crucial sites of learning and 
performing identities and community membership. As such, much of the analysis 
of youth political geographies is centered on the spaces of formal education. But 
the personal geographies of youths outside of school and the home are also 
beginning to be recognized as critical sites of identity formation and 
performances of citizenship—thus, analyses of the urban space are being folded 
in to the broader examination of young people’s worlds.  
This review weaves together theories of citizenship, identity, belonging, 
civic education, and urban spatiality, providing a theoretical framework to 
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examine young people’s development and maintenance of identity and 
citizenship in divided societies. Insights about citizenship and belonging provided 
by young people are unique because youths encounter and engage multiple 
discourses while they are in the world of adults, but not entirely of it. Young 
people are situated within political communities where their capacities for formal 
political and legal interaction are dependent upon adults.  
But formal limits on young people’s political agency do not remove their 
ability to negotiate, interpret, and contest the discourses they encounter in the 
adult world. Young people contend with discourses set by adults—such as their 
families, educational officials, and policy-makers—but actively negotiate and 
interpret these discourses within the context of their own lives and for their own 
purposes. This negotiation results in the performance of different, highly 
contextualized identities and citizenships that are influenced by the discourses of 
adults but reflected through the prism of young people’s lives. In examining the 
spatiality of young people’s lives, we can develop a better understanding not only 
of how youths come to conceive of belonging, identity, and citizenship, but also 
of how citizenship in general forms and is formed by complexly interacting 
discourses of societal membership. Finally, it pays particular attention to the 
multi-scalar nature of the sites and spaces in which young people encounter 
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Identity, Citizenship, and the Politics of Belonging 
Theories of identity and of citizenship are bound up together, informing by 
one another. Identity and citizenship are both inclusionary and exclusionary 
constructs that delineate insiders and outsiders as well as what attributes define 
those who belong and those who do not. Citizenship theories, traditionally 
concerned with the narrow parameters of formal membership in a bounded 
political territory, especially rights and responsibilities, have expanded in recent 
decades to include discussion of socio-cultural identities and the ways these 
mediate access to and exercise of rights that exist on levels other than the 
nation-state. Therefore, understanding identity formation has become central to 
understanding the construction of citizenship.  
Contemporary scholarship understands identity to be a social construction 
rather than an a priori characteristic (Paasi 2001; D. J. Smith and Burch 2012) 
and to be both performative and discursive in nature- that is to exist in the realm 
of language and ideology and in the realm of social, spatial, and institutional 
practices (Jenkins 2000; Paasi 2003; Newman and Paasi 1998; Entrikin 1999; 
Merritt 2000). Identity, at a fundamental level, is a relational concept: it involves 
defining oneself in relation to some “other”, “us” in relation to “them” (Browning 
and Christou 2010; Kolossov 2003; Paasi 2002; Jenkins 2000; Delanty 2006; 
Fuchs and Klingemann 2002). Groups uphold such distinctions through borders 
and bordering practices that are simultaneously spatial, social, temporal, and 
discursive (Newman and Paasi 1998). Borders, in this sense, are instruments of 
power that make the inclusion of “insiders” and exclusion of “outsiders” visible 
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and real (Paasi 2001; Delanty 2006). As products of human agency, borders can 
achieve a degree of fixity, but they also shift over time, re-shaping the 
identity(ies) of those included and excluded, as well as relationships and 
interactions between groups (Delanty 2006).  
The construction of an identity is a process of binding people together and 
creating solidarity between them. The ways in which identities are learned, 
accepted, and ascribed are myriad. Families are one important sphere of identity 
formation; as Jenkins states “we know who we are…because, a long time 
ago…other people told us” (Jenkins 2000, 15). Identities are also continuously 
produced and reproduced through education systems and curricula, in historical 
narratives, public rituals and monuments, art, literature, and other media 
(Newman and Paasi 1998; Kolossov 2003; Yiftachel and Ghanem 2004; Berg 
and Oras 2000; Delanty 2006; Murphy 2002). Dominant identities come to 
saturate societies, becoming so ubiquitous that they seem natural and banal 
(Billig 1995). Those who do not assimilate, whether by choice or discrimination, 
face the disciplinary power of dominant groups. At times though, the 
subordinated and the unassimilated can challenge exclusionary practices and 
alter identities from within. In short, while identities uphold systems of privilege, 
they can also be mobilized to press claims for inclusion. Identities, in this sense, 
are not static or singular, but dynamic, multiple, and context dependent. 
Identities are given material and symbolic structure through their 
geographies (Rose 1997). Individuals and groups use discourses and narratives 
to spatialize the definitions of identity and, subsequently, understand the terms of 
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belonging and exclusion through space, place, and landscape (Keith and Pile 
1993). The discourses of “power ridden social relations” produce “particular 
spatialities” that articulate identities “by giving them spatial form” (Rose 1997, 2). 
Discourses of “‘race,’ gender, sexuality, and nation (and by extension, class, 
ablebodiedness and so on)” (Rose 1997, 2) produce multiple identities and, 
subsequently, spatialities of identities. Individuals, then, have “multiple and 
sometimes contradictory subject positions, and are sometimes torn between 
identifications, often moving between identifications in different situations and 
places” (Pratt 1998, 27; Yuval-Davis 2006; K. Anderson 1987; Mahtani 2001) 
The processes of power relations work to produce spaces and places 
where identities are enacted and negotiated in different ways by different 
individuals and groups (Massey 1995; Pratt 1998). Hegemonic discourses 
manifest hegemonic entities and work to organize space, privileging dominant 
identities and relegating minority identities to the margins of society. The power 
relations that “produce bounded areas” of identity have marked implications for 
“those who are contained and enact their identities within” those spaces (Pratt 
1998, 31). Discourses of power and the politics of identity mark the spatialities of 
dominant identities as spaces of belonging, thereby organizing spaces—and 
access to them—according to hegemonic identity processes. Dominant 
discourses and identities, however, are processes that can be challenged and 
contested by. Spaces of belonging, like the identities associated with them, are 
“dynamic process[es], not reified fixities,” and may be “stable, contested, or 
transient” (Yuval-Davis 2006, 199).   
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As individuals ascribe multiple identities to themselves and to others, they 
are often negotiating multiple spaces of belonging simultaneously. Individuals 
and groups perform many identities simultaneously as they move through the 
spaces of their everyday lives, but the politics of identity will affect how each 
individual or group performs these identities (Keith and Pile 1993). Several 
scholars have observed how “different aspects of identity come to the fore in 
different contexts” and spaces (Pratt 1998, 32). Empirical studies have 
demonstrated that people’s  “concrete social locations are constructed along 
multiple axes of difference” (Yuval-Davis 2006, 200), and that they will 
emphasize or suppress certain aspects of their identities, such as class (Pratt 
1998), ethnocultural heritage (Leonard 2006; Secor 2003), and religion (K. 
Mitchell 2006a) in order to navigate and cross the borders of spaces of belonging 
and exclusion. 
The contemporary literature on identity has demonstrated that the 
complexity of the interactions between power relations and social boundaries 
account for the changeable nature of identities and their spatialities. But the fact 
that identity can be said to be an always-becoming, dynamic process does not 
negate the realities of boundaries in space and place that are crucial to identity 
formation “and its complement, the production of difference” (Pratt 1998, 27). 
Geraldine Pratt (1998, 27, 35) describes the spatialities of various identities as 
“grids of difference” that are complexly situated at varying scales. These grids 
are bounded places that “can stabilize identities or, alternatively, open up the 
potential” for cross-boundary movement and communication (Pratt 1998, 44). 
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Individuals’ movements within and across the borders of grids of difference, she 
argues, illustrate the complex nature of identity as both located and mobile, and 
the complex nature of bounded spaces of belonging/exclusion as both palpable 
and changeable. People’s negotiations within and through grids of difference 
may serve to challenge or reinforce boundaries of identity spaces, promote 
progressive change or protect the status quo, and fragment identities or solidify 
them. The concept of grids of difference provides a framework within to 
acknowledge both the structure of identity spaces and the potential for those 
structures to be shaped and reshaped by power relations. 
Pratt’s conceptualization of grids of difference as the spaces and places 
where identities are enacted and subjectivities negotiated demonstrates how 
crucial identities and their spatialities are to understandings of citizenship. The 
recognition that identities become associated with spaces of belonging and 
exclusion, the center and margin, and insider/outsider status illuminates the ways 
in which societies become divided and the ways in which the rights and 
responsibilities of citizenship are accessed and demanded. Recognizing the 
processes by which citizenship itself serves as a particular form of identity that is 
bound up with state power and access to rights allows for a more nuanced and 
comprehensive understandings of how individuals and groups are included or 
excluded from accessing rights in contemporary nation-states.  
Many types of identities figure with people’s claims to rights and political 
membership in nation-states. The processes and performances of myriad 
identities—national, ethnic, class, and religious, among many others—that 
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structure individuals’ and groups’ social locations take place within the political-
legal framework of the contemporary nation-state. Examining the ways in which 
young people develop and understand notions of belonging and exclusion in 
terms of citizenship reveals the ways in which their movements within and 
through grids of difference and their performances of varying identities both 
shape, and are shaped by, political structures of the nation-state that permeate 
daily life. The following sections address the ways in which citizenship, as an 
identity, is configured in the contemporary world, how it structures the ways in 
which people navigate their daily geographies, and the ways in which it affects 
peoples’ access to political, social, and civil rights. 
 
Citizenship 
From the ancient Greek polis and the Roman Republic to the modern 
nation-state system and globalizing world, citizenship has been an institution that 
confers rights on and demands duties from members of a political community. 
Historically, citizenship has been connected to the territorial space of a bounded 
political unit—i.e. the rights and duties of citizenship are both established and 
acted upon within the space of a sovereign, bounded polity (Painter and Philo 
1995).  
Traditionally, citizenship implied politico-legal rights that entitled the bearer 
to protections within the polity and demanded politico-legal duties (of widely 
varying degrees) to society (R. Smith 2002; Dagger 2002; Schuck 2002; 
Lefebvre 2003; Isin and Turner 2002; Heater 1999; Isin 2002). Academic 
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literature in the twentieth century conceptualized citizenship as a body of rights 
including civil and social rights and duties in addition to political ones (Marshall 
1964); citizenship has often been seen as becoming more expansive over time, 
encompassing more rights and applying more widely across society. National 
citizenship configurations in Western liberal democratic societies have contended 
with and extended beyond-political rights inconsistently and unevenly throughout 
the history (Marston 1990; Yuval-Davis 2006; Yiftachel and Ghanem 2004). But 
the concept of a comprehensive space of citizenship rights and obligations is 
ubiquitous enough that a number of policy makers and scholars “equate genuine 
citizenship with full possession of all three types of rights: civil, political, and 
social” (R. Smith 2002, 110). 
Contemporary theorizations of citizenship have moved beyond a rights-
focused discussion to interrogate the scales at which communities are defined 
and the ways in which membership in communities is defined, regulated, and 
applied (Hobsbawm 1990; Billig 1995; Desforges, Jones, and Woods 2005; 
Staeheli 2008; R. Smith 2002). The contemporary body of scholarship on 
citizenship represents myriad conceptualizations of the nature of community, 
rights, and duties, but the concern common to these scholars is the examination 
of the how power, politics, and identity interact to include and exclude individuals 
and/or groups from access to rights. 
The concept of citizenship has always implied an entitlement to rights, an 
expectation of duties, and “participatory practices and contestations in the public 
sphere” that allow citizens to make claims (Soysal 1997, 510; R. Smith 2002; 
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Heater 1999; Painter and Philo 1995). Citizenship has always been presented as 
a status that not only connotes that the bearer possesses rights and duties 
(Marston 1990; Yegen 2008), but also that those without that status do not 
possess those rights and duties (Bosniak 2000; Marshall 1964; Hughes 2005). 
Citizenship defines “us here” from “them there” requiring both difference and 
space for its constitution (Isin 2002; Painter and Philo 1995; Desforges, Jones, 
and Woods 2005). As an inherently spatial institution, citizenship dictates access 
to the space of rights, the nature of rights and duties within that space (Marshall 
1964; Soysal 1997), and the nature of the community guaranteeing the rights 
(Benhabib 2007; Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003; Staeheli 2008). 
Because citizenship is membership of a particular community, defining 
what the characteristics of a community member are (and are not) is a crucial 
and fundamental process in the creation citizenship. Establishing which 
individuals and/or groups are included within the community requires the 
delimiting of “the community.” In other words, creating the identity of a community 
creates the identity of the citizen (Painter and Philo 1995). As the contemporary 
world political system is separated into nation-states, the most influential process 
of creating the identity of the citizen has been the creation of nations and national 
identity.  
 
Identifying the Citizen: Nations and Nationalism 
The construction of nations is a contentious, political process that involves 
the ideological production of cultural sameness in a context of modern state 
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formation. Benedict Anderson (2006) has argued that the establishment of 
common consciousness between individuals in a modern era of print capitalism 
and mass communication created “imagined communities.” Anderson argues that 
such communities are “imagined” in the sense that individuals feel connected to 
past, present, and future inhabitants of a territory they have not met and cannot 
possibly meet. These imagined communities initially formed around common 
language and then began to include ethnic, cultural, and heritable characteristics 
that created a sense of commonality between members of the group. In 
understanding themselves to be part of a nation, people view their commonality 
as stretching across time and space—as rooted in the past and as continuing 
into the future.  
National communities establish identities via emphasis on the 
commonality between its members that simultaneously bind them together and 
distinguish the community from other groups. Michael Billig (1995) illuminates the 
importance of the “Othering” process in nation-building, arguing that nations are 
made real when they are defined against other national communities. National 
communities are not stand alone entities, but rely on the presence of Other 
national groups to define their space of existence. The commonality that is the 
foundation for community is derived from myriad social, cultural, economic, and 
political factors that interact within that community. Nationality is simultaneously 
the “marker of inclusion” in a community and the “justification for exclusion” from 
it (Staeheli 2008, 9). The processes of masking difference and promoting the 
image of a homogenous polity are crucial not only to essentialize the identity to 
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the national community, but also to naturalize its connection to the territory it 
occupies. For that reason, these processes of identity construction are constantly 
operating activities, rather than one-off actions that often call upon specific 
readings of history to naturalize the connection between national identity, 
citizenship, and the state. 
We can gather from the theories of Anderson and Billig that nation is 
inherently spatial because it implies place as well as a community of people. 
Historical accounts of a national community inhabiting a territory provide 
justification for that nation’s sovereignty and political control over the territory 
(Agnew 2001). As a result of historical narratives, political control over territory 
becomes essentialized as a fundamental part of a nation. These “constitutive 
stories” naturalize the presence of the nation and give it legitimacy (R. Smith 
2002, 109). National histories use social, cultural, and political elements to 
naturalize the geography of national community and impart a spatial quality to 
national identity. Because memory and history are hegemonically produced and 
maintained, the group in power determines the “official” history of a nation (K. 
Mitchell 2003). The ways in which a national history is cast will have great impact 
on the territory the nation exercises sovereign political control over.  
Historical narratives play a vital role in the conflation of the nation and the 
state because they construct an intrinsic connection between the nation and 
sovereign control of territory. This connection tends not only to naturalize 
categories of belonging, but subsequently, also entitlement to political rights from 
the state (Murphy 2002). The importance of national identity is realized in this 
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essentialization because any individual with the proper identity markers of the 
ruling nation will automatically be included in the political community. Political 
membership in a state has therefore often hinged on the identity markers of the 
nation, such as language, ethnicity, and race (Billig, 1995). 
 
Political Rights and National Citizenship 
It is readily apparent from the literature that both the conception of a 
nation based on common ethnocultural, heritable traits and the definition based 
on common ideas for governance of the people have had, and continue to have, 
real and lasting effects on the granting, performance, and maintenance of 
national citizenship. The critical literature on nationalism exposes the highly 
contested and complex nature of national identities and establishes that national 
consciousness emerges neither quickly nor easily (Hall 1996; Billig 1995; Till 
2005; Forest, Johnson, and Till 2004). National identities are far from stable, 
homogenous characterizations, but are rather constantly subject to competing 
historical narratives, internal power politics, contradictions of performance, and 
cross-cutting allegiances (Hall 1996). However, while the nation is constantly in 
flux there is a concerted effort by contemporary liberal democratic states to 
naturalize identities and give them the appearance of universality. It is at this 
point that national identity, as defined by those in power, intersects with the 
status of citizenship to naturalize, essentialize, and enfranchise some individuals 
and groups while excluding, alienating, and marginalizing others. 
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Universal Citizenship and Particular Identities 
By the late nineteenth century the linkage between national identity and 
citizenship had become well established, as had the use of universal, inclusive 
terms to obscure the highly particular, exclusionary practices of citizenship 
(Laclau 1992; Young 1989; Yuval-Davis 1997). Universalist vocabularies of 
citizenship have always been central to liberal democratic citizenship (Lefebvre 
2003; Ipperciel 2007). Post-War sociopolitical developments in the West 
compelled marginalized and politically alienated groups to assert their right to 
“full citizenship status—that is, equal political and civil rights” with increasing 
frequency and fervor (Young 1989, 250). As discussed by Marshall (1964), these 
post-War conditions prompted the expansion of rights and their extension to 
previously marginalized groups such as women, working classes, and minorities. 
However, the achievement of full formal national citizenship status has not 
translated into freedom and equality for all individuals and groups, compelling 
scholars to interrogate and challenge the extent to which universal citizenship is 
actually universal. 
“The ideal of universal citizenship” has driven the “emancipatory 
momentum of modern political life” and assumes that the status of citizen not 
only entitles fundamental rights to the bearer, but also that the bearer will have 
equal access to the spaces of said rights (Young 1989, 250). Young’s 
classification of universal citizenship as an ideal rather than an objective reality 
stems from the fact that unfettered access to political, civil, and social rights and 
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the ability to interact meaningfully in a shared public sphere remains to be 
realized (S. J. Smith 1989).  
Universality of citizenship is a “core tenet of liberal citizenship theory” 
(Bosniak 2000, 377) that conceives citizenship in individualistic, rights-based 
terms (Schuck 2002). IM Young (1989, 250) has argued that the “universal” 
assumption in modern conceptions of citizenship is “citizenship for all.” If all 
members of a political community have the same citizenship then: 
 
“that citizenship status transcends particularity and difference. 
Whatever the social or group differences among citizens, whatever 
their inequalities of wealth, status, and power in the everyday 
activities of civil society, citizenship gives everyone the same status 
as peers in the political public.” 
 
This universal equality that comes with citizenship status is an “equality 
conceived as sameness”—an equality that is based on generality and 
commonality amongst citizens rather than particularity and difference. Moreover, 
such a universal citizenship implies that rights and duties within the political 
community, such as laws and rules, are “blind to individual and group difference” 
and as such are impartially applied to everyone (Young 1989, 250; Young 1990; 
Yuval-Davis 1997; Yegen 2008). 
Equality conceived as sameness is necessary to the modern Western 
political system because it works toward achieving a homogenous citizenry that 
has a unified general will for the polity (Yuval-Davis 1997; R. Smith 2002). Both 
liberal and republican conceptions of citizenship cast difference as a threat to 
freedom and stability in society (Calhoun 1997; Schuck 2002; R. Smith 2002), 
holding that “the particular can only corrupt the universal” (Laclau 1992, 84; 
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emphasis in original) or at least fragment it. In the modern nation-state 
‘homogenous citizenry’ is built upon the foundation of the national community 
(Yuval-Davis 1997; B. Anderson 2006; Yegen 2008), which exposes the 
inherently exclusionary nature of the ostensibly “universal” and equal national 
citizenship. Because national identity and citizenship are both built upon 
exclusionary practices, such that claims of universality and inclusiveness are in 
fact obscuring foundations of particularity and difference (Painter and Philo 1995; 
Jenkins 2000; Entrikin 1999; Laclau 1992; Lefebvre 2003). 
Theoretical debates regarding the universality of citizenship have informed 
and been informed by empirical studies exploring the alienation of certain 
individuals and groups in Western liberal capitalist societies (Wemyss 2006; 
Aasland and Flotten 2001; Isin 2002; Laclau 1992; Marston 1990; S. J. Smith 
1989; Young 1989; Young 1990; Yuval-Davis 1993; Secor 2007; Staeheli 2008). 
This literature raises significant points regarding the ways that the ideal of 
universality of citizenship subsumes social and cultural difference under the 
paradigm of equality and works to perpetuate the marginalization of Others 
through the politics of identity and belonging.  
Firstly, and as previously noted, this literature reveals the ways in which 
citizenship is a status and membership that is bestowed upon those with the 
accepted identity markers. Within political communities, the particular traits of the 
dominant group in society become naturalized and universal (Laclau 1992; 
Young 1989). These naturalized identities come to be taken for granted as 
“inherent” to members of the political community, making the bestowal of 
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citizenship status contingent upon performance of the particularities of a 
hegemonic group. The gendered, racialized, ethnicized, and religious 
considerations that construct the borders between insiders and outsiders, those 
who belong and who do not, are asserted as neutral, universal markers of a 
citizen’s identity (R. Smith 2002; Marston 1990). The result of such politics of 
identity is that the ideal of universal citizenship becomes a mechanism through 
which hegemonic ideologies are advanced (Young 1990) and those deemed “too 
different” or “unassimilable” are positioned outside of the boundaries of 
citizenship and, thus, unable to fully access the space of rights in a community. 
A second point raised by this literature is that the universal extension of 
formal citizenship rights in liberal democracies maintains the appearance and 
assumption that not only are those rights substantively distributed (Holston 2008, 
7), but also that all citizens are “in a position to avail themselves of these rights in 
a meaningful way” (Bosniak 2000, 378; emphasis mine). This assumption 
obscures the ways in which the politics of identity and belonging intercede to 
alienate certain individuals and groups based on ethnic, cultural, gender, 
religious, social, and/or class-based differences (Yuval-Davis 2006; Yegen 
2008).  
Lastly, several scholars note that nationalism becomes “the most 
frequently troubling instance of identity politics writ large” (Calhoun 1997, 80) 
because of its “historical alliance” with the “discourse of citizenship” (Yegen 
2008, 103). The identity politics of ethnonationalisms may seem more overtly 
exclusionary because of their bounding of the nation-state along ethnocultural 
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and heritable lines (Aasland and Flotten 2001; Hughes 2005), but civic 
nationalisms that are based on common adherence to political practices and 
ideas also serve to exclude individuals and groups from the community (Dagger 
2002; Ipperciel 2007; Lefebvre 2003). Nationalisms are actively constructed as 
the particular ideologies of dominant groups become universalized as the 
ideologies of the community, subsequently, the citizen.  
This literature has generated attention to the outcomes of identity politics 
in national communities. Such scholarship not only deconstructs hegemonic 
identity politics as they relate to national citizenship, but also reexamines the 
constant contestation and negotiation of identities and belongings that 
characterizes modern societies.  
For individuals and groups who hold formal citizenship but fall outside of 
the dominant group’s identity parameters, substantive citizenship often remains 
elusive. The inequality that survives within nation-states in spite of a universal 
extension of formal political citizenship is what Young describes as the “paradox 
of democracy” (1989, 259). In large part due to the naturalization and 
essentialization of the dominant group’s identity and its equation with the identity 
of the citizen, certain citizens are simply more powerful than others even when 
political rights are universal. This is an imbalance of social power where, as 
George Orwell’s pigs assert, “all animals are equal, but some animals are more 
equal than others” (Orwell 1997, 92). 
The result of persistent imbalances between citizens is what Holston 
(2008) describes as a “differentiated citizenship,” where differences, rather than 
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commonalities,  are emphasized through the dominant group’s appropriation of 
spaces of meaningful citizenship for only those individuals who possess the right 
identities. Holston’s extensive research in Brazil demonstrates that configurations 
of citizenship that are “universally inclusive in membership and massively 
inegalitarian in distribution” are particularly conducive to the reproduction of the 
inequalities of substantive power within nation-states (Holston 2008, 7). In nation-
states where the blend of civic nationalism and ethnonationalism is particularly 
fraught, social and ethnocultural differences are used to “distribute different 
treatment to different categories of citizens” (Holston 2008, 7) 
In such nation-states social differences, such as education and 
occupation, are affected and reproduced based on ethnocultural differences like 
language. The interplay of such social and ethnocultural differences can 
sometimes form a negative feedback loop that replicates majority/minority group 
identities, further complicating any attempt to rectify differences in access to the 
spaces of social, civil, and political rights (Kulu and Tammaru 2004; Secor 2007; 
Faas 2011). The resultant differentiated citizenship “generates a graduation of 
rights… in which most rights are available only to particular kinds of citizens” 
(Holston 2008, 7).  
An entirely different kind of paradox emerges, then, when minority 
individuals and groups with differentiated citizenships move to demand access to 
spaces of political, social, and civil rights (e.g. education, employment, or 
consistent application of law). Laclau argues that individuals and/or groups that 
cannot or will not fully integrate into the nation-state—i.e. groups that maintain 
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differentiated identity—can only make demands for truly equal access to rights by 
deemphasizing their differentiated identity and appealing to the “universal 
principles that [they] share with the rest of the community: the right to have 
access to good schools, to live a decent life, to participate in the public space of 
citizenship, etc.” (Laclau 1992, 89). 
The realities of such uneven power dynamics in the modern Western 
political system have prompted much discussion in academic literature on how 
best to deal with the obvious heterogeneity of nation-states and the unequal 
distribution of rights and duties that result. The implementation of multicultural 
policies and discourses has been one way of addressing these problems and 
resolving these tensions. However, as the next section will address, neither 
scholars nor policy makers have a unified conceptualization of what 
multiculturalism is or should be. 
 
Multiculturalism and its Critics 
The word “multiculturalism” is ubiquitous in contemporary Western 
societies and yet there is no absolute, agreed upon understanding of what it is. 
There are multicultural policies and practices in the political arena as well as 
theoretical and conceptual discussions in the academic arena. Definitions of what 
it means to be multicultural exist across the ideological spectrum but all notions 
of multiculturalism revolve around recognition of difference. Multiculturalism’s 
coexisting ubiquity and uncertainty, while seemingly contradictory and 
counterproductive, are realities that are essential to understanding how 
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multiculturalism has affected (and continues to affect) contemporary liberal 
democratic societies and why there are simultaneous proclamations of its 
success and failure.  
Nagel and Hopkins (2010) provide a cogent representation of 
multiculturalism that is conducive to understanding such a contested concept. 
Multiculturalism, they argue, is more than “a particular philosophy of governing 
diversity” but “represents the on-going disruption of ideas about nationhood and 
culture and the articulation and negotiation of cultural differences by state and 
non-state actors” (2010, 2). Operating from such an understanding allows for an 
easier negotiation of the chaotic collection of propositions for dealing with cultural 
diversity. 
Contemporary multiculturalist policies emerged out of post-war emphases 
on new and different approaches to cultural plurality and minority rights (Kymlicka 
1995). Nagel and Hopkins (2010) identify concomitant processes that “led to the 
reimagining of national communities” and the prompted a reassessment of how 
citizenship rights and responsibilities are made available to individuals and 
groups “marked as deviant and the other” (Young 1989, 268; Kymlicka 2007). 
One process was a collective recognition in the wake of the destructive 
nationalisms of the Second World War “that strident, militaristic ethnonationalism 
could no longer have a place in a free, democratic West.” A second process was 
the “emergence of civil rights and feminist movements” that “destabilized and 
undermined deeply entrenched systems of discrimination in Western states” 
(Nagel and Hopkins 2010, 3). These processes affected public policy and 
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confronted uneven citizenship distribution not only amongst groups distinguished 
by racial or ethnic difference, such as indigenous peoples, immigrant 
populations, and national minorities (Carens 2000; Kymlicka 2007), but also 
groups distinguished by religious, gender, and sexual differences (Yuval-Davis 
2006; Nagel and Hopkins 2010; Marty 2007). 
The increase in discussions of multiculturalism, its existence, success, 
and failure within the past two decades specifically has been attributed to 
“volatile disputes over the rights of… cultural minorities” in the West (Kymlicka 
1995, 1; Wemyss 2006) and the eruption of ethnonationalist conflicts in the wake 
of the collapse of the USSR (Feakins and Białasiewicz 2006; Heater 1999; 
Pavlenko 2008; Laclau 1992; Hughes 2005; Kuus 2002). Underlying the debates 
over multicultural policies and practices in Western societies is the tension 
between the democratic principles of individual liberty and the wellbeing of 
collective society. Although some scholars argue that these two principles need 
not be seen as antagonistic toward each other (Benhabib 2002; Kymlicka 1995; 
Carens 2000), the varying opinions on whether recognition of group difference is 
the solution to the challenges posed by cultural plurality (Young 1989) or is the 
death knell of a free society (Balint 2010) continue to permeate the 
multiculturalism debate.  
The following sections address the different forms of and attitudes toward 
multiculturalist discourses and policies and how those forms and attitudes 
manifest themselves in liberal democratic societies. The broader point being 
made is that while the word “multiculturalism” may have been discredited in 
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discourse and policy, its underlying concepts are not dead. Rather, 
multiculturalism endures as an innocuous means of talking about cultural 
difference. Multiculturalism may not be effective at integrating minorities, but its 
discourse remains present under different vocabularies of addressing diversity 
and difference. 
Liberal multiculturalist theories that focus on recognizing group difference 
and embracing cultural heterogeneity argue that universalistic configurations of 
citizenship require assimilation of minority individuals and groups into political 
communities shaped by “hegemonic, majoritarian” identities (Yuval-Davis 2006, 
207; Carens 2000; Marty 2007). Multicultural theory and practice, in contrast, is 
“designed to give recognition to, and to affirm, cultural diversity” by creating an 
environment where performance of cultural difference in the public sphere would 
not jeopardize access to the full spectrum of citizenship rights and responsibilities 
(Nagel and Hopkins 2010, 4). 
The scholarship favoring liberal multiculturalism asserts that suppression 
of group difference in favor of emphasizing the commonalities of the citizenry will 
severely restrict the ability of minority groups to meaningfully access rights and to 
participate fully in society (Kymlicka 1995; Young 1989). Multicultural advocates 
assert that protecting cultural difference is not an act that will threaten individual 
liberty by giving recognition to groups, but rather is a protection of the right of all 
individuals to have their own their own beliefs, ideas, identities and cultures 
(Kymlicka 2007; Yuval-Davis 2006). Also, the positive recognition of difference is 
consistent with the liberal citizen’s responsibility to respect the equality of their 
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fellow citizens (Modood 2007). Different citizens have different needs, and 
measuring all individuals and groups against “neutral” behavioral and 
performative citizenship norms, which are nothing more than the norms of the 
privileged hegemon made natural, perpetuates discrimination and division 
amongst the citizenry (Laclau 1992; Young 1989). 
These perspectives on liberal multiculturalism maintain the importance of 
positive recognition of group difference for substantive, meaningful citizenship in 
contemporary societies. While liberal multiculturalism’s critics cite the continued 
conflict and inequality amongst dominant and minority groups and threats to 
social cohesion and national security as the “failure” of liberal multicultural 
policies, its advocates maintain that such charges are “greatly exaggerated” 
(Carens 2000, 88) and note the continued existence and prosperity of nation-
states that have implemented such policies (Kymlicka 2007). Additionally, despite 
the pronouncement of multiculturalism’s vast failures in Western societies, it “still 
has a great deal of currency in everyday language” (Nagel and Hopkins 2010, 2). 
But whether the actual configurations and implementations of liberal 
multiculturalist policies affect meaningful and substantive citizenships for minority 
groups is hotly contested.  
Critiques of multiculturalism have had great currency both in scholarly and 
policy-related circles (Nagel and Hopkins 2010; Gill, Johnstone, and Williams 
2012). Criticism of liberal multiculturalism has been vociferous and has come 
from both ends of the ideological spectrum. Moreover, the proliferation of 
counterarguments to liberal multicultural policy and theory has ensured that, 
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even though it is being challenged, the issue of multiculturalism is still pervasive 
in contemporary, everyday life. 
One critique of liberal multiculturalism centers on a “social fragmentation” 
or “Balkanization” argument. This line of thought posits that respect for and 
recognition of group difference is a direct threat to the unity of the national polity 
(Schlesinger 1998; Miller 1995; Phillips 2009). Furthermore, intense focus on 
group specificity that bleeds into the arena of differentiated needs amongst the 
citizenry will undermine the “common good”—a core tenet of liberal theory at the 
base of all liberal democratic societies and the critical parts of republican thought. 
A stable democracy is dependent upon a certain solidarity or universal character 
to define, uphold, and protect the rights of citizens. The distillation of a 
democratic society into separate cultural groups “crystallizes differences, 
magnifies tensions, [and] intensifies hostilities” thereby threatening the freedom 
of the citizenry (Schlesinger 1991, 2; Doppelt 2001; Phillips 2009; Zechenter 
1997).  
Still other critics argue that the inchoate character of liberal multiculturalist 
policy has allowed for its relatively uncontested “shunting aside” in favor of 
neoliberal, market-based conceptions of citizenship in many Western nations (K. 
Mitchell 2006b; Carens 2000). These arguments typically come from a more 
leftist perspective that recognizes the importance of groups but view 
multiculturalism as hopelessly naive. These critics suggest that the inarticulate 
yet routine nature of liberal multiculturalist principles has effected nonsensical, 
mindless, and meaningless celebrations of cultural difference “while doing little to 
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address deeply entrenched racism” (Nagel and Hopkins 2010, 5). Thomas (2008; 
see also: El-Haj 2007) argues that this is particularly evident in schools, spaces 
that are integral to the development of citizens who value diversity and respect 
difference. “Uncontextualized and unexplained” discourses of multiculturalism 
circulate in school curricula fostering a mere “banal or rote celebration of 
difference” rather than an actual achievement of diversity (2008, 2964). Benhabib 
(2002, 129) cautions that if multicultural discourse becomes rote then what may 
result is: 
 
“a kind of multicultural cold war: there may be peace but no 
reconciliation; there may be bargaining but no mutual 
understanding; and there may be stalemates and standoffs, 
dictated less by disrespect for the positions of others than by the 
fear of others.” 
 
The variety of approaches, interpretations, configurations, and criticisms of 
multiculturalism have ensured that it is a ubiquitous presence in Western 
societies. Regardless of those who proclaim that multiculturalism is alive, well, 
and effective (Kymlicka 2007) and those who have claimed to observe its 
“strange death” (Hesse 2000, 10), multiculturalism is present in the in cities, 
schools, and civic organizations. The “ways in which social groups encounter, 
experience, recognize, and make sense of cultural difference” on a daily basis 
demonstrate that, outside of policy and scholarship forums, multiculturalism 
exists in “everyday, lived” realities (Nagel and Hopkins 2010, 2). However, 
multiculturalism’s continued presence in Western societies does not imply that 
the contestations over its meanings and proper practices have been resolved. 
Such ambiguity has affected many practices that use the legitimacy of 
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multicultural keywords such as “tolerance” to mask uncritical pseudo-
engagements with group difference.  
 
Tolerance as Multiculturalism 
Multiculturalism’s reluctance to coalesce around one meaning has meant 
that debates regarding its validity remain present in discussions of both theory 
and policy. As debates on validity have continued a kind of “soft multiculturalism” 
that revolves around ideas of tolerance has become ubiquitous. This trend 
reflects a widespread acceptance of actual cultural differences and a need for 
everyone to tolerate—i.e. accept and permit—those differences. In the absence 
of a consensus on how to meaningfully integrate different groups within societies 
with each other, the basic consent to the presence of such differences has 
become the most common way of dealing with cultural diversity. Tolerance, then, 
can be seen as a soft form of multiculturalism that attempts to “deal with cultural 
difference” (Nagel and Hopkins 2010, 2), however ineffective it may be at 
producing meaningful integration of different groups. 
Tolerance, like multiculturalism, does not have a unified, agreed-upon 
meaning with regards to the way that it is put into practice (especially in the 
political space), but has come to be couched in the realm of public practice as 
the desired telos of the culturally diverse liberal democratic nation-state (Gill, 
Johnstone, and Williams 2012; Balint 2010). The discourse of tolerance is 
ubiquitous at every geographic scale, ranging from the supranational (e.g. the 
EU) to the local (e.g. educational spaces), as the “appropriate solution” for 
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contending with sociocultural difference while respecting the liberal principles of 
freedom and equality (W. Brown 2008).  
Tolerance is, at its heart, is a normative principle that “organizes the 
‘conduct of conduct’” (W. Brown 2008, 4; Dobbernack and Modood 2011). It is a 
principle shot through with judgment of what is right or wrong, good or bad. 
Although the greater complexities of tolerance are debated, most scholars agree 
that tolerance (and tolerating behaviors) involve three paradoxical elements. The 
first element is that both objection and acceptance are necessary for tolerance to 
exist (Forst 2003; Gill, Johnstone, and Williams 2012; Dobbernack and Modood 
2011; W. Brown 2008). Tolerant behavior exists when a person, practice, belief, 
or identity is deemed objectionable but is allowed to be present in spite of the 
objectionable behaviors.  
The second paradoxical element of tolerance arises from the first. In the 
name of being “tolerant” towards someone/something that is distasteful, the 
person doing the tolerating is simply withholding their power to eradicate it—i.e. 
tolerating “even if she or he has the power not to tolerate” (Dobbernack and 
Modood 2011, 10). Therefore, the act of tolerating constructs and assumes a 
power hierarchy in which the person doing the tolerating is “anointed with virtue” 
because they are “standing for a principled act of permitting one’s own principles 
to be affronted,” while the subject of the tolerance is marked as distasteful, 
objectionable, even deviant, and therefore occupies a subordinate position. 
The last paradoxical element of tolerance is that while it parades as an act 
of acceptance, it is actually a bordering practice built on the politics of belonging 
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(Dobbernack and Modood 2011, 25). The label of “tolerable” on a practice or 
belief implies that there are practices and beliefs that are “intolerable.” Thus, 
persons, practices, and beliefs are saddled with identities that include or exclude 
them from the space of tolerance. Significantly, this “bordering practice” also 
establishes who is tolerant and who is intolerant. Thus, tolerant people are 
constructed as bastions of Western liberal antiprejudice and those who are 
intolerant are marked as barbarians who, by virtue of their intolerance, are 
intolerable (W. Brown 2008, 6). These three elements that underpin tolerance 
have informed the critical engagement with it as a path toward peace, 
acceptance, and substantive equality. The continued presence of minority 
groups’ inequalities within Western societies have laid bare that tolerance has, at 
times, “overtly blocked the pursuit of substantive equality” instead creating an 
environment of mutual respect between dominant and majority groups (W. Brown 
2008, 9).  
Rainer Forst (2003) contends that while there are types of tolerance that 
reify power structures and perpetuate inegalitarian citizenship, an “esteemed” 
conception of tolerance (2003, 75) that “is driven by a desire to be inclusive, 
emancipatory, and equality-driven” (Gill, Johnstone, and Williams 2012, 515) is 
the component of a democratic society essential to promoting mutual respect and 
substantive equality amongst the citizenry. Forst’s prescription for achieving 
“esteem” tolerance is inadequately articulated, however, in that he assumes that 
“the most important rights and resources” are the same for all individuals and 
groups (Forst 2003, 76). Dobbernack and Modood (2011, 9–10) assert that the 
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establishment of what rights and resources should be protected is a contested 
process, and one that problematizes liberal conceptions of tolerance: 
 
“The liberal difficulty here is to establish the exact definition of 
which interests are important—and should be protected by rights—
and what constitutes harm and therefore a violation of those rights. 
From the very beginning, this points to some ambiguity in liberal 
toleration and to its context-dependence.”  
 
This point underscores that the modalities of tolerance operating in 
Western society are in constant contention with the politics of identity and 
belonging. In some modalities of tolerance, individuals or groups vie for the 
recognition that their differentiated identity is within the bounds of tolerance. 
Other modalities of tolerance strive to promote social cohesion and political unity 
by marking certain identities as threatening to the polity and therefore not worthy 
of being tolerated.  
Wendy Brown (2008) maintains that this process of establishing the rules 
about what gets tolerated and by whom is a cleverly disguised way of ensuring 
that liberalism, which is itself a culture, retains its socio-political and cultural 
hegemony (2008, 23–4). Tolerance, as practiced in liberal nation-states, has 
established itself as a “universal value and impartial practice” (2008, 7) when in 
fact is it establishing the interests of liberal society as most important. Subjects of 
tolerance are marked as “inferior, deviant, or marginal vis-à-vis those practicing 
the tolerance,” and the liberal democratic state allows for those in need of 
toleration to be present in society in spite of their difference. When this allowance 
is projected as an equalizing act, any other existing inequality becomes 
something “innate” or “natural” that exists in spite of tolerant attitudes. Brown 
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calls this depoliticization (W. Brown 2008, 15), a process which “involves 
constructing inequality as either personal or natural in origin, or otherwise 
natural, religious, or cultural and therefore profoundly antithetical to claims for 
equality” (Gill, Johnstone, and Williams 2012, 514). Brown’s conception of 
tolerance as a process of regulating aversion within the parameters of liberalism 
illuminates its inefficacy as an instrument for promoting substantive citizenship in 
diverse societies. The “mainstream” understanding of tolerance in the West has 
served to confirm the universalization of particular identities and cement power 
hierarchies instead of “removing social stigma” and providing “for equal 
accommodation in the public sphere” (Dobbernack and Modood 2011, 8).  
The ideals of multiculturalism, tolerance, and diversity remain embedded 
in the political discourses of Western societies even as new modes of citizenship 
are coming into being. While many of these discourses have been (and continue 
to be) deployed and contended with at the national level, multiculturalism and 
tolerance are also embedded in the discourses of the more recent configurations 
post-national citizenships. Post-national citizenships, which are decentralized 
from the nation-state, are centered heavily upon human rights discourses, the 
acceptance of cultural diversity, and the toleration of difference. The conditions of 
these “post-national citizenships” entail rights that are derived from membership 
in international and supranational citizenships and are often engaged with 
separately from multicultural citizenship in the literature. But post-national 
citizenships, such as cosmopolitan and European citizenship, reflect discourses 
of tolerance and acceptance of diversity, suggesting post-national citizenships 
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interface with multicultural discourses just as national citizenships do. The 
following section considers post-national citizenships in greater detail in order to 
uncover the ways in which post-national and multicultural citizenship discourses 
interact with each other. 
 
Post-national Citizenships 
Since the 1980’s significant changes in the world system stemming from 
the many forms of globalization have generated conceptualizations and 
observations of citizenships that are multivalent, and dynamic (Sassen 2002; 
Calhoun 2002; Desforges, Jones, and Woods 2005). Citizenships that supersede 
the national scale have been termed “post-national” (Soysal 1997). The literature 
on post-national citizenships notes that advancements in communication and 
transportation technologies and the proliferation of migratory movements, free 
market capitalism, liberal democratic ideals around the globe have fundamentally 
altered the boundaries societal associations (Soysal 1997; K. Mitchell 2007; 
Kofman 2003; R. Smith 2002; Paasi 2002). The parameters of post-national 
citizenships have reconfigured the rights and forms of political participation 
associated traditionally associated with citizenship. Post-national citizens may be 
defined by multiple dimensions such as identities (e.g. transnational 
communities), political participation (e.g. environmental activism), rights (e.g. the 
right to identity), and norms (e.g. international human rights regimes). Changing 
ideologies, apparatuses, and capacities of nation-states have “engendered or 
strengthened alternative notions of community membership,” many of which have 
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emerged from an unwillingness to “automatically identify with a nation as 
represented by the state” (Sassen 2002, 277). These changes to ideas and 
practices of belonging, identity, and rights have problematized the traditional 
conceptualization of citizenship as a national phenomenon and have shifted the 
boundaries of “the political vis-à-vis citizenship” (Soysal 1997, 510).  
Cosmopolitan ideology has undergirded the emergence of the post-
national, global citizen that is part of “the worldwide community of human 
beings.” Cosmopolitanism is composed of “global identities, attachments, and 
commitments” (Banks 2008, 134) and is linked to “political practices associated 
with globalization and the possibilities of a new global democratic order” (K. 
Mitchell 2007, 706). Cosmopolitanism, therefore, is a key component of post-
national citizenship that eschews the primacy of national community membership 
in favor of membership in the worldwide community of human beings (Calhoun 
2002; Soysal 1997; Banks 2008). 
The “entrenchment of international human rights regimes and the spread 
of cosmopolitan norms” (Benhabib 2007, 19) have perhaps posed the most 
significant challenge to the absolute primacy of the nation-state as the guarantor 
of citizenship rights and duties. According to Soysal (1997, 511), the notion that 
that all humans are entitled to rights regardless of formal citizenship status within 
a nation-state and can claim access to those rights have brought about systemic 
challenges to conventional conceptualizations of the public sphere: 
 
“What this challenge entails is that public spheres are realized intra- 
or transnationally; solidarities are shaped beyond national 
boundaries; and the referent is no longer exclusively the national 
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citizen, but increasingly an abstract individual entitled to claim the 
collective and bring it back to the public sphere as her ‘natural’ 
right.”  
 
These developments have embroidered the traditional configuration of 
citizenship with multi-scalar components that are “shaped by conditions, 
processes, and institutions at the local, national, and international scales” 
(Staeheli 2003, 99). In addition to the “recasting” of national rights as human 
rights, some forms of citizenship are multilayered institution and only partially 
political (Painter and Philo 1995). It is not clear whether social, cultural, 
economic, and civil attributes are working together to actually change the fabric 
of citizenship or simply to shift understandings of citizenship, but such attributes 
are being mobilized in contemporary society and “may be used as resources in 
political struggles” that take place at different places and moments in time 
(Staeheli 2003, 99; Staeheli 2008; Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003; Soysal 1997).  
These recastings relating to scale and rights have effected new 
vocabularies surrounding citizenship. Discourses of cosmopolitan citizenship are 
commonly circulated “in reference to the promise of global democracy based on 
liberal conceptions of human rights, tolerance, and universal standards of dignity 
and justice” (K. Mitchell 2007, 706). Cosmopolitanism, while not a new concept 
by any means, has in its contemporary usage contributed to the linking of 
democratic ideals to scales beyond the nation-state by naturalizing the 
universality of human rights and legitimizing beyond-national public spheres for 
claiming those rights.  
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The spread of cosmopolitan norms and the naturalization of international 
human rights regimes are evident in real-world practice and not solely in 
theoretical conceptualizations. Such norms and understandings of universal 
rights are enshrined in and protected by many international documents, such as 
the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European 
Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms2, the Inter-American 
System for the Protection of Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (Benhabib 2007, 19–20). Such human rights regimes assign 
“fundamental rights” to individuals who are not formal citizens of the national 
polity in which they reside. This contributes to a condition in which residents 
claim some semblance of membership in the political community without full legal 
status or participation in the polity’s public sphere. Furthermore, the extension of 
such universal rights may be used for those with formal but without substantive 
citizenship to claim access to the space of meaningful rights within their polity. 
The articulations of post-national citizenships also complicate the 
relationship between identity and citizenship. Whereas the formulation of the 
identity of a citizen and the negotiation of cultural difference has most commonly 
taken place at the national level, post-war reconfigurations of citizenship rights 
transformed identity into a fundamental human right. Alternative notions of 
collective identities and solidarities that cross borders and transcend the nation-
state are “natural attributes and rights” that “are exercised in individual and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is 
distinguished by the inclusion of non-EU nation-states as signatories.	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collective actors’ narratives and strategies” for participation in the multiple 
manifestations of the public sphere (Soysal 1997, 513). The “identity as a right” 
phenomenon undergirds the multiplication of identities and legitimizes 
particularities relating to ethnonationalisms, religious identities, and various other 
expressions of the self within the space of the nation. These trends demonstrate 
that post-national citizenship processes and practices are intersecting with 
discourses of multiculturalism and tolerance in multiple ways and at multiple 
scales.  
Furthermore, the universal right to identity provides the opportunity for 
myriad identities to validly attach to post-national citizenship. The importance of 
collective identities to the experience and performance of post-national 
citizenships demonstrates that the tension between universality and particularism 
exists beyond national scale discussions of multiculturalism and identity. Indeed, 
post-national citizenship seems to both produce these tensions and allow them to 
proliferate. The widening and reassertion of the boundaries of citizenship to the 
universal/cosmopolitan scale complicates and multiplies identities, which are at 
their very core based on particularities. Post-national citizenship regimes, such 
as the European Union, often celebrate multiple identities within their 
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European Citizenship 
The pervasiveness of the international human rights discourse has been 
crucial to the development of European Union citizenship, the most formalized of 
post-national citizenships (Sassen 2002, 277–8). More accurately termed 
“supranational” than cosmopolitan or international, EU citizenship is one result of 
the post-war politico-economic integration of Europe. The rights and duties 
guaranteed by Europe’s supranational citizenship are clear demonstrations that 
citizenship is no longer inexorably tied to the nation-state. But while the creation 
of such post-national rights at the supranational scale changes the nature of 
identities and claims to rights and membership, it does not fundamentally alter 
the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion intrinsic to the institutionalization of 
citizenship. My argumentation in this section is based on the premise that 
although modes of post-national citizenship present many new possibilities for 
claiming rights and asserting belonging, they ultimately work to reinforce (and 
sometimes multiply) the tensions between universalisms and particularisms.  
The implications of European citizenship are manifold, but three are 
particularly salient. First, its relationship vis-à-vis national citizenship is that the 
EU’s sovereignty over supranational citizenship rights is constructed from a the 
voluntary reduction of its member states to national sovereignty over rights 
claims (Benhabib 2002). The rights afforded to European citizens are heavily 
influenced by international human rights discourses, such as the right to 
particular identities. The various EU institutions provide public forums within 
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which to make claims on the fundamental rights accorded to European citizens, 
allowing such practices to be performed above the national scale.  
But the second implication demonstrates that European citizenship serves 
to link the particularisms that exist on the national level to the supranational level. 
European citizenship status is contingent upon national citizenship in a member-
state. This contingency is significant because it demonstrates that the multi-
scalar natures of post-national citizenships do not erase the importance of the 
national scale or eradicate the need for national citizenships, but instead interact 
complexly with national citizenships (Delanty 2006; Desforges, Jones, and 
Woods 2005; D. Kaplan and Häkli 2002; Painter 2006; Shaery-Eisenlohr 2011; 
Paasi 2001). Therefore while the EU passport makes the portfolio of citizenship 
rights, experiences, and practices more robust, the nation-state “remains by far 
the most important site” of citizenship (Sassen 2002, 278). As Reed-Danahay 
(2007, 198–9) argues, the EU’s on-going endeavors “to get its inhabitants to see 
themselves as European citizens…is not intended to supplant national identities; 
rather it is intended to supplement them with an additional frame of reference.”  
The third significant implication of European citizenship is that like all 
citizenships it functions as an identity that relies on alterity to constitute itself (Isin 
2002). The European citizenship certainly is a unique institution that sets itself 
apart as a formalized status of a supranational polity which “alters the topography 
of participation and facilitates new projects of citizenship” within its borders 
(Soysal 1997, 514). A substantial softening of Europe’s internal borders has 
accompanied the deployment of universalisms regarding supranational rights 
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afforded to European citizens. However, there is a concomitant hardening of its 
external border that is an equally important component of creating the identity of 
the European citizen (Delanty 2006). EU geopolitical discourses invoke 
“European values” as the identity markers of European member states and their 
citizens and unquestioningly “demarcate the EU inside from its outside” 
(Browning and Christou 2010, 112; Boedeltje and van Houtum 2011). These 
concurrent border-softening and -hardening processes further illustrate that while 
the possibilities for new rights and opportunities are manifold, European 
citizenship is ultimately characterized by a tension between the universal identity 
that encompasses a European citizenry and the particularisms that exclude non-
European Others from the space of belonging (Reed-Danahay 2007).  
But as a post-national citizenship whose rights are based on international 
human rights norms, European citizenship not only multiplies identities by 
distinguishing Europeans from non-Europeans, but also multiplies identities 
within its own borders. The European Union’s recognition of identity as a 
fundamental right has “authorized” both ethnonationalisms and minority group 
identity projects to proliferate within its borders (Deets 2006; Soysal 1997; 
Feakins and Białasiewicz 2006; Dobbernack and Modood 2011). The 
introduction of a supranational citizenship, and thus a supranational forum within 
which to mobilize rights claims, has wrought intense struggle between the EU 
and (particularly post-Soviet) member states regarding the treatment of 
minorities, multiculturalism and tolerance within national and supranational 
boundaries, and the right of formerly oppressed titular majorities to protect their 
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own cultures (Johns 2003; Kolossov 2003; Feakins and Białasiewicz 2006; Deets 
2006). These situations are acute examples of how post-national citizenship 
articulations complicate the relationship between identity and citizenship. In many 
European countries, both titular majorities and minorities are drawing upon the 
post-nationalist concept of identity as a universal human right—a concept 
codified in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union—to assert 
the legitimacy of particularisms at national levels. Identities, community 
memberships, and entitlements to rights converge and diverge in ways that are 
made difficult by post-national configurations of citizenship. 
Such struggles over identities and rights in the European Union have 
furthermore created complex negotiations of identity and membership in the 
everyday, lived reality of European citizens. Citizens of national majority and 
minority groups have agency within the political limits of both their nation-states 
and the European Union, but their majority or minority group affiliation will create 
differing understandings of how and when national and supranational citizenships 
are negotiated, invoked, and performed. As such, understandings of citizenships 
in Europe are multiple, fluid and, because they are multi-scalar, somewhat 
fragmented (Reed-Danahay 2007; Benhabib 2002; Sassen 2002; Delanty 1997). 
With respect to minority exclusion and marginalization, however, the universality 
of European citizenship (and its protections of identity rights) does not erase the 
dynamics of inclusion and exclusion on the national level, but rather complicates 
them. Therefore it can be said that while majority/minority politics have long 
existed, they have been greatly complicated by the introduction of post-national 
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discourses and modes of citizenship. The EU’s supranational space allows 
national majority and minority groups to partially locate the politics of belonging 
and identity outside the confines of the national-state by deputizing the universal 
rights of “Europeans” into arguments for performances of particular collective 
identities (Laclau 1992; Soysal 1997), making the discussions on the value of 
diversity and the limits of tolerance much more intricate and involved. 
European citizenship is illustrative of the increased opportunities and 
entrenched tensions that characterize post-national citizenships on a broader 
level. Although post-national citizenships are construed in universal terms, the 
ways that they complicate the interaction between identity and citizenship reveal 
that post-national citizenships are shot-through with particularisms that 
perpetuate processes of inclusion and exclusion. Moreover, post-national 
citizenships interact complexly with national citizenships and therefore 
demonstrate that a thorough consideration of citizenships on multiple scales 
should not treat them as discrete entities, but rather processes that take place at 
various scales at various times. The following sections will shift this discussion 
from post-national and national conceptions of citizenship to the role of the local 
scale in understanding the interface between state agents and actual citizens. 
The school is one of the most crucial spaces at the local scale in which nation-
state and supranational citizenship practices and discourses are deployed. 
Giving particular attention to the educational realm illuminates the processes of 
production and reproduction of citizenship at multiple scales.  
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Creating the Citizen: Schools and the Formation of Youth Citizenships 
Schools have long been recognized as important socializing agents whose 
purpose is to prepare young people for life as members of the nation-state and 
inculcating multicultural values (S. L. Holloway and Valentine 2000; Wylie 2004; 
Heater 1999; Calhoun 1997). More recently the literature has noted the 
importance of the school in also the fostering of post-national citizenships, such 
as the European and the cosmopolitan (K. Mitchell 2006b; Banks 2008; E. Doyle 
Stevick 2007). Education frameworks and curricula are influential vehicles for 
shaping young people’s perceptions of the world in their developmental years. 
This influence materializes later in life, as adult attitudes (including those about 
cultural identity and solidarity) are directly linked to attitudes formed early in life 
(S. L. Holloway and Valentine 2000; Leonard 2010; Wylie 2004).   
Previous sections in this chapter discussed the important link between 
identity formation and conceptions of citizenship. Education curricula and schools 
sites work not only to develop understandings of citizenships, but also the 
identities that mark citizenships. Thus, schools should be seen as sites where 
young people confront multiple citizenship ideals and norms, engage with 
national and supranational ideologies, and learn how to be citizens (S. L. 
Holloway and Valentine 2000).  
 
Instructing the National Citizen 
State actors use the space of the school to foster particular 
conceptualizations of nationalism. Consequently, when nation-state citizenship 
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regimes are exclusionary educational will frequently diffuse ethnocultural identity 
markers and schools will become key spaces of nationalist political ideologies 
and control (Hromadzić 2008; Kolossov 2003). Nation-building projects become 
embedded in school and educational policy in different ways. Arguably the most 
easily recognizable forms of nationalism in the classroom are curricula and 
textbooks that privilege ethnoculturally specific versions of various courses. 
Teaching methods will also naturalize and essentialize the connection of the 
dominant ethnic group to the territory when the group’s particular ethnocultural 
markers are emphasized.  
Subjects outside of the formal civics  can have just as much (if not more) 
influence on students’ attitudes and conceptions of citizenship than the  of the 
formal civics courses. For instance, several studies note the important political 
socialization abilities of a variety of courses, including but not limited to history, 
language, and geography courses (Faas 2011; Galston 2001; Ahonen 2001). 
Historical myths, language, religion, and folk customs taught in schools serve to 
“supplement biological evidence of kinship, and are deployed to circumscribe 
who does and does not belong to the national ‘family’” (Michaels and Stevick 
2009, 228). Narratives of the past particularly play a crucial role in demarcating 
spaces of belonging in the nation, and subsequently the polity (Staeheli and 
Hammett 2013; Ahonen 2001). 
Nationalist ideologies and socio-cultural attitudes can also be performed 
implicitly in the classroom, even in the presence of explicit democratic civic 
education . “Informal curriculum” disseminated in learning spaces through 
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teacher attitudes and practices, as well as classroom climate, are just as 
important and communicative to students as formal curriculum and school policy 
(S. L. Holloway and Valentine 2000; Hahn 1998; Wylie 2004). Implicit agreement 
with nationalist ideologies may manifest in “diluted recognition” of programs 
intended to promote inclusive, democratic, and open ideals of civic education (E. 
Doyle Stevick 2007). Just as significant can be teacher avoidance of critical and 
open discussion on nationalistic attitudes and practices.  
Ethnonationalist policies coexist with more democratic notions of civic 
education in the classroom, even in divided societies. In EU member states, 
tension between universalist and particularist notions of civic education Union 
member states arises from the presence of both state discourses promoting 
national solidarities and EU multicultural discourses promoting a “unity in 
diversity.” Thus, young people in Europe in particular are on the receiving end of 
multiple civic education discourses that play roles in the creation, performance, 
and experience of the multi-scalar citizenships that they claim.  
 
Instructing the Cosmopolitan/Multicultural Citizen 
Multicultural and cosmopolitan discourses have had a salient position in 
European schools. As cultural diversity within nation-states spurs discussion and 
debate on how liberal democracies define their societies and their citizenry, the 
school has become a site where multiple and conflicting discourses of 
multiculturalism and national citizenship exist simultaneously (Banks 2008; Faas 
2011). Furthermore, the supranational space of the European Union adds 
	   67 
another layer of citizenship education to the already crowded space of national 
education, as these multi-scalar formations interact with recognition of cultural 
diversity. Thus, the challenges of building a society whose citizens are both 
connected by shared values, ideas, national identity and who respect the cultural 
diversity within the citizenry are translated to educational  in schools (Michaels 
and Stevick 2009). 
Discourses of multicultural and cosmopolitan youth citizenship have 
currency within national education systems because, despite the criticisms 
discussed earlier in this chapter, such discourses “remain important ideals” in 
Western liberal democracies (Thomas 2008, 2864). The forces of globalization, 
including transnational migration, are highly salient influences on citizenship 
education as nation-states are forced to contend with differentiated identities and 
loyalties that operate on multiple scales (El-Haj 2007; Faas 2011). That being 
said, nationalist discourses are still highly influential within citizenship education, 
and as such discourses of national unity and (oftentimes poorly articulated) 
discourses of multiculturalism interact unevenly and complexly within the space 
of the school (Michaels and Stevick 2009; Thomas 2008; K. Mitchell 2006b). 
Citizenship education in the European Union is a clear instance of the 
project to make young people into multicultural citizens who are capable of 
interacting across cultures within their own nation-state, within Europe, and within 
the global community. Much of the universalist rhetoric of liberal citizenship is 
deployed in order to foster common identities between young people at the 
supranational level (as European citizens) and the cosmopolitan level (as citizens 
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of the world). Although European Union member states retain almost exclusive 
control over national education  (Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union 2009, Article 6), Brussels’ focus on citizenship education in its member 
states is considerable. Many empirical studies of civic education in European 
countries note the persistent conflict between member states’ prioritization of the 
“development of national consciousness and citizenship” and the European 
stress on fostering inclusive, multicultural citizenship (Faas 2011, 481; Wylie 
2004). However despite such tensions within educational spaces, incentives for 
funding extended to member states by the EU “provide European proposals with 
substantial clout” and many opportunities to enter into classrooms (Michaels and 
Stevick 2009, 226).  
The proliferation of European rhetoric in member states’ civic education 
has been paralleled in interdisciplinary scholarly literature by discussions 
regarding whether European youth citizenship discourses are (in)effective at 
enabling young people to enact substantive multicultural citizenships. For 
example, scholars note that notions of inclusion and exclusion actually undergird 
the European identity project (Reed-Danahay 2007; Faas 2011). The project to 
create a pan-European identity involves concerted efforts to “instill a sense of 
belonging and identity connected to Europe as a social unit” and identify as EU 
citizens. But while the EU casts itself as a multicultural unit that is “united in 
diversity” it universalizes its particular values and ideologies while simultaneously 
Othering individuals, groups, and nation-states that do not espouse liberal 
democratic norms in the ‘correct’ way (Reed-Danahay 2007; Johns 2003; Jeffrey 
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2008). Moreover, EU civic education curricula and materials emphasize 
commonalities between its member states to solidify Europeanness while “any 
fundamental cultural or political differences either within or between countries” 
are minimized (Reed-Danahay 2007, 203). These contradictions, rather than 
fostering substantive attitudes of cultural acceptance amongst young Europeans, 
reify “stereotypical notions” of what it means to be European, effectively blocking 
out other religions and cultures (Reed-Danahay 2007, 213). 
Michaels and Stevick (2009) and Ahonen (2001) address how the 
dialogue between nationalist and European citizenship education can work to 
reify inter-cultural boundaries and cause conflicting understandings of a Europe 
that is “united in diversity” to be presented in schools. EU member states 
(particularly in Central and Eastern Europe) that have histories of state socialism 
promote nationalist rhetoric in their civic education curricula as part of a wider 
societal project of “correcting” the illegitimate histories and identities promulgated 
by their former socialist rulers. Such ideas are also meant to emphasize these 
nation-states’ inherent “Europeanness” and are framed in terms of a “return to 
Europe” after decades of interference from political interlopers. The EU, however, 
operates under vastly different Western European conceptualizations of being 
European that are rooted in the liberal-democratic ideals of inclusiveness, 
acceptance of cultural diversity, and universal democratic rights. As such, while 
in school young people are subject to and made to negotiate competing notions 
of what it means to be European (Michaels and Stevick 2009; Faas 2011). The 
result within classrooms is citizenship education that focuses on superficial 
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celebrations of cultural difference and focuses on issues that are easy to talk 
about, such as rights and privileges of European citizenship, rather than 
programs that address entrenched inequalities and substantive pluralism 
(Thomas 2008; Hahn 1998). 
A slightly different yet no less relevant observation about current 
citizenship education in Europe its “implicit association” of the “successful” 
European citizen with the cosmopolitan citizen who is able to compete for 
employment in the global economic system (K. Mitchell 2007, 397; Reed-
Danahay 2007; Johnston Conover and Searing 2000). Katharyne Mitchell 
(2006b) coherently articulates this argument by examining the marked, albeit 
uneven, shifts in EU policies, particularly those of the Education and Culture 
Directorate of the European Commission. The changes to policies and programs 
for education are trending away from the “philosophical ideals of state-sponsored 
multicultural integration” and toward characteristics associated with neoliberal 
policy aims, such as “a focus on individual pragmatism and…the skills and 
mobility needed for economic success” (K. Mitchell 2006b, 391–2, 404). Major 
policy initiatives such as the EU Lifelong Learning Programme (2013) explicitly 
aim to “make lifelong learning and mobility a reality,” which leads Mitchell to 
conclude that educational spaces in Europe are becoming forums for 
“constitution of both market-rational and state-oriented subjects (2006, 396, 
emphasis in original). The nature of such neoliberal projects in the EU is “highly 
contested… hybrid and contextual, often cohabitating and/or overlapping with 
other regimes,” but the ubiquity of EU civic education discourses equating the 
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“advancement of citizenship” and the “strengthening of cross-border 
employability” is undeniable (K. Mitchell 2007; European Commission 2013). This 
suggests that the culture of liberalism (W. Brown 2008) has, to some extent, 
universalized its norms rational economic behavior and individual responsibility 
for effective sociocultural integration, leading citizenship education programs in 
Europe away from the valuation of difference and towards the valuation of 
economic competitiveness in Europe. 
 
Education in a Broader Context of Youth Identity and Citizenship Formation 
In understanding ways that different educational policies shape identity 
and citizenship, we must recognize young people to be active political agents 
rather than passive vessels into which knowledge is poured (S. L. Holloway and 
Valentine 2000). Education policy makers, and especially those involved in 
devising citizenship education, have historically viewed young people has 
citizens-in-waiting—as minors learning about their rights but not yet capable of 
exercising them (Skelton 2010; S. L. Holloway and Valentine 2000; Weller 2003); 
they have also assumed in many instances that young people are politically 
passive, apathetic, and disengaged. One strand of literature has countered this 
image of young people by demonstrating the variety of non-traditional ways (e.g. 
electronic petitions, volunteering) in which young people participate in politics 
and are active as citizens (Galston 2001). Others have made the broader 
argument that young people are profoundly aware of the networks of power 
relations in which they are embedded and that they act politically by 
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accommodating, challenging, and subverting such power relations in their daily 
lives (Skelton 2010). In this sense, their ideas about identity, citizenship, and 
belonging might flow from different set of ideals than that offered by formal 
curricula. It is crucial, therefore, to place young people at the center of analysis 
and to understand the ways in which they actively participate in the politics of 
citizenship and identity in their societies, drawing on a panoply of discourses and 
experiences both inside and outside the space of the school. By considering 
youth geographies, we understand nation building and citizenship from the 
ground up—as performed and practiced by people and not as simply dictated by 
states or supranational bodies.  
Young peoples’ conceptions of citizenship and identity are not only 
dependent upon state or local official curricula, but are also heavily influenced by 
teacher attitudes, classroom climate, and school-specific approaches to subjects. 
Moreover, whether young people’s understandings of citizenships—especially 
post-national ones such as EU citizenship—are based on access to rights or 
mere association with a group is heavily influenced by the nature and time of 
instruction devoted to those topics. An equally valuable consideration when 
understanding how education and youth perceptions interact is that youths are 
“active in the construction of their own lifeworlds” and “are not passive dupes 
learning a set of skills deemed necessary by national government” (S. L. 
Holloway and Valentine 2000, 769). Young people have agency and will 
construct their own meanings of citizenship and identity by combining what is 
taught in school, what is experienced in their everyday lives outside of school, 
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and by what is observed in the media and wider culture (Hahn 1998; Dittmer 
2005).  
This requires, in turn, that we view the school in relation to a wider set of 
youth geographies, that is, everyday spaces in which young people formulate 
identities, negotiate social differences, and make various claims of belonging. 
Focusing on youth spaces is especially important in divided societies, where 
numerous social and geographical barriers can reinforce a sense of privilege or a 
sense of oppression and subordination (Leonard 2006; Leonard 2010). In 
addition to examining interaction between groups (or the lack thereof) in schools, 
we need to consider the cultural landscapes they are confronted with and 
negotiate, how they navigate city streets and neighborhoods, and how in moving 
through the city, young people accommodate or subvert social, political, and 
spatial boundaries (Weller 2003). The next section of this chapter will consider 
the ways in which socio-cultural landscapes reinforce, subvert, or mediate the 
politics of belonging and discourses of citizenship and identity that they 
encounter at home, school, and in wider society.  
 
Identity, Citizenship, and Everyday Space 
Space and spatiality provide a lens through which we understand 
citizenship as more than state practices and discourses. Citizenships also exist in 
everyday experiences and actions of national citizens and non-citizens who 
reside within a nation-state’s territory, who are subject in varying ways to 
inclusionary and exclusionary narratives and practices (Staeheli and Hammett 
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2010; Nagle 2009; Holston 2008). Focusing on youth citizenship demands 
understanding the ways that young people relate to space, place, and the 
material construction of belonging and exclusion.  
Several scholars have enriched theories of citizenship by investigating the 
spatialities of citizenship at the local scale and articulating the importance of the 
urban context to how citizenship learned, performed, experienced, and 
negotiated. Such studies tease out intricacies that illuminate citizenship as more 
than an abstract status or bundle of rights (Staeheli 2003). Citizenship is a 
dynamic institution that is learned, understood, performed, and negotiated by 
individuals on a daily basis. Moreover, the urban environment is a site at which 
citizenship takes place rather than simply existing in the abstract. The following 
sections of this chapter will explore the theoretical and conceptual 
understandings and research regarding the everyday, “lived” spaces in which 
individuals and groups learn about and experience citizenship, national identity, 
and belonging.   
 
City and Society: Citizenship Formation at the Local Level 
As demonstrated in the previous sections of this chapter, citizenship is a 
fluid, dynamic marker of community membership that can (and does) take 
multiple forms and exist at multiple scales. Citizenship, therefore, is not an a 
priori concept applied evenly to individuals and groups in society by political 
institutions, but one that is continuously being constructed and understood, and 
spaces of everyday interaction and experience are critical points at which these 
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constructions and understandings take place (Isin 2002; Staeheli 2003; Secor 
2004; Bollens 2007). Engaging with local spaces allows investigation into how 
citizenship is “continuously being reconfigured from the bottom up” through 
practices in the everyday realities of the city (Secor 2004, 365). 
The spaces of the city are crucial to the ways in which individuals and 
groups use the processes of inclusion and belonging to understand their relation 
to the wider political community because it is in these spaces that “routinized 
interactions…shape social relations and feelings of belonging” (Staeheli 2003, 
99). More than just a status of membership, citizenship is “relational” and can be 
conceptualized as a “process” of establishing who belongs by delineating 
boundaries (Staeheli 2003, 99; Coward 2012). It is in the everyday spaces of the 
city that “identities are staked, belonging is negotiated, and rights are pursued” 
(Secor 2004, 353). These processes and the urban spaces where they take 
place are “crucial constitutive elements” (Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003, 145) of the 
“meaning and practice of citizenship” (Secor 2004, 353).  
By prioritizing the everyday life at the local level the relational character of 
citizenship becomes apparent, but so too does its spatial character. Anna Secor 
(2004, 353) demonstrates that, especially within the context of the city, 
citizenship is a spatial strategy that that “fixes identities, delineates boundaries, 
and disciplines the meanings and practices of social space,” thereby organizing 
claims-making through urban positions. Ordinary urban spaces such as 
neighborhoods, shopping districts, workplaces, and homes are where citizenship 
extends beyond government sites and is actively negotiated by all individuals. 
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Because of the “ordinariness” of everyday urban spaces, individuals and groups 
that are excluded from the formal political spaces of citizenship (such as non-
citizens or young people who are not yet old enough to vote) engage with rights 
and notions of inclusion and belonging through spatial practices.  
The city gives meaning to citizenship by spatially differentiating identities. 
The ways in which people move through urban spaces delineates boundaries of 
sociocultural difference and locates identities in certain areas. But such 
boundaries oscillate between fluidity and concreteness as contests are waged 
between various groups about access to rights and resources (Staeheli 2003; 
Isin 2002). The city harbors the “flows of people and ideas” about belonging, 
identity, and legitimate membership in society (Secor 2003, 149), and as such 
navigating and negotiating its spaces are the practices and processes through 
which “relationships and definitions about citizenship are mediated” (Nagle 2009, 
133).  
Spatial strategies of establishing the parameters of citizenship operate by 
disciplining space—that is, making spaces accessible or inaccessible, welcoming 
or hostile, or contingent upon specific identity performances. Holston (2008) and 
Weyeneth (2005) describe how regimes of sociopolitical power are reproduced in 
work and leisure spaces via architecture that “assigns… place and reinforces 
social relations” (Holston 2008, 278). Moreover, several empirical studies 
demonstrate that access to public space for civic actions (Ehrkamp and Leitner 
2003), demonstrations of cultural identity (Nagle 2009), and performances of 
historical memory (Ehala 2009) are crucial to claims making and that “continued 
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exclusion” from such city spaces are “spatial confirmation of unequal status” in 
society (Nagle 2009, 136).  
Spatial strategies of citizenship work to discipline space and establish 
dominant power structures, but this very action also prompts marginalized and 
alienated groups to “decide whether to dissemble or to articulate” their identities 
in those spaces (Secor 2004, 362). Thus, the urban is fertile ground for not only 
contestations and negotiations over belonging, exclusion, and access to 
resources in the city but also dialogue regarding fairness, tolerance, and 
acceptance (Bollens 2007). This underscores the important point that although 
citizenship attempts to discipline and organize space, it does so unevenly and to 
varying degrees of success. Economic, cultural, social, political, and gendered 
processes constantly interact in the ordinary urban spaces, creating “fluidity of 
identity across community lines” and “diversity of meaning within supposedly 
bounded spaces” (McDowell and Shirlow 2011, 704; Secor 2003; K. Mitchell 
2006b; McDowell 2008; Leonard 2006). 
Empirical studies that prioritize the role of urban geographies in everyday 
conceptualizations and configurations of citizenship demonstrate that “the urban 
or local are inextricably connected to processes operating at other scales” 
including nation-building and state formation (Staeheli 2003, 97). They also 
provide a framework within which to address divided societies, those polities 
where the politics of belonging and struggles over citizenship are most acute and 
the spatial divisions are most entrenched. 
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In understanding the roles that everyday urban spaces play in the 
construction, contestation, and negotiations of citizenship, the material sites in 
cities that shape and are shaped by the politics of belonging and identity must 
also be examined. In the context of nationalism and citizenship, landscape theory 
has provided a framework through which to view dominant meanings, power 
geometries, and contestations of identity. Although landscape has been 
conceptualized in different ways, it can broadly be understood as the “tangible, 
visible entities that are both reflective and constitutive of society” (Schein 1997, 
660).  
Contemporary landscape theory revolves around questions of power and 
the way power relations produce material landscapes and are in turn reproduced 
through spatialities. Richard Schein’s (1997, 663) approach to landscape as 
“discourse materialized” is helpfully comprehensive because it acknowledges the 
simultaneously material and non-material nature of landscapes. Schein (1997, 
663) agrees that discourses have textual and ideological manifestations, but 
argues that: 
 
“As a material component of a particular discourse… “cultural 
landscape” at once captures the intent and ideology of the 
discourse as a whole and is a constitutive part of its ongoing 
development and reinforcement.”  
 
This theorization mediates the tension between ideology and materiality 
inherent in cultural landscape literature while remembering that the landscape is 
perpetually becoming and unbecoming as a result of human action. Within the 
context of the processes of citizenship, Schein’s theory is a mechanism through 
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which the materialization of notions of belonging and exclusion and practices of 
enfranchisement and alienation can be assessed. 
Don Mitchell (1996) also stressed the need to scrutinize both the 
materiality and the representation of ideas that structure landscape. A significant 
contribution of Mitchell’s empirical study of migrant labor and the California 
landscape is the recognition of the duplicitous nature of landscape—that is, the 
ability of specifically constructed landscapes to mask the power relations behind 
it. Landscapes, he argues, are both a “work and an erasure of work” (1996, 6), 
spaces that are the result of contests between groups of varying economic, 
social, and political power. The dominant group will reproduce landscape in order 
to represent the “natural” qualities of the land, and in doing so will fade and erase 
the power disparities, exploitation, and oppression of minority groups. Only by 
seriously considering the materiality of the landscape, instead of only considering 
its representation, can the presence of minority groups, opinions, and work be 
revealed alongside hegemonic forces. 
The theorizations of Schein and Mitchell are particularly useful to 
understanding nationalist landscapes because nationalist landscapes reflect and 
project very particular sets of historical narratives and identity discourses while 
actively submerging others. By interrogating the materiality of nationalist 
landscapes, both the ideology of hegemonic discourses that informs and is 
informed by landscape and the power relations that are masked by it are 
illuminated which allows for a richer and more comprehensive understanding of 
the politics of identity operating within the nation.  
	   80 
Interrogating the mutually constitutive relationship between landscape and 
identity is crucial to understanding the wider set of everyday geographies in 
which youths negotiate spaces of belonging and social difference. Because the 
landscape is constructed out of the contests waged between groups with differing 
degrees of power (D. Mitchell 1996; Falah 1996; Steven Hoelscher 2003; Price 
2004), youths’ geographies are populated with multiple ideologies of varying 
strengths. This point is critical, as it underscores the nature of landscape as fluid 
and contested rather than a unilateral exercise of the hegemon’s control.  
The urban landscapes encountered by young people will not only serve to 
reinforce the sense of belonging or exclusion perpetuated by the prevailing 
narratives in their national society, but will also make real the ideologies of 
supranational identity as well. Young people, as engaged, active citizens, will 
respond to, interact with, and affect change on the landscape because of—or in 
spite of—overarching identity narratives and nationalist discourses disseminated 
and enacted by adults (Weller 2003; Skelton 2010; Hörschelmann 2008).   
Young people with Outsider status—whether at the national or 
supranational level, or both—can and do challenge or contest the societal 
divisions and socio-cultural narratives that are embedded in the landscapes of 
their cities and towns. Importantly, however, all young people will “work through 
and alongside” the dominant discourses that have made categories of belonging 
and exclusion seem natural and incontrovertible (Mills 2006). This means that, in 
divided societies with pervading nationalist ideologies, youths contend with the 
landscapes that are constructed, destroyed, preserved, and maintained by 
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nationalist elites. Similarly, in European member states, youths contend with 
landscapes that are influenced by Brussels. For instance, Tallinn’s landscape is 
inscribed with symbols of what could be termed “banal supranationalism,” such 
as EU flags and EU symbols on the euro currency.   
The use of landscapes of memory to establish how the nation-state’s past 
is remembered is a central and long-established practice of producing and 
reifying national identity (S. Hoelscher and Alderman 2004). Societies—and their 
governments—will create “material representations of the past” that are “symbols 
of a ‘people’ or nation” (Forest, Johnson, and Till 2004, 357; Mensagem, 
Sidaway, and Power 2005). The features landscapes of memory are most often 
monuments, statues, and memorials, which are nationalist discourses that mark 
out favored histories, heritages, and people while simultaneously ignoring others 
(Johnson 1995; Hay, Hughes, and Tutton 2004). Nation building projects and 
landscapes are both ongoing processes, and since nation building is made 
material and public through memorialized landscapes (Johnson 1995), the two 
processes are intertwined.  
Nationalizing elites will move to alter places of memory to reflect the ‘right’ 
representations of history (Till 1999). However, while political elites have control 
over public spaces of memory in the urban landscape, they cannot control how 
those places are interpreted and understood by various individuals (Till 2003). 
Nations do not have one solitary history, but many competing versions of history 
(Billig 1995; Forest, Johnson, and Till 2004; Nora 1989), and therefore the 
meanings of historical landscapes can be and are contested. Especially during 
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times of social, political, and economic change, the struggle over memory is an 
important societal issue (Steven Hoelscher 2003; D. J. Smith and Burch 2012). 
Struggles over existing monuments and memorials can reveal changing 
conceptions of the nation that are part of the contestations of identity and 
belonging in wider society (K. Mitchell 2003).  
The geographies of national identity and citizenship, therefore, can be 
identified not just by uncovering visible entities in the cultural landscape, but also 
by locating ideologies and power relations in a multitude of spaces. The 
geographies of identity and citizenship are not fixed, however, but are fluid and 
are contested and negotiated in individuals’ movements through everyday 
spaces. Seemingly mundane urban spaces host processes that establish identity 
and belonging at multiple scales, making them sites of complex and multilayered 
interaction of community memberships. 
Cultural landscapes are meaningful parts of the ongoing fluctuations, 
reconfigurations, and shifts in contemporary modes of citizenship. Careful 
consideration of landscapes reveal not only the visible translations of nationalist 
discourses into concrete forms but also implicit discourses of diversity, tolerance, 
and cosmopolitan understandings of societal membership. Contemporary nation-
building projects may be concretely inscribed in the cultural landscape through 
monuments, memorials, and other places of memory, but they operate within a 
context in which national identities have been challenged through multicultural 
and post-national understandings of societal membership. The everyday, 
palpable presence of multicultural and post-national modes of citizenships 
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alongside national citizenships has lent legitimacy to identities and 
understandings of belonging that are alternative to nationalist concepts and, 
subsequently, to alternative readings, productions, and reproductions of cultural 
landscapes. Cultural landscapes, then, further demonstrate that multicultural, 
post-national, and national discourses operate simultaneously and interface 
complexly at multiple scales on an everyday basis. Moreover, current 
approaches to studying cultural landscapes also suggest that the tendency to 
address nationalisms, post-national citizenships, and multicultural citizenships 
separately will result in partial, fragmented understandings of identity, belonging, 
and community membership in contemporary society. 
 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have attempted to draw a theoretical framework for 
understanding the multiple conceptualizations and configurations of citizenship 
that young people encounter and negotiate in contemporary Western societies. 
Citizenship is often broadly construed as a national phenomenon and the nation-
state continues to be an important agent in understanding it. However, 
citizenship is a much more complicated institution that exists at multiple 
geographic scales. Empirical trends in citizenship studies have thoroughly 
demonstrated that it is not only the prerogative of the nation-state, but also 
supranational and international institutions, spawning manifold articulations and 
understandings of citizenship rights, entitlements, and duties. At any given 
moment in any given context, different discourses and formations of citizenship 
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exist. As such, citizens necessarily negotiate their citizenship rather than 
passively receive it. 
Citizenship at any scale exists in tension between universalism and 
particularism, inclusion and exclusion. The language of liberal democratic 
citizenship employs a vocabulary of universalisms that emphasizes the equality 
and sameness of community members and the egalitarian distribution of rights 
and duties throughout the citizenry, notably at the national level. But the 
qualifications for inclusion in the community of citizens hinges upon 
particularisms based on dominant identity narratives and discourses. Moreover, 
even in polities where formal citizenship has been universally extended to all 
groups, meaningful access to rights is still restricted to those seen as “too 
different” from or “unassimilable” to dominant identity norms. Post-national and 
multicultural conceptualizations of citizenship also adopt vocabularies of 
universality and contextualize community membership beyond the national level. 
But while post-national and multicultural citizenships offer new many possibilities 
for rights, belongings, and identities, they are ultimately premised upon the same 
tensions between universalisms and particularisms that national citizenships 
contend with and, indeed, can serve to multiply and reinforce these tensions.  
Conceptual insights into the citizenship of minority groups within 
multicultural societies have revealed citizenship to be a highly contested 
institution. The reality of cultural heterogeneity within nation-states and the 
multiplication of identities and loyalties that have resulted from globalization have 
prompted intense debate over access to rights and requirements of duties. 
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Scholars and policy makers alike grapple with the most effective way to deal with 
differences in society, resulting in many competing conceptualizations of 
multiculturalism at national, supranational, and global scales. The lack of 
consensus on how best to talk about and engage with cultural difference, 
however, has resulted in myriad proliferations of “multiculturalism” that are 
ultimately mindless and feeble. But while multiculturalism may not be effective at 
integrating diverse groups, the discourse remains significantly present in political 
and social rhetoric through innocuous vocabularies of tolerance, acceptance of 
difference, and respect for diversity. 
Citizens’ negotiations of multi-scalar citizenships take place at the local 
level in everyday urban spaces. National, supranational, and international 
community memberships are made meaningful by the movement through and 
encounters in urban spaces. Of the urban spaces, the school can be said to be a 
critical site of citizenship formation, as young people contend with adult 
discourses of identity and belonging in the nation and broader world. But young 
people, far from being passive citizens-in-waiting, are active agents in the 
development of their citizenships and identities. The questions that emerge from 
this theoretical framework are, How do young people in Tallinn contend with 
multiple, and sometimes contradictory, discourses of identity, belonging, and 
citizenship? What are the everyday spaces and contexts in which young people 
in Tallinn develop and awareness and understanding of social membership(s)? 
What role does a young person’s positionality within the nation-state have on his 
or her understandings citizenship in the European Union?  
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This dissertation attempts to unpack how young people understand and 
contend with notions of identity, citizenship, and belonging at multiple geographic 
scales using the case of young people in the last year of secondary school in 
Tallinn, Estonia. The analysis that follows pays particular attention to the way that 
these understandings unfold in young people whose national communities are 
simultaneously socio-spatially divided and part of a wider supranational 
community that emphasizes unity. In doing so, this analysis uses a theoretical 
framework blended from scholarship on citizenship, identity, belonging, civic 
education, and cultural landscapes in order to better address the complex 
environments in which young people negotiate and develop their sense of 
identity and citizenship.




In this research project students in their last year of secondary school in 
Tallinn, Estonia provide an empirical evidence for exploring wider theoretical 
questions relating to citizenship, identity, and belonging in divided societies. This 
research employed qualitative methods and is situated within an interpretive 
paradigm that “highlights the socially constructed and locally negotiated nature of 
experience” (Rubin 2007, 455). This dissertation draws on qualitative data 
gathered in focus groups and semi-structured interviews. Qualitative research is 
often criticized for lacking scientific vigor and the ability to make generalizations 
(Staller 2010), but the findings that result from qualitative studies contribute to 
theory-building and, as such, can provide a basis for theoretical abstraction (Yin 
1992). Moreover, qualitative methods are pragmatic and constructive when the 
questions at hand demand explanations of phenomena that cannot be quantified, 
such as how the ways that people think, know, and feel relate to the ways that 
people behave (Secor 2010; Stake 1978). 
 This chapter explains the methodology used in this dissertation and why 
qualitative techniques are apropos to the research questions. Next, data 
collection and analysis are described, specifically addressing the steps taken to
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 recruit research participants, formulate focus group and interview questions, and 
code and evaluate the data gathered. In addition, this chapter addresses the 
reflexivity specific to this project’s data collection. As qualitative research has 
become more accepted within the social sciences, the issue of reflexivity has 
assumed a significant role in the discussion of knowledge production and validity. 
Reflexivity is “an awareness that the researcher and the object of study affect 
each other mutually and continually in the research process” (Haynes 2012, 73), 
i.e. cognizance on the part of the researcher that there are power dynamics 
between her and the research participant(s) and that those dynamics affect the 
production and interpretation of information (Secor 2010). 
 
Qualitative Study and Research Techniques 
 Qualitative research is an “umbrella term” for a wide variety of research 
methods and approaches that “provide holistic, in-depth accounts and attempt to 
reflect the complicated, contextual, interactive, and interpretive nature of our 
social world” (Staller 2010, 1159). The various research methods under the 
umbrella label of “qualitative” are not mutually exclusive (Yin 1992) and 
combining more than one method in a research design allows for triangulation of 
data and, thus, a more rigorous research project (Baxter and Eyles 1997; Morgan 
1996; Peek and Fothergill 2009). This research has elements of both case study 
and ethnographic evaluation, allowing for a methodologically appropriate forum 
within which to “answer questions about the ways in which certain events, 
practices, or knowledges are constructed and enacted within particular contexts” 
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(Secor 2010, 199). These qualitative approaches are often criticized for lacking 
reliability, precision, and the ability to produce generalizable conclusions (Staller 
2010). But these criticisms ignore the validity and usefulness of qualitative data 
and methods in studying the highly contextual political and sociocultural 
processes involved in the production of citizenship, identity, belonging, and 
exclusion (Yin 1992; Fetterman 1989).  
 This research project uses the case study method to investigate 
“contemporary phenomen[a] within… real-life context when the boundaries 
between phenomen[a] and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 1992, 123). 
Integrating features of case study methods into this project gives proper attention 
to the positionality and situation of knowledge within networks of power and daily, 
lived experience. Case studies can include quantitative data, but the importance 
of contextual factors in this method makes the richness of qualitative data 
particularly salient. This dissertation seeks to understand how young people 
develop notions of citizenship, identity, belonging, and exclusion as they 
negotiate myriad discourses in spaces of everyday life. As such, the case study 
approach is fitting for this project because it is best for research questions that 
ask “how” and “why” questions about phenomena that the researcher has little or 
no control over (Yin 2009).  
 The qualitative research methods like the ones used in this study are 
soemtimes criticized for producing findings that are not generalizable. However, 
this is an un-nuanced appraisal of qualitative methods. Case studies allow for 
generalizing about existing theoretical discussions (Yin 2009). Such research 
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allows for substantive engagement with existing theories of citizenship and 
identity, explaining and expanding upon previously advanced theories and 
conceptualizations. In this respect, qualitative research projects are theory-
building, rather than theory-testing, which is no less valuable when attempting to 
contribute to the knowledge of identity formation and delineation of citizenship 
boundaries. 
 Furthermore, qualitative research methods’ use of qualitative data—such 
as narratives, observations, and artifacts—helps preserve the contextual integrity 
of the research findings. Qualitative, non-numeric data is situated within real-
world settings and maintains the link between people’s experiences and the 
meanings that they attach to them, which cannot be said of quantitative data 
(Staller 2010). In this dissertation, the use of qualitative data ensures that the 
nuances and complexities involved in understanding, negotiating, and 
formulating conceptualizations of citizenship and identity are not lost or drowned 
out by inflexible techniques.  
Quantitative studies focus on highly standardized, pre-determined 
variables to measure phenomena in order to produce “objective” and “value 
neutral” conclusions, but in doing so lose the texture of individual perspectives 
that provides for deeper explanations. Quantitative studies have attempted to 
categorize and streamline the identities of young people in transitioning societies 
(Nimmerfeldt 2008), predict the feasibility of citizenship projects intended to unify 
diverse groups (Fuchs and Klingemann 2002), and measure the correlation 
between the adoption of certain identity practices and feelings of belonging or 
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exclusion (Kulu and Tammaru 2004). But such studies tend to be reductionist in 
that they isolate identity markers and citizenship traits in the vacuum of statistical 
analysis and therefore cannot account for the multiple and varied meanings of 
community membership and identity. Moreover, quantitative scholarship tends to 
rely on pre-given categories to define citizenship, such as Bloaemraad’s 
examination of naturalization levels amongst migrants to the US and Canada 
(Bloemraad 2006; Bloemraad 2004). Qualitative research, in contrast to 
examining citizenship within such narrow, pre-given parameters, tries to 
interrogate these very categories and uncover the complexities of societal 
membership. Furthermore, quantitative studies cannot appreciate the value of 
non-quantifiable experiences and actions that are important to young people’s 
understandings of belonging, identity, and citizenship rights such as everyday 
encounters with discourses, narratives, and other people,. As a result, 
quantitative studies are limited with respect to the depth of knowledge they can 
produce, even though they can produce a great breadth of it (Staller 2010). 
Recent literature on the geographies of citizenship and identity 
demonstrates the understanding that can be achieved through the meanings and 
motivations behind actions and experiences is produced through analyzing 
qualitative data gathered from interviews, focus groups, observation activities, 
and documents. For instance, Leonard has used focus groups and participant-
generated maps to articulate how young people’s identities are attached to 
certain performances and movements through certain spaces in Belfast, 
Northern Ireland (2006; 2010). Her studies show how youths not only inherit 
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certain understandings of citizenship and belonging from their parents but also 
actively construct their own awareness of their community and membership in it. 
Also, Zeigler (2002) compares pre- and post-Soviet era maps in Central and 
Eastern European countries as a means of illustrating how the meanings of 
identities are re-framed and naturalized through banal visual and textual 
mediums. Hromadzic uses “multisited participant observation” (2008, 545) and 
interviews to illuminate the tension between discourses of citizenship and 
democratic principles that are situated at multiple scales and how that tension 
becomes tangible within neighborhood, school, and urban spaces. Hromadzic’s 
findings indicate effects of competing notions of acceptable interaction between 
ethnonational groups on the development of youth citizens. 
The important characteristic of qualitative studies, only a few of which 
have been mentioned here, is that they allow for both substantive understandings 
of highly contextual phenomena and meaningful engagement with theory. 
Qualitative research methods recognize that the researcher and the research 
participants are situated in networks of power, privilege, and positionality, but that 
such situations provide understandings of the contexts of political and 
sociocultural processes (Secor 2010; Jones 2004). So while qualitative data, 
such as that gathered from interviews and focus groups, are context dependent 
and situational, they can also be used to draw out and explain theoretical 
propositions regarding citizenship, identity, and belonging.  
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Study Population and Research Sites 
 As explained in the introductory chapter, students in their last year of 
secondary school in Tallinn were chosen as a study population because of the 
growing recognition of young people as competent beings with political agency 
and the importance of investigating how they formulate understandings of 
citizenship, identity, and belonging in their everyday lives. As the focus on 
Central and Eastern European nation-states’ transitions to democratic polities 
increased after the collapse of the USSR, so too did the focus on how these 
nation-states construct their national identities, engage with their Russophone 
minorities, and educate their younger generations on citizenship and belonging. 
As members of a society divided along ethnolinguistic lines, the young people in 
Tallinn, Estonia are a study population that will provide fresh insights to the 
theoretical issues that this dissertation engages with. 
 Secondary school students in Tallinn contend with discourses of belonging 
and citizenship in the context of a divided society on the national level, but also in 
the context of a pan-European community on the supranational level. This makes 
for a messy and complicated forum within which to investigate youth citizenships, 
but I argue that it is this complexity that gives this project significance and 
relevance in broader theoretical discussions of citizenship in the contemporary 
world.  
Furthermore, investigating the citizenships and identities of Estonian and 
Russophone students in Tallinn sheds light on a majority/minority politics that 
does not fit comfortably into the common minority group categories of indigenous 
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peoples, immigrant groups, and minority nationalisms (Kymlicka 1995). As 
previously noted, the vast majority of Russophones in Estonia are a “beached 
diaspora” that resulted from (voluntary or involuntary) Soviet-era migration. 
Therefore, the processes of citizenship and identity formation, negotiation, and 
mediation in the student study population illuminate a set of sociocultural and 
political cohesions and fragmentations. 
While young people’s identities and citizenships are “made and remade” in 
and through everyday spaces, the school is a key site where they are “socialized 
with regard to their roles in life and their places in society” (Holloway and 
Valentine 2000, 770; Aitken in Holloway and Valentine 2000, 771). Teachers are 
included in the study population because, as discussed in Chapter Four, they are 
implicated in wider processes of social, cultural, and political interactions are 
reproduced through formal and informal curricula. This places teachers in a 
prominent role of transmitting and mediating the discourses of citizenship, 
identity, and belonging within the nation-state as well as within supranational and 
global contexts.  
 Secondary schools were chosen as the primary site to engage and recruit 
student and teacher research participants. While there are a small, but growing, 
number of private schools throughout Estonia, public secondary schools were 
chosen for this study to reflect the fact that the large majority of basic and 
secondary schools remain publicly funded by the Estonian government. As 
mentioned in the introductory chapter, primary and secondary education in 
Estonia is divided into Estonian-medium and Russian-medium schools. There is 
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a large overlap between school language medium, student ethnolinguistic 
heritage, and student mother tongue (Kulu and Tammaru 2004), so in general it 
can be said that Estonian-medium school students’ mother tongue and ethnic 
heritage will be Estonian, and Russian-medium school students’ mother tongue 
will be Russian and ethnic heritage will be Russian/Slavic. This overlap is 
beneficial to study population recruitment in that the student focus groups 
recruited from school sites will reflect the wider socio-spatial and educational 
segregation in Tallinn.   
Two secondary schools from each language medium were approached to 
be part of the research project. Research into Tallinn’s educational landscape 
and school demographics was conducted via public reports, national surveys, 
and personal contacts in Tallinn. Contacts at each of the four participating 
schools were made through emailed invitations to school administrators and 
teachers describing the nature of the research project. Koidula School and 
Pushkin School are well known in Tallinn for their prestigious reputations, high 
national exam scores, and vibrant school atmospheres. It should be noted that 
these schools are located in upper-middle class areas and that the student 
populations generally come from comparatively higher socioeconomic 
backgrounds. Both of these institutions are located in middle class areas of 
Tallinn. These schools were selected with due consideration to stratifying the 
study population over middle and lower level socioeconomic backgrounds so as 
to reduce skew to upper class respondents as much as possible.  
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Research Questions 
 This project’s data collection and analysis were shaped around three 
major research questions: 
 
1. What are the everyday contexts in which Estonian youth develop an 
awareness and understanding of social membership(s)? 
 
Empirical inquiry for this research question concentrated on the following issues: 
(a) how young people position themselves, their own group, and the Other group 
within Estonian society; (b) the cultural, social, and political narratives they use to 
constitute belonging and exclusion in the Estonian nation-state; and (c) the 
extent to which historical memories of conflict endemic to adult populations in 
Estonia influence their perceptions and narratives of citizenship and identity.  
 
2.  What role does citizenship/civic education play in the citizenship 
imaginaries of Estonian youths? 
	  
Empirical inquiry relating to question two focused on: (a) how educational 
discourses on national identity, European citizenship, and multiculturalism impact 
the way young people understand, express, evaluate, and negotiate their 
citizenships and identities; (b) how young people evaluate, understand, and act 
upon their citizenships at the national and supranational level; (c) the extent to 
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which they feel politically and socially vested in Estonia, Europe, and/or other 
places. 
 
3.  What is the significance of everyday, urban space and place in the 
development of young people’s cognizance of belonging and exclusion in the 
context of a divided society? 
 
Empirical inquiry for the final research question addressed: (a) the ways that 
students’ own identities and the identities of the Other group shape and are 
shaped by the everyday, urban spaces that they move in and through; and (b) 
how day-to-day experiences impinge on their access to rights and feelings of 
belonging vis-à-vis different groups. 
 
 These research questions pivot around the multiple, everyday contexts in 
which young people experience and express citizenship and identity and attempt 
to reveal the processes by which they negotiate discourses of belonging and 
exclusion, group boundaries, and multi-scalar polities. These research questions 
use everyday contexts as a base for exploring youth citizenships for two main 
reasons. First, citizenships and identities are lived, negotiated, and experienced 
institutions rather than passively received labels. It is in the everyday spaces and 
places that individuals live their citizenships and identities, contending with 
myriad discourses and narratives. Second, national and global discourses and 
processes are embedded and operate in local spaces and contexts (S. L. 
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Holloway and Valentine 2000; Staeheli 2003). Consequently, an investigation 
into the everyday environments that young people are situated in exposes how 
multi-scalar citizenships and identities intersect and are made meaningful on a 
daily basis. This study approaches everyday spaces as more than inert 
containers in which activity takes place, but as meaningful, active parts of the 
lived practices through which young people articulate citizenship and belonging 
at various scales. In this way it contributes to prevailing understandings of how 
young people, understood as active agents, produce, reproduce, contest, and 
negotiate multiple citizenships and identities. These questions relating to 
everyday contexts and spaces, citizenship discourses, and identity narratives 
structured the data collection and analysis, discussed below. 
 
Primary Data Collection 
Focus Groups  
 Focus groups were chosen as the primary data collection technique for 
conversations with the student research participants. Focus groups are noted for 
their ability to be adapted to the needs of many different types of research (Peek 
and Fothergill 2009; Morgan 1996). Peek and Fothergill (2009, 55) explicitly 
stress the “utility of focus groups for studying children” because the researcher is 
able to understand children’s views from their own perspectives rather than 
“relying on the accounts of adults.” Furthermore, focus groups have the ability to 
“ ‘give a voice’ to marginalized groups” (Joseph et al in Morgan, 1996: 133; Kidd 
and Parshall, 2000). This research engaged Russophones, the obvious 
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marginalized group in Estonia, and focus groups allowed them to openly discuss 
topics that contribute (or not) to their feelings of marginalization. It is argued here 
that because of the tendency by dominant adult actors to discount or altogether 
ignore the opinions and experiences of children, youths in general can also be 
considered a marginalized group (Skelton 2010). The focus groups actively 
engaged youths in a setting where their opinions were not only be heard, but 
were also valued.  
Moreover, focus groups create a group dynamic which solicits richer data 
than one-on-one interviews because participants interact with each other (Peek 
and Fothergill 2009; Seale 2004). Group members have been found to ask 
questions of each other, explain themselves to each other, and engage in spirited 
debate, which makes the sum of the focus group parts greater than the value of 
individual interviews (Morgan 1996; Hambach et al. 2011). Group engagement 
can also encourage participants to volunteer information that they would not have 
disclosed in individual interviews (Kidd and Parshall 2000; Peek and Fothergill 
2009). The researcher can also take advantage of the group setting to ask the 
participants to compare and contrast their own experiences “rather than 
aggregating individual data in order to speculate about whether or why the 
interviewees differ” (Morgan 1996, 139). Focus groups allow the researcher to 
learn multiple perspectives on a topic at one time (Gibbs 1997), and they provide 
an opportunity for social interaction and engagement amongst research subjects, 
helping to uncover tensions and different viewpoints that might exist among a 
group of people (Morgan 1996; Morgan 1997; Leonard 2006; Goss and Leinbach 
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1996; Montell 1999)(Man, 1996, 1997; Leonard, 2006; Goss and Leinbach, 1996; 
Montell, 1999).   
Eight focus groups were conducted with 29 students over a three-month 
period in the autumn of 2012. The focus groups ranged in size from three 
students to five students, and each focus group was comprised of students from 
the same school. As previously mentioned, the participant school sites were used 
to recruit student participants. 
 It was imperative to the research process that the students voluntarily 
agreed to participate in the focus groups in order to reduce bias arising from 
teachers or school administrators selectively identifying particular “types” of 
students to participate. Teachers in each of the four participating schools agreed 
to post an informational flyer in their classrooms and verbally alert students to the 
opportunity to participate in the project. The informational flyer was made 
available in Estonian and Russian and explicitly detailed the nature and purpose 
of the project, the format of the focus group meeting, the assurance that the 
focus group conversation would not be shared with any teacher, school 
administrator, family member, or individual outside the focus group, and my 
personal contact information.  
 The focus groups were assembled through a combination of direct 
responses to the flyer and the snowballing technique. Snowballing “begins by 
finding an entry point,” (in this case the students who contacted me directly about 
participating) and asking “these contacts…to provide the names of others” (Secor 
2010, 201). The initial student contacts were encouraged to invite other 
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classmates to the focus group. The snowballing technique can “lead to focus 
groups where participants are mostly acquainted with each other,” and therefore 
bias the sample with participants who are similar to themselves (Secor 2010, 
210). Nonetheless, homogeneity of background and personal identity traits in 
focus groups can be beneficial because it decreases participant anxiety over 
voicing different opinions and promotes “free-flowing conversations” (Peek and 
Fothergill 2009, 39; Morgan 1996; Secor 2010). In this research, homogeneity of 
personal characteristics were not found to preclude differing attitudes and 
opinions as students in the same focus group often disagreed with each other 
and debated topics.  
 The voluntary participation and snowballing recruitment techniques, 
however, did not produce a sample representative of Tallinn’s young people that 
would allow for inferences across the entire population of youths in Estonia, or 
even Tallinn. For instance, because participation was voluntary, some 
characteristics, such as gender, could not be controlled for. This resulted in 
overrepresentation of females in the Estonian-medium school focus groups and 
overrepresentation of males in the Russian-medium school focus groups. 
Despite these limitations, however, the voluntary participation and snowballing 
recruitment strategies did produce a broad range of attitudes and opinions on 
belonging, exclusion, identity, and citizenship amongst young people in Tallinn.  
 The small size of the student study population prohibited large-scale 
generalizations from being made across youths in Estonia or, indeed, in Tallinn. 
The limited sample size meant that the analysis is necessarily skewed along 
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lines such as gender, class, and student participants with relatively homogenous 
ethnolinguistic identities. As such, the analysis of the data gathered from the 
student study population contains gaps in attention to issues addressed 
elsewhere in literature on citizenship, identity, and education in Estonia, such as 
non-Russophone minority identities (K. D. Brown 2005; Tammaru and Kulu 2003) 
and the decline in the number of Russian-medium schools in Estonia (Hogan-
Brun et al. 2008).  
 Table 3.1 summarizes the student study population. Coded identifiers are 
used instead of pseudonyms in order to maximize anonymity across the student 
population. The coded identifiers label students by their school and gender (e.g. 
Koidula Girl 1, RB Boy 4) in order to compare responses to the interview data 
gathered with teachers at their school during the analysis process. Because of 
the aforementioned overlap between school language medium, student 
ethnolinguistic background, and mother tongue, the majority of the students were 
categorized into “Estonian” and “Russophone” subgroups. The four students 
whose school language medium, ethnolinguistic heritage, and mother tongues 
did not line up neatly were categorized in a separate subgroup labeled “outliers.” 
These students are identified by an “O” in front of the standard coded identifiers. 
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Table 3.1. Student Study Population 
      










School           
  Koidula Girl 1 Est Est Est Est 
  Koidula Girl 2 Est Est Est Est 
  Koidula Girl 3 Est Est Est Est 
  Koidula Girl 4 Est Est Est Est 
  O-Koidula Girl 5 Mixed Heritage Est Est & Rus Est 
  Koidula Boy 1 Est Est Est Est 
  Koidula Boy 2 Est Est Est Est 
Tammsaare 
School       
  Tammsaare Girl 1 Est Est Est Est 
  Tammsaare Girl 2 Est Est Est Est 
  Tammsaare Girl 3 Est Est Est Est 
  Tammsaare Girl 4 Est Est Est Est 
  Tammsaare Girl 5 Est Est Est Est 
  Tammsaare Girl 6 Est Est Est Est 
  
O-Tammsaare 
Boy 1 Rus Est Rus Est 
Pushkin 
School       
  Pushkin Girl 1 Rus Rus Rus Est 
  O-Pushkin Girl 2 Mixed Heritage Est Rus Est 
  O-Pushkin Boy 1 Mixed Heritage Est Est & Rus Est 
  Pushkin Boy 2 Rus Rus Rus Est 
  Pushkin Boy 3 Rus Rus Rus Est 
  Pushkin Boy 4 Rus Rus Rus Est 
  Pushkin Boy 5 Rus Rus Rus Est 
  Pushkin Boy 6 Rus Rus Rus None 
  Pushkin Boy 7 Rus Rus Rus Est 
Tolstoy 
School       
  Tolstoy Girl 1 Rus Rus Rus Est 
  Tolstoy Girl 2 Rus Rus Rus Est 
  Tolstoy Girl 3 Rus Rus Rus Est 
  Tolstoy Boy 1 Rus Rus Rus Russia 
  Tolstoy Boy 2 Rus Rus Rus Est 
  Tolstoy Boy 3 Rus Rus Rus Est 
*Est = Estonian/Estonia; **Rus = Russian/Russophone
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The focus group template utilized structured questions (in the form of an 
intake survey) and semi-structured questions (in the form of open-ended 
conversation). The structured questions on the intake survey were intended to 
collect basic information to be used in concert with the semi-structured question 
responses to make connections about ethnolinguistic heritage, identities, and 
family background. The intake survey, shown in Appendix A, assessed data such 
as place of birth, mother tongue, self-identified national identity, citizenship 
status, and family background. “National identity” was a problematic category for 
Russophone students because of the variety of Slavic backgrounds in their 
heritages. After due consideration and discussion with the student participants, 
this category was given the more appropriate label of “ethnolinguistic identity” for 
the entire student study population as it better represented the group 
identification that cleaves Estonian society. The intake survey, then, allowed for 
comparison of identities and establishment of sub-groups within the student 
study population.  
The semi-structured questions facilitated in-depth assessment of how 
individual and group identities are constructed, how boundaries are made and 
unmade between different groups, how terms of belonging and exclusion are 
established, and how different discourses influence and mediate narratives of 
identity and citizenship. The questions corresponded to the three main research 
questions stated above. The questions addressed: (a) the students’ mental 
appraisals of the city landscape and how/why certain meanings are attached to 
urban spaces; (b) how the students identify themselves and others, and how they 
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evaluate different identity classifications (e.g. Estonian, Russophone, European); 
and (c) how the students perceive, contend with, and internalize discourses of 
citizenship and identity in their everyday spaces such as schools, home, and in 
public. The focus group intake survey and semi-structured question templates 
are included in Appendices A and B. 
During the focus group the students were also shown maps of Tallinn and 
encouraged to mark out which areas and locations are meaningful spaces in their 
lives and what territorial impressions (if any) that they had of the city. The use of 
this data collection technique was influenced by Leonard’s work on Protestant 
and Catholic students in Belfast, Northern Ireland (2010). In her work this 
mapping technique was very effective in prompting study participants to explain 
their socio-spatial practices and how these relate to their identities and their 
experiences of belonging and exclusion.   
 
Conducting Focus Groups 
 I coordinated focus group meeting times via emails with student 
respondents. I chose a café in Tallinn’s historic Old Town as the meeting place 
because the city center is a site where people of many ethnic, cultural, and 
national backgrounds mingle together freely. The café was chosen because it 
had a small, relatively secluded upstairs section where the focus groups could be 
conducted in as discrete a manner as possible. Furthermore, my personal 
acquaintance with the café staff made reserving the same tables for each focus 
group very easy, thus ensuring that the atmosphere was consistent for each 
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group of students. Each focus group lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, and was 
preceded and/or followed by exchanges of pleasantries and inquiries into 
American culture, life, and higher education.  
 All focus groups were recorded on a digital voice recorder. Each focus 
group was offered the opportunity to have an Estonian or Russian interpreter 
present during the conversation. A Russian interpreter was present at all of the 
Russian-medium school focus groups, while the Estonian-medium school 
students opted not to have a translator present. The English skills of all students 
were advanced, however, and the interpreter present at the Russian-medium 
school focus groups served principally to clarify vocabulary rather than to 
interpret the entire conversation. Conducting focus groups in a language other 
than the participants’ native tongue or through an interpreter poses the risk of 
muddled meanings, miscommunications, and adding a power dimension. 
However, due to the high quality of the students’ English skills and the 
interpreter’s linguistic dexterity, few issues arose during the focus groups. 
Regarding the addition of a power dimension between the interpreter and the 
students, this was minimized due to the fact that the interpreter used was of 
Russophone heritage and therefore the Russophone students were not apt to 
adopt defensive or intimidated attitudes because of her presence. 
 
Interviews 
 The research questions informed the interview templates used for 
schoolteachers. The interview template consisted of semi-structured questions 
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used to investigate the discourses and narratives of identity, citizenship, and 
belonging that circulate within spaces of education in Estonia. These questions 
were intended to draw comparisons between the discourses and narratives 
presented by teachers in the classroom and the discourses and narratives used 
by student respondents. The interview template can be found in Appendix C.  
	  
Identifying Interviewees and Building the Adult Study Population 
 Semi-structured interviews were chosen for data collection amongst 
schoolteachers, education government officials, and NGO representatives. 
Interviews are often used for “experts from whom [the researcher] hopes to learn 
how certain practices, experiences, knowledges, or institutions work” and have 
the benefit of allowing research subjects to explain the context in which they live 
and work and how it informs their thoughts and actions (Secor 2010, 199; Jones 
2004). Semi-structured interviews are the most appropriate method for acquiring 
in-depth, subjective opinions from individuals who occupy particular positions in 
public or private enterprises because “it might be socially awkward and 
logistically difficult” to arrange a focus group. Furthermore, the use of semi-
structured interviews in addition to focus groups increases the rigor of the 
research by producing richer data, allowing for triangulation, and balancing the 
strengths and weaknesses of the utilized methods (Baxter and Eyles 1997; 
Morgan 1996). 
Teacher interviewees from the participating schools were recruited either 
by direct email or the snowballing technique. Interviewees were identified through 
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their subject of instruction. I not only interviewed civics teachers, but also history, 
geography, and language arts teachers due to the fact that civic values and 
national consciousness are shaped in many different subjects and curricula 
(Faas 2011; Ahonen 2001; E. Doyle Stevick 2007; Galston 2001).  
 Teacher participation was voluntary. This accounts for the varying 
numbers of teachers (and subjects) that were interviewed for each school. The 
teachers who declined to participate cited time constraints and, on one occasion, 
unsuitability of their subject for my project3. The teachers of the twelfth level, i.e. 
the grade level of the student participants, were prioritized as interviewees. 
However some teachers that volunteered handled other secondary school levels. 
These interviews were still conducted on the basis that the students’ civic 
education is not limited to their last year in secondary school, but takes place 
throughout their childhood and adolescence. As such, the discourses and 
narratives of schoolteachers throughout students’ education are likely to impact 
the conceptualizations of citizenship and identity they hold in their last year of 
secondary school.  
 The adult research participants were given coded identifiers similar to 
those of the student respondents. Teachers’ coded identifiers are based on their 
school and their subject (e.g. EB History/Civics or Pushkin Russian Language). 
Table 3.2 summarizes the adult population, but it is addressed in more detail in 
Chapter Four.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 A geography teacher that was contacted replied that she only taught physical geography and 
not human geography, and therefore would be unhelpful to interview given the subject matter of 
the research. 
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Table 3.2 Teacher Study Population  
School Identifier Self- Reported Ethnolinguistic Heritage 
Koidula School      







  Koidula Geography 1 Est 
  Koidula Geography 2 Est 
  Koidula Extracurriculars Est 
   
Tammsaare School     
  
Tammsaare 
History/Civics 1 Est 
  
Tammsaare 
History/Civics 2 Rus 
  
Tammsaare 
History/Civics 3 Est 
   
Pushkin School      Pushkin History/Civics 1 Rus 
  Pushkin History/Civics 2 Rus 
  Pushkin Russian Language Rus 
  Pushkin Geography  Est 
   
Tolstoy School      Tolstoy History/Civics Est 
  
Tolstoy Estonian 
Language Mixed Heritage 
  Tolstoy Geography  Rus 




 Interviews were arranged according to the needs and preferences of the 
interviewee. Interviews with teachers were conducted in their classrooms during 
after-school or break hours. Education government officials and NGO 
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representatives were interviewed in their offices (with one exception of an 
interview being conducted in a café of the interviewee’s choosing).  
 The interviews were recorded on digital voice recorders and lasted from 
45 to 70 minutes. As with the student study participants, all adult study 
participants were offered the opportunity to have an Estonian or Russian 
interpreter present. Throughout the majority of the adult study population, 
interviewees who were younger and/or operated at state and international levels 
opted not to request an interpreter. The English skills of these interviewees were 
exceptional, decreasing the possibility for miscommunication and linguistic 
barriers. Conversely, older and locally based interviewees requested an 
interpreter. These interviews included both conversations that were completely 
conducted via the interpreter and those where the interviewee spoke English and 
consulted the interpreter for vocabulary and/or grammar issues. In order to 
maximize the interviewees’ comfort levels and decrease awkwardness, the 
interpreters used shared the same ethnolinguistic background of the individual 
being interviewed. 
 
Reflexivity: Power Relations in Focus Groups and Interviews 
 Several scholars of qualitative methodologies have written on the inherent 
subjectivities of research. Constructivists, such as feminist and critical theorists, 
in particular “reject the basic premise that an objective researcher discovers 
truths from preexisting data” (Staller 2010, 1159–60; C. Brown 2005). In 
qualitative data collection techniques such as focus groups and interviews, the 
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interviewer and interviewee(s) are situated within a power relation that is imbued 
with meanings, values, and ideas. This power relation affects both the researcher 
and respondent because during focus groups and interviews the “encounter 
becomes a mutually co-operative event” (Seale 2004, 253; Secor 2010).  
In recognizing the researcher’s embeddedness within the social 
interactions and iterative processes, qualitative methods theorists have argued 
the imperativeness of reflexivity—that is, the awareness on the part of the 
researcher that she affects and is affected “by the research processes and 
outcomes” (Haynes 2012, 72). Moreover, reflexivity on the part of the researcher 
must extend past the face-to-face encounter and into the data analysis and 
research dissemination phases (Gee 2011; Haynes 2012; Fetterman 1989; 
Oakley 2004; Staller 2010).  
A properly reflexive researcher acknowledges not only that she and her 
respondent(s) are entrenched in webs of power relations, but also the way in 
which she herself is situated within the respondents’ communities. This involves 
both the way that she perceives her respondents and the way that her 
respondents perceive her (Nagar and Geiger 2007). Moreover, when the 
researcher is or becomes, to a certain extent, an “intimate insider” of the 
community she is researching or at least “friendly” with the respondents (both of 
which I experienced during fieldwork) the importance of reflexivity is elevated 
(Taylor 2011). The relationships that develop between the researcher and 
respondent(s) will generate certain biases, but will also enhance the richness of 
the data gathered.   
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In my case I decided to ingratiate myself with the Estonian community by 
studying the Estonian language intensively for six weeks prior to fieldwork. The 
Estonians regard their language as the hallmark of their identity and are 
extremely protective of its continued existence because of the small number of 
people who speak it (approximately 1 million speakers in 2012). Estonians are 
known for looking favorably upon any foreigner who learns their language, not 
only because it is a basic show of respect but also because Estonian is a 
notoriously difficult language to study and therefore requires a great deal of effort 
on the part of the learner.  
Being able to converse, however basically, in Estonian was quite clearly 
appreciated by Estonian respondents—both young and adult—and generally 
effected friendly, relaxed atmospheres during interviews and focus groups. The 
Estonian research participants were forthcoming and enthusiastic during 
conversations, demonstrating a genuine appreciation for an American researcher 
that was informed about Estonian culture, language, and history. To be sure, my 
“insider” status should not be interpreted as complete knowledge of sociocultural 
substance and structure, but rather as a status that makes me “privy to 
undocumented… knowledge of the people and cultural phenomenon being 
studied” (Taylor 2011, 9).  
This insider status was not uniformly applied, however. My abilities in 
conversational Estonian did not, for instance, preclude some Estonian 
respondents’ from adopting a somewhat frosty attitude towards an American 
whose research project included questions of Russophone experience and 
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minority politics in Estonia. With Estonian adult respondents in particular there 
was an emphasis placed on addressing the historic plight of Estonians at the 
hands of Russian and Russophone interlopers and the subsequent right of 
Estonians to preserve and protect their culture and identity.  
Conversely, Russophone respondents tended to perceive me as a friendly 
figure (even though my Russian was extremely limited) because I was 
acknowledging the legitimacy of their perspectives and narratives. Several 
Russophone respondents expressed surprise that an American (a) knew that 
there was a Russophone diaspora living in Estonia and (b) did not appear biased 
against Russophones because of the historically contentious politics between the 
USA and Soviet Union/Russian Federation. These attitudes contributed to many 
open, frank, and enthusiastic responses from Russophones. 
These and other factors contributed to the relationships that I developed 
with many of the research participants, and those relationships continue to 
influence this dissertation in several aspects. For instance, the reciprocal 
perceptions developed between myself and the respondent(s) are evident 
through the tenors of the conversations. The mood and tone of each 
conversation contributed to the ongoing development of these mutual 
perceptions during the encounter, which affected the amount and content of the 
information exchanged. Furthermore, the natures of these relationships have a 
continual effect on the ways in which I interpreted and engaged with the data 
during the analysis process. In consideration of trust and confidence between my 
respondents and I, great care was given to use and analysis of the data so as to 
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respect the contexts in which statements were made while also reporting 
information relevant to my research. 
 
Secondary Data Collection  
The two main components of data collection outlined above were 
supplemented by the collection of Estonian government policy documents, 
census data, reports, and assessments, EU educational policy documents, 
treaties, and directives, newspaper stories, and other secondary materials that 
provide context and background information for this project. Particular focus was 
given to the following: Estonian reports and assessments of integration programs 
and policies; newspaper articles about interethnic issues in Estonia; EU 
programs and policies aimed directly at youths in new member-states; and 




Evaluative Criteria and Coding 
 The analysis of the primary and secondary data was organized around the 
topics that relate directly to the primary research questions detailed previously in 
this chapter: 
 
1. Student Identities: Focus groups were evaluated according to (a) the 
respondents’ definitions of themselves (e.g. Estonian, Russophone, 
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European, and/or combinations of these); (b) their explanations of the 
boundaries of their identities as well as the permeability of those 
boundaries; (c) the terms of belonging to or exclusion from certain identity 
groups and the processes of Othering different individuals and groups the 
extent to which ideas of diversity and multiculturalism are relevant to their 
identities; (d) their sense of possessing rights an identities somewhere 
other than Estonia; (e) the extent to which school is a meaningful site of 
citizenship formation; and (f) the extent to which identities if formed 
through everyday experiences. 
 
2. Civic Education Curricula and Discourses: For this element of the 
research, both focus groups and interviews were assessed according to: 
(a) teachers’ engagements with nationalist discourses of citizenship and 
identity in the classroom; (b) teachers’ engagements with discourses of 
multiculturalism, diversity, and tolerance in the classroom; (c) the 
characterizations of national, post-national, and multicultural citizenships 
within the classroom and wider school environment; (d) the styles of 
informal curricula present in the classroom; (e) students’ perceptions of 
the discourses, narratives, and strategies employed by their teachers in 
the classroom; and (f) students’ conceptualizations of citizenships, 
identities, and terms of belonging as compared to the discourses they and 
the teachers report experiencing in the classroom. 
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3. Youth Geographies: For the final research component focus groups were 
examined according to: (a) students’ narratives of Tallinn’s urban 
geographies; (b) descriptions and evaluations of Tallinn’s sociocultural 
landscape, including specific places of memory such as monuments, 
memorials, and museums; (c) spaces of inter- and intra-group social 
interaction, including where students feel comfortable and uncomfortable, 
and places that they frequent or avoid; (d) evaluations of the meanings 
and identities attached and/or ascribed to certain spaces and places in the 
everyday urban landscape of Tallinn; and (e) the sense of belonging or 
exclusion felt in particular areas or places in the city.  
 
The evaluative criteria were formalized through color-coding of focus 
group and interview transcripts. The coding guide designated certain colors to 
responses regarding various topics, such as self- and Other- identify traits, 
dialogues on language use, perceptions and meanings assigned to urban 
spaces, discussion of traits and significances of national and European 
citizenships, and explicit and implicit evaluations of identity and citizenship 
discourses disseminated in schools and other everyday spaces.  
 Following fieldwork, focus group and interview recordings were 
transcribed and prepared for analysis. Both primary and secondary data were 
evaluated using the discourse analysis technique. Discourse analysis, according 
to Gee, “is the study of language-in-use” and is appropriate for this research 
project because “all language is political and all language is part of the way we 
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build and sustain our world, cultures, and institutions” (Gee 2011, 10). By 
language-in-use, Gee refers to meanings, attitudes, and opinions that are 
conveyed both through and beyond words. Discourse analysis involves careful 
selection of formal and informal, direct and indirect themes of meaning in oral 
and written texts. Such an analysis technique is salient to the research questions 
that shaped this project because,  
 
“people build identities and activities not just through language, but 
by using language together with other “stuff” that isn’t language… 
[Discourses are] ways of combining and integrating language, 
actions, ways of thinking, believing, valuing, and using various 
symbols, tools, and objects to enact a particular sort of socially 
recognizable identity.” (Gee 2011, 28–9)  
 
In order to establish patterns in narratives and identify discourses, student 
and adult respondent traits were input into several spreadsheets labeled with a 
specific criteria topic. In each of these spreadsheets, the participants’ responses 
on the particular topic were matched with the corresponding participants’ 
identifying traits. For instance, focus group or interview participants’ traits, such 
as sex, school-language medium, ethnolinguistic identity, mother tongue, or 
subject taught in school, were listed on each spreadsheet. Then, the responses 
of each participant for the spreadsheet’s particular topic were matched to the 
particular participant’s identity trait. This allowed for their responses to specific 
topics to be sorted and compared within the group according to particular identity 
traits. This ordering was not intended to make broad generalizations across the 
entire student or adult study population. Instead, this sorting aimed at identifying 
patterns within sub-groups of the study population in order to establish what, if 
any, connection existed between sex, school-language medium, ethnolinguistic 
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identity, mother tongue, or subject taught in school and the nature of the 
responses for that particular topic. Table 3.3 is a partial example of one such 
spreadsheet that grouped responses by identity trait. 
 
Table 3.3. Partial Spreadsheet Sorting of Coded Responses  
 
School	  Medium	   Heritage	   Sex	   Study	  Abroad?	   Length	  
Estonian	   Estonian	   F	   Yes	   Short	  
Estonian	   Estonian	   F	   Yes	   Short	  
Estonian	   Estonian	   F	   Yes	   Short	  
Estonian	   Mixed	   F	   Yes	  
Long/perman
ent	  
Estonian	   Mixed	   M	   Yes	   Short	  
Russian	   Mixed	   F	   Yes	   Short	  
Russian	   Mixed	   M	   Yes	   Short	  
Russian	   Russophone	   M	   No	   n/a	  
Russian	   Russophone	   F	   Yes	   Short	  
 
 
Additionally, a reverse sorting of responses and identity traits was 
performed. Instead of sorting responses by identity traits, identity traits were 
sorted by responses. Clustering by response allowed comparing and contrasting 
between subgroups according to how various members of the study population 
delineated boundaries of social groups, characterized citizenship meanings, and 
ascribed identities on urban spaces. Moreover, this type of grouping aided in 
evaluating response patterns that may not have coincided with preconceived 
notions and assumed linkages between certain identity traits and attitudes or 
opinions. For instance, it became clear that narratives of multiculturalism were 
woven into the fabric of several Russophone students’ conceptualizations of 
belonging and exclusion in Estonian society. Not all Russophone students, 
however, incorporated those tenets into their thoughts on issues of belonging. 
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Thus, the multiculturalist ideas cannot be assumed to be part of the narratives of 
all Russophone students, much less all Russophones in Estonia, simply because 
they are part of the minority group. However, by comparing student responses 
that included and omitted multicultural ideas, I was able to explore the ways in 
which different discourses play into individuals’ perceptions of the politics of 
identity and belonging in Estonia.  
One benefit of performing these two sorting methods on responses and 
participant identity markers was the ability to monitor consistency, or lack thereof, 
in respondents feedback about interrelated topics. For instance, in clustering one 
set of responses that involved phrases and ideas related to multiculturalism and 
another set of responses that privileged specific ethnolinguistic or cultural 
practices over others, I was able to discern which members of the study 
population contradicted themselves, either explicitly or implicitly. As is discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter Four, this analysis revealed trends that suggest 
uneven internalization of multicultural discourses amongst the student 
respondents in particular.  
The focus group and interview transcripts were analyzed according to the 
criteria outlined at the beginning of this section. I engaged with the results of the 
research in the context of both the issues of Estonian youth citizenship that 
interested me and the possibilities that I anticipated prior to fieldwork. To begin, 
these young people’s unique position of being the first wholly post-Soviet 
generation in Estonia posed interesting questions about the interaction between 
historical narratives of older generations and young people’s personal 
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experiences in a democratic Estonia. I anticipated the possibility that tensions 
between Estonian and Russophone youths would have remained high due to the 
strong influence of negative narratives in home spaces, but also the possibility 
that EU membership and discourses may have served to mediate animosity 
between the younger generations. Second, the fact that the young people in the 
proposed study population holding Estonian citizenship have been European 
citizens for almost a decade at the time of fieldwork raised compelling questions 
about their perceptions of supranational citizenship and the attendant rights and 
responsibilities.  Third, my research on Estonian society prior to fieldwork led me 
to expect that the students’ personal geographies would reflect the socio-spatial 
divisions of Tallinn’s neighborhood districts. I was interested in exploring whether 
this expectation was true and how the student respondents ascribed meanings 
and identities to urban spaces and place. Finally, I was interested in what kinds 
of narratives and discourses operate in secondary schools in Tallinn and how 
they address multi-scalar identities and citizenships in a post-Soviet, European 
Estonia. The data collected in focus groups and interviews was compared 
against these assumptions and that analysis was used to inform arguments 
made regarding the original research questions noted above on youth citizenship 
and identity formation. 
 
Conclusions 
 To summarize, this dissertation has applied qualitative research methods 
in the framework of a case study. This research project has attempted to achieve 
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results that are valid and reliable through methodic ordering, organizing, and 
analyzing of focus group and interview transcript data. The highly contextual, 
rich, and subjective explanations of citizenship and identity perceptions 
presented by young people in Tallinn required the use of qualitative techniques to 
produce substantive and considered arguments about such unquantifiable topics. 
While not concerned with generalizing findings to young people in Tallinn (or 
Estonia) as a whole, this dissertation has focused on using conclusions to 
engage with and contribute to current theories and approaches to citizenship, 
identity, and belonging in youth populations. 
 As the body of citizenship and identity theory indicates, myriad 
conceptualizations of belonging, rights, and community membership have been 
advanced. What is apparent in these contemporary conceptualizations, 
regardless of the numerous striations within the literature, is that citizenship, 
identity, and belonging are not static statuses or institutions, but rather are 
constantly being formed and reformed in and through various spaces, places, 
and scales. In assessing the data and investigating the potential trends that the 
data suggests, this dissertation intends to illuminate the ways in which young 
people actively negotiate, mediate, and contend with multi-scalar discourses of 
belonging, identity, and rights and the spaces in which these practices occur. 
These issues are the focus of Chapters Four, Five, and Six, which use focus 
groups and interviews to engage with contemporary understandings of 
citizenships.
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Chapter 4 
Youth Citizenship and Identity:  
Navigating Multiple Discourses of Belonging 
 
Liberal theory defines citizenship as a rights-based institution that 
establishes a relationship between citizens and the state. Liberal theory rests on 
an “ideal of universal citizenship” that assumes an equality amongst all 
individuals in a political community and that “transcends particularity and 
difference” (Young 1989, 250). Most contemporary definitions of citizenship treat 
the universality of citizenship as a given and draw upon a vocabulary of equality, 
sameness, and generality. Critics of these assumptions of liberal theory, 
however, suggest that such universal ideals are in fact predicated on difference. 
Liberal theorizations have been challenged by cultural conceptions of citizenship 
as a “collective identity… that can come to terms with cultural difference and 
fragmentation” (Bosniak 2000, 967). 
Because equality has been “conceived as sameness” (i.e. a status that is 
common to all regardless of differences of identity, social standing, or economic 
worth), the universality of citizenship, it seems, rejects particularity. Universality 
means that citizens are defined by what they “have in common as opposed to 
how they differ” and that laws and rules are the same for everyone because they 
are “blind to individual and group differences” (Young 1989, 250). However the
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 universality of citizenship in contemporary liberal democratic nation-states has 
failed to bring real equality to all individuals within the polity. Groups and 
individuals with formal national citizenships still experience significant 
discrimination and marginalization. 
Several citizenship theorists have interrogated the reasons why universal 
citizenship has not led to the actual equality of all groups and individuals in 
nation-states (Bosniak 2000; Laclau 1992; Young 1989; Wemyss 2006; W. 
Brown 2008). These discussions indicate is that although membership in the 
nation-state is defined in universal terms of common identity markers and the 
“same general point of view” (Young 1989, 251), those identity markers and the 
elements of the same point of view are in fact defined by the particularisms of the 
dominant group in society. Hence, the privileged position of the dominant group 
in a liberal democratic nation-state results in “the universalization of its own 
particularism” (Laclau 1992, 86; emphasis mine) that “asserts its…perspective on 
social events as impartial and objective” (Young 1989, 268). Universal 
citizenship, therefore, is nothing more than a particularism that has been made 
dominant.  
The liberal insistence on “equality as sameness” has resulted in a 
universal citizenship that suppresses or ignores group difference in order create 
a seemingly homogenized society. In recent years multiculturalist theory and 
practice have attempted to rectify the suppression of social and group differences 
through discourses of acceptance and tolerance of cultural difference. 
Multiculturalism has attempted to decouple the idea of sameness from equality 
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by arguing that recognition of socio-cultural difference will lead to true freedom 
and equality for all citizens. These multicultural ideas have permeated most 
Western societies, as evidenced by the European Union’s assertion that it is 
“united in diversity,” among much else. But the ambiguity in multiculturalist 
discourse and theory is revealed in actual practice of multiculturalism. Brown 
(2008) argues that multiculturalism usually means mere toleration of difference 
that allows the majority group to maintain privilege. Wood and Gilbert (2005) 
have observed that multiculturalism in practice involves superficial contact with 
the Other in urban, educational, or political spaces. The result is that theories of 
multiculturalism are not as adept at alleviating the tension between universalisms 
and particularisms as its proponents suggest. In fact, multiculturalism reproduces 
these tensions and indeed brings them into sharper relief, calling into question 
whether the tensions between universalisms and particularisms can actually be 
alleviated at all. 
Still, multicultural discourses are important in Western societies. They 
operate in myriad spaces and have become important fixtures in political and 
social discourses (Kymlicka 1995; Balint 2010). The pervasiveness of 
multicultural discourse in educational spaces in particular demonstrates their 
significance in Western nation-states. Schools are principal sites where 
citizenship ideals are communicated to young people and are sites where youth 
encounter and learn about multicultural discourses. Multicultural discourses, in all 
their variations, are attempts to articulate and practice sameness and difference 
in diverse societies—i.e. they are modes of negotiating the tensions in attempting 
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to reconcile the idea of equality and sameness with the reality of differences and 
disparities. As such, despite the theoretical paucity of multiculturalism, the 
consideration of multicultural discourses is requisite to the examination of 
articulations of belonging and identity. 
Western nation-states and the EU are constantly contending with how to 
balance between promoting nation-building/social cohesion and espousing 
tolerance/respect of difference. This contention is thrown into sharp relief in 
culturally diverse divided societies. Multicultural integration is often framed as the 
desirable alternative to assimilatory nationalisms, processes that involve minority 
culture(s) being subsumed under the dominant culture. However, a more critical 
reading of these two apparently competing discourses illuminates that both rely 
on processes of Othering particular groups. Similar logics of alterity lead both 
multiculturalist and nation-building practices to define terms of membership in 
society, thereby locating Other groups on the margins or outside the boundaries 
entirely. Multiculturalism does not eliminate assimilatory practices and 
discourses, but rather complements and complicates them.  
This chapter attempts to illustrate how the narratives of national 
citizenship and multiculturalist discourses inform identity, citizenship, and 
belonging among young people Estonia. The analysis here assesses how the 
student interviewees ascribe identity traits to the Estonian citizen. This chapter 
also highlights the interaction between the student participants’ positionalities 
within the Estonian nation-state and the Western liberal democratic ideals of 
multiculturalism (framed as tolerance) that circulate in their educational spaces, 
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and how this interaction produces conceptions of belonging, identity, and 
citizenship.  
The findings from this study reveal that the politics of identity and 
citizenship in Estonia are much more complex than simply a titular majority 
discriminating against a minority. Young people are prone to delineating the 
parameters of substantive citizenship along ethnolinguistic and socio-cultural 
lines rather than solely on formal politico-legal membership in the nation-state. 
This results in a contestation over who is or should be allowed access, and under 
what terms, to all citizenship rights—legal, political, socio-cultural, and civil. The 
legacy of Estonia’s Soviet era has produced an unpredictable environment where 
the “righting of historical wrongs” interplay with the country’s dominant narrative 
of leaving behind an oppressive Soviet past and embracing a free, democratic, 
Western European way of life and with ideas of diversity and tolerance.  
Estonian students often justify universalizing the particular identity traits of 
ethnic Estonians as a means of protecting an Estonian culture that has been 
historically threatened by outside forces (most recently Russophone Soviet 
forces). At the same time, Russophone students adduce the ethnopolitics of 
exclusion that Russian-speakers have faced in recent years to highlight threats to 
their own identities and to argue for their sociocultural and linguistic rights. 
Tellingly, however, Russophone students continue to maintain and assert their 
differentiated identities in response to the dominance of the Estonian group even 
while holding Estonian citizenship—in other words, they assert sameness and 
difference at the same time. Further complicating the students’ ideas and 
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opinions is their use of multicultural keywords like “tolerance” and “acceptance” 
(likely influenced by EU discourses on unity in diversity in schools and wider 
society) without any indication that they have internalized attitudes of 
acceptance. The meanings of citizenship articulated by both the Estonian and 
Russophone students reflect stereotypes, prejudices, assumptions, and 
experiences, which in turn lead to frequent contradictions. As such, the student 
focus groups reveal highly complex and dynamic conceptions of belonging and 
citizenship.  
This chapter focuses on the tensions between universalisms and 
particularisms present in both multicultural and national citizenship discourses 
and how these tensions interact with the students’ ascriptions of identities in 
Estonian society. Using data collected in student focus groups and teacher 
interviews, this chapter examines the tension inherent in negotiating an 
apparently universal citizenship that is in fact underscored by differences in the 
students’ positionalities in the Estonian majority or Russophone minority. It pays 
special attention to the discourses that they encounter in schools by exploring the 
similarities and differences between the narratives of the students and their 
teachers. This chapter is organized around the contexts in which young people 
form citizenship and draws on direct quotations from focus groups to illustrate 
how they negotiate, contest, and perform citizenship in Estonia. These contexts 
are not limited to formal circumstances in which official discourses of citizenship 
circulate, but also include mundane spaces of daily life where engagements with 
informal, varied configurations of citizenship take place. The varied nature of the 
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contexts in which young people develop understandings of belonging suggests 
that citizenship is a multi-sited process, de-centered from the nation-state, and 
present everyday spaces and interactions 
 
The Classroom as Forum for Multiple Discourses of Citizenship 
 Educational spaces have long been recognized as a crucial site for the 
development of citizens. Through national curricula that emphasize certain 
“values and behaviors associated with citizenship” and particular readings of 
history nation-states not only create citizens but also the identity of the national 
community (Staeheli and Hammett 2010, 668; Michaels and Stevick 2009; 
Ahonen 2001; Kolossov 2003). In Western nation-states civic education curricula 
are by and large aimed at forming democratic citizens, and are therefore laden 
with discourses of liberal ideals of citizenship that include “post-national” 
narratives of equality, tolerance, and multiculturalism (Banks 2008; Ahonen 2001; 
Soysal 1997). Such post-nationalist narratives work to reconfigure rights, 
identities, and political processes that are traditionally associated with the nation-
state, instead conceptualizing citizenships as institutions and processes that exist 
above and across national boundaries. But even in liberal democratic nation-
states that espouse multicultural ideals there are narratives and discourses of 
nationalism that seek to construct a cohesive national community (Faas 2011; 
McGlynn et al. 2004). The coexistence of different civic ideals reflects multiple 
layers of citizenship discourse that are multivalent rather than uniformly 
constructed. As a result, national and post-national agendas and discourses 
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operate and circulate simultaneously, generating ideological tensions that must 
be then negotiated by teachers and students in the classroom (Hromadzić 2008; 
Sarah L. Holloway et al. 2010). 
 The coexistence of national and post-national discourses in educational 
spaces is particularly evident in divided societies. Civic education in divided 
societies that are in the process of transitioning to liberal democratic systems is 
particularly fraught because of the simultaneous desires to establish and solidify 
a national community and a democratic citizenry. These discourses exist in 
tension with each other, creating civic education discourses that “veer between 
ethnocentrism” and liberalism (Faas 2011, 480). During the process of 
democratic transition in divided societies, teachers are required to both navigate 
the “step-by-step” transformation into democratic civic education (Toots 2003, 
566) and the shift in the grand narratives used in nation-building (E. Doyle 
Stevick 2007; Ahonen 2001; Staeheli and Hammett 2010). In such situations 
classroom environments are not only subject to conflicting discourses and 
narratives but also to widely varying attitudes projected by teachers, parents, and 
fellow students (Sarah L. Holloway et al. 2010; Hahn 1998).  
 Teacher narratives, classroom environments, and curricula discourses, 
along with the actual built environment of the school, are all parts of what Brown 
(2005, 79) calls the “schoolscape”—the “physical and social setting in which 
teaching and learning take place.” Schoolscapes are the everyday contexts that 
comprise part of educational spaces, where abstract educational plans, ideals, 
and values are enacted. If educational spaces, broadly construed, are where 
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citizens are developed, schoolscapes are the crucial “factor[s] in shaping 
identities and dispositions toward” citizenship and the terms of belonging in 
society (K. D. Brown 2005, 79). The schoolscape contributes to what Havel 
(2009, 18) describes as “the panorama of everyday life,” which constantly, and 
often subliminally, “reminds people… what is expected of them...and what they 
must do well if they don’t want to be excluded” from society. For young people in 
particular, schoolscapes are prominent and oft-encountered parts of the 
“panorama of” their everyday lives and geographies and transmit ideas not only 
about what it means to be considered legitimate in society, but also about what it 
takes to be excluded from society.   
 The schoolscape encompasses discursive, material, and even virtual 
elements that convey particular assumptions about identity, belonging, and 
legitimacy in wider society. School curriculum topics and projects, displays of 
patriotic symbols in the school and on the school grounds, ceremonial events 
and rituals, and even the use “of the school’s social space” (K. D. Brown 2005, 
84) are components of the schoolscape that (re)produce and even reinforce 
certain understandings of citizenship, the rights it affords, and what individuals 
(and groups) those rights are available to. Schoolscapes are undoubtedly an 
important factor in shaping educational spaces, but must still be considered as 
situated within young people’s broader geographies amongst other spaces where 
socialization takes place, most notably the home and other familial settings (S. L. 
Holloway and Valentine 2000; Wylie 2004; Thomas 2008). 
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 Schoolscapes in divided societies, (i.e. those with divided school 
systems), often introduce an added layer of complexity to the education of 
citizens. Even if there is a formal, official, national curricula that applies to all 
schools in a divided educational system, the physical and social settings in which 
learning takes place will vary considerably depending upon whether the school’s 
student body is from the majority group, minority group, or is mixed (integrated) 
(Hromadzić 2008; Hayes, McAllister, and Dowds 2007). In addition to the 
possibility that schoolscapes will vary according to societal divisions drawn along 
ethnocultural lines, young people’s experiences within the schoolscape will 
interact with experiences in other spaces of their personal geographies, 
especially the home and the segregated urban landscape. In minority group 
schools, for instance, “required” curriculum material dictated by the government 
(read: dominant majority), as well as the way in which that curriculum is 
presented, may serve to reinforce feelings of exclusion and “supply raw material 
for partisan narratives” (Barton and McCully 2005). Therefore, the schoolscape, 
as the “vital, symbolic context” in which values and ideals are “socially supported 
in the school” (K. D. Brown 2005, 79), will serve to communicate standards of 
legitimacy, but cannot guarantee that all young people will experience the 
schoolscape similarly or positively. 
 Civic education is not a static, unilateral process in which adult agents 
pour knowledge into young people who are passive receptacles of ideas and 
information (S. L. Holloway and Valentine 2000; Hahn 1998; Skelton 2010). Civic 
education is a dynamic set of processes in which teachers, students, and 
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communities interact within highly contextual political, economic, social, and 
cultural situations to actively “rework both the teaching of citizenship education 
and the ways in which it is received” (Staeheli and Hammett 2010, 668). 
Therefore it is important to consider the role of teacher narratives, classroom 
environment, and the school site in the production and reproduction of citizenship 
discourses within the space of the school.  
 As detailed in chapter one, the Estonian school system is divided by 
language-medium. Similar to this research’s student study population, there is a 
sizable overlap between the teachers’ ethnolinguistic heritages and the language 
medium of the school they teach in (with a few notable exceptions). This point is 
worth noting, as teachers’ backgrounds can and do figure into the informal 
curricula of teacher attitudes to produce varying classroom environments even 
when the formal curriculum is standard across schools (McGlynn et al. 2004; E. 
Doyle Stevick 2007; Hahn 1998). The special attention given to the teachers’ 
narratives and discourses is not meant to imply that the school is the only or the 
most meaningful space in which young people encounter and negotiate 
conceptualizations of citizenship; on the contrary, this section will illuminate that 
young people’s conceptualizations of citizenship and belonging cannot be 
compartmentalized within one discrete space, but must be understood as fluid 
products produced and reproduced through and in multiple spaces of their 
everyday geographies such as the home and the urban environment. Because 
citizenship education “inevitably has to confront the histories that children, 
parents, and teachers have lived” it will necessarily involve discourses of 
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citizenship, identity, and belonging in other spaces that complement, contradict, 
and mediate each other (Staeheli and Hammett 2010, 668). The evidence 
gathered in this project substantiates these theorizations of the school as one of 
many important spaces for young people’s development and understanding of 
belonging and identity in society.  
 My findings suggest that Holloway and Valentine’s (2000, 771) 
theorization of “the spatiality of the school as both embedded within wider socio-
spatial relations and as a site through which these are reproduced” is a helpful 
mode of understanding the complexities of young people’s negotiation of 
citizenships and identities.  In comparing the responses of the student and 
teacher study populations I discovered that the interaction between students’ 
experiences in the school and in other spaces (e.g. the home and the city) is 
complex and circular—that is, the discourses that students encounter in the 
classroom inform and are informed by the discourses and experiences in other 
spaces. This finding suggests that citizenship is produced in a very uneven 
political landscape, resulting in multiple productions of ideas about belonging. 
Importantly, the discourses of identity and belonging that the students from 
different schools speak ardently about vary between multiculturalisms and 
ethnonationalisms, and between nationalisms and supranationalisms.  
 The sections that follow will address the citizenship discourses present in 
all participant schools, how teacher narratives of these discourses vary, and the 
patterns that emerge between the students from the same participant schools. 
Responses and narratives from both teachers and students are compared in 
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order to demonstrate these patterns. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 outline the teacher and 
student respondents’ identifiers, school affiliations, and ethnolinguistic heritages, 
and are provided for reference purposes. 
  
Table 4.1 Teacher Study Population 
 
School Identifier Self- Reported Ethnolinguistic Heritage 
Koidula School      







  Koidula Geography 1 Est 
  Koidula Geography 2 Est 
  Koidula Extracurriculars Est 
   
Tammsaare School     
  
Tammsaare 
History/Civics 1 Est 
  
Tammsaare 
History/Civics 2 Rus 
  
Tammsaare 
History/Civics 3 Est 
   
Pushkin School      Pushkin History/Civics 1 Rus 
  Pushkin History/Civics 2 Rus 
  Pushkin Russian Language Rus 
  Pushkin Geography  Est 
   
Tolstoy School      Tolstoy History/Civics Est 
  
Tolstoy Estonian 
Language Mixed Heritage 
  Tolstoy Geography  Rus 
 *Est = Estonian; **Rus = Russian/Russophone 
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Table 4.2 Student Study Population 
      










School           
  Koidula Girl 1 Est Est Est Est 
  Koidula Girl 2 Est Est Est Est 
  Koidula Girl 3 Est Est Est Est 
  Koidula Girl 4 Est Est Est Est 
  O-Koidula Girl 5 Mixed Heritage Est Est & Rus Est 
  Koidula Boy 1 Est Est Est Est 
  Koidula Boy 2 Est Est Est Est 
Tammsaare 
School           
  Tammsaare Girl 1 Est Est Est Est 
  Tammsaare Girl 2 Est Est Est Est 
  Tammsaare Girl 3 Est Est Est Est 
  Tammsaare Girl 4 Est Est Est Est 
  Tammsaare Girl 5 Est Est Est Est 
  Tammsaare Girl 6 Est Est Est Est 
  
O-Tammsaare 
Boy 1 Rus  Est Rus Est 
Pushkin 
School           
  Pushkin Girl 1 Rus Rus Rus Est 
  O-Pushkin Girl 2 Mixed Heritage Est Rus Est 
  O-Pushkin Boy 1 Mixed Heritage Est Est & Rus Est 
  Pushkin Boy 2 Rus Rus Rus Est 
  Pushkin Boy 3 Rus Rus Rus Est 
  Pushkin Boy 4 Rus Rus Rus Est 
  Pushkin Boy 5 Rus Rus Rus Est 
  Pushkin Boy 6 Rus Rus Rus None  
  Pushkin Boy 7 Rus Rus Rus Est 
Tolstoy 
School           
  Tolstoy Girl 1 Rus Rus Rus Est 
  Tolstoy Girl 2 Rus Rus Rus Est 
  Tolstoy Girl 3 Rus Rus Rus Est 
  Tolstoy Boy 1 Rus Rus Rus Russia 
  Tolstoy Boy 2 Rus Rus Rus Est 
  Tolstoy Boy 3 Rus Rus Rus Est 
*Est = Estonian/Estonia; **Rus = Russian/Russophone
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Teacher Narratives of Belonging  
 A pattern that emerges across the student study population as a whole is 
one of inconsistent but frequent narratives about multiculturalism, tolerance, and 
respect of diversity. This pattern, I argue, results from students’ contradictory 
encounters with multicultural and ethnocultural discourses both in their individual 
school sites and in the wider Estonian educational space.  
 In almost all of the teacher interviews there are persistent referrals to 
multiculturalism and tolerance. All but one of the teachers interviewed explicitly 
state that teaching tolerance and respect of difference to their students are major 
priorities. Unsurprisingly, the teachers’ descriptions of their classroom practices 
and narratives indicate that there are different levels and modalities of 
engagement with multicultural discourse depending upon subject, teacher 
ethnolinguistic heritage, and school-language medium, and combinations of 
these elements. But the manner in which the teachers describe their classroom 
narratives and teaching methods invariably include multicultural vocabularies: 
 { [The     is to be tolerant. Tolerance. Because it doesn’t matter, are you Russian, are you  
Tolstoy Estonian Language: [I say to them] Ok, it doesn’t 
matter who you are! The most important thing is that we are human 
beings, and you have to be tolerant about everybody. 
 
Tammsaare History/Civics 2: We have [the topic] pluralism—
that our nation, that Estonian society here, we are from different 
nationalities, we are multicultural. 
 
 Pushkin Russian Language: During the lesson I can’t just 
specify that here we are studying Russian culture and here is 
Estonian [culture]. So they are connected… We respect traditions 
of both cultures…I don’t like to separate them. 
 
 Koidula Geography 1:  When we talk about human 
geography [I want] them to understand that the world is very…that 
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there are different parts to the world and that they understand these 
differences and that they respect them. 
  
 Tammsaare History/Civics 1: Tolerance is in the curriculum—in 
the history curriculum especially. We have these seven points that 
we have to get through to them, and one of them is tolerance and 
empathy [sic]… I have to think about this, when making up every 
lesson, to ask some questions or tell some stories to make them 
think about this, because empathy is the thing to learn. 
 
From these interviews we can gather that multicultural rhetoric is very present in 
each of the four participant schools. The teachers’ responses suggest that if 
nothing else students are exposed to formal curricula that define the “right” 
attitude toward identity and belonging is a tolerant, multicultural attitude. The 
statements in student focus groups mirror those in teacher interviews. Both 
groups verbally espouse narratives of tolerance and assert that a tolerant attitude 
is what everyone “should” adopt. Because we know that multicultural ideals are 
heavily present in formal educational curricula, I argue that the students’ verbal 
affirmations of multicultural values are directly related to their official prominence 
in the classroom. 
 However, students’ tolerance talk, which is addressed in detail in the 
following section, is often followed by contradictions, qualifications, and 
particularisms that contravene their espousal of multicultural ideas. Careful 
consideration of the teacher interviews reveals that ethnoculturally specific 
narratives and discourses are also present in the teachers’ formal and informal 
curricula. Most, but not all, teachers make statements in the interviews that 
indicate an implicit bias towards prioritizing Estonian or Russophone culture, 
depending upon the ethnolinguistic heritage of the teacher in question.  
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Teachers with Estonian heritage tend to reify the importance of Estonian 
cultural traits to forming the base for Estonia’s multicultural society even if they 
speak passionately about respecting Estonia’s cultural diversity elsewhere. 
Koidula History/Civics teacher, for instance, describes Estonian national identity 
to the students as “our own language, our own culture, our own traditions, and 
loyalty to our country.” The use of “our” is a verbal bordering practice that 
legitimizes Estonianness, locates Russophone characteristics outside the bounds 
of the national community, and implies that it is the responsibility of non-
Estonians to assimilate in order to be accepted. Tolstoy History/Civics, an 
Estonian teaching in a Russophone school, notes that the history of the Soviet 
era “is difficult to teach” because “I think the students have their own different 
opinion from the ‘official road’ opinion on the subjects in Estonia, because their 
opinion is based on Russian media.” Tolstoy History/Civics goes on to describe 
how national identity is discussed with the Russophone students: 
 
[Defining national identity] is a problem for me. I had this problem 
during my lessons. And actually, I asked my Russian students, 
“who do you think you are? Are you Estonians or Russians? So the 
majority of my students are Estonian citizens, but for example if I 
ask them, ‘if you go to Russia, what do you say? Are you Estonians 
or Russians?’ They say ‘we are Estonians.’ But then I say, ‘but you 
don’t speak Estonian!’ So there is a great paradox with this 
question. 
 
This teacher’s unease with the students’ lack of proper Estonian qualities filters 
into the classroom environment and exists in tension with the multicultural 
discourses in the formal curricula. These two teachers’ narratives imply 
suspicions, if not rejections, of multiculturalism in the classroom, attitudes that 
	   139 
have been observed in Estonian heritage teachers elsewhere (Valdmaa 2002). 
These teacher’s comments exemplify a pattern in the interviews with Estonian 
heritage teachers that reveal the simultaneous presence of formal multicultural 
curricula and informal ethnocultural biases in the classroom.  
 Teachers with partial or fully Russophone backgrounds tend to put 
emphasis on the fact that, while respecting Estonian culture is important to 
integration, Russophone culture has the right to exist in the Estonian nation-state 
and that Estonians have a responsibility to accommodate Russophone culture 
within their society. Russophone teachers create dialogues about tolerance and 
respect of cultural diversity in their classrooms, but also exhibit attitudes of 
marked sympathy for the Russophone community in Estonia. One example of 
this is how Pushkin Russian Language describes the importance of continued 
Russophone education in Estonia: 
 
It’s important to learn [Russian] because, firstly, it’s our culture, it’s 
our national identity, and we are integrating, but we are not 
assimilating into the Estonian society…I think we should think of the 
[fact that] there are not only Estonians living here, but we have to 
honor the other cultures. We [Russophones] have to be proud of 
our own.  
 
Similar to Koidula History/Civics, Pushkin Russian Language uses the word “our” 
repeatedly, which reifies the borders in Estonian society drawn along 
ethnolinguistic lines. Again we see national identity not connected to citizenship 
in the nation-state, but to a cultural subgroup within it. These teachers’ 
perspectives seem to understand integration as a process of protecting rights to 
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cultural identity rather than meaningfully incorporating multiple cultures into one 
society.  
The invocation of “right to identity” is used alongside discourses of 
“respect for diversity” in Tolstoy School as well. Tolstoy Estonian Language, who 
is of mixed Estonian and Russophone heritage, explains to her students that 
learning Estonian is crucial to economically successful citizenship. But Tolstoy 
Estonian Language also displays sympathy for the students being forced to take 
60 percent of their courses in Estonian when they haven’t been properly 
prepared: 
 
Sixty percent, I think that is a very big number…I do not think [it is 
fair] because first of all, I don’t believe that they [the students] have 
to study history or civics in Estonian because they don’t understand 
it. They don’t speak Estonian well enough to understand about 
history or the other issues in the Estonian language… They won’t 
be able to speak about those dates or events of historical wars and 
so on in Russian because they won’t have the Russian vocabulary. 
They just take a text [in Estonian] and they are learning every 
phrase from there, but they don’t understand what it means. 
 
 What these examples from both Estonian-medium and Russian-medium 
school teachers imply is that the students in this study move through and in 
school spaces that are unevenly populated with seemingly contradictory 
discourses of multiculturalisms and cultural particularisms. This fact creates a 
school space within which opportunities for critical engagement with 
multiculturalism are often contradicted or obscured by ethnocultural rhetoric, 
leading the students to impart inconsistent narratives about the terms of 
citizenship, identity, and belonging in Estonia.  
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 These characteristics of the student respondents’ individual school sites 
are reinforced by the wider structure of the Estonian education space. The fact 
that the Estonian education system is divided along ethnolinguistic lines serves 
to reinforce the socio-spatial division of young people’s everyday geographies 
and to reduce the number of opportunities to have meaningful encounters with 
the Other group. While simply putting young people from the different groups 
together in a physical setting is no guarantee of meaningful exchange, 
educational spaces are much more likely to induce cross-cultural dialogue and 
mixing than a short-term space like a youth camp. The majority of the teachers 
interviewed for this project use group projects and in-class discussions on a 
frequent basis in their classrooms. However, because schools in Estonia are 
largely ethnolinguistically homogenous, group classroom activities and lesson 
plans are facilitating interaction between students who are, by and large, 
ethnolinguistically similar. Such consequences are not lost on the student 
respondents in this study. O-Koidula Girl 5 asks “How can you learn the [other] 
culture if you are surrounded by people like you?” Tammsaare Girl 2 and Pushkin 
Boy 2 both make mention of the fact that, similar to home and leisure spaces, 
schools are not a place where Estonian and Russophone youths encounter each 
other and therefore “don’t communicate” as a result of spatial separation. 
Perhaps Pushkin Girl 1’s pithy summary of the benefits that young people would 
reap from an integrated school system is most telling: 
 
It would be great if the schools would have been mingled so 
Estonians and Russians, for example, would go to the same 
school. And maybe some different cultures also—this would be 
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great for practice for language. In the future there wouldn’t be any 
problems between people who don’t understand each other 
because there wouldn’t be any language barrier, if they had studied 
together. 
 
 Integrating the Estonian education system is quite easier said than done 
as the language barrier exists not only between Estonian and Russophone young 
people, but also between Estonian and Russophone teachers and administrators 
(Toots 2003; Laitin 2003; Kulu and Tammaru 2004; Brosig 2008). But the data 
that I gathered through focus groups, interviews, and participant observation 
indicate that the division of schools along ethnolinguistic lines works to 
exacerbate the negative effects of Estonia’s wider socio-spatial divisions, 
especially in terms of inter-cultural dialogue and experience between young 
people.  
Divided along linguistic lines, it is important to note that Estonia’s schools, 
to say nothing of each classroom, engage with varying discourses of citizenship 
and belonging in unique ways and thus produce unique schoolscapes. The 
following section demonstrates the impact that specific school environments 
have on student narratives by examining patterns that appear between student 
respondents from the same participant schools.  
 
Pushkin School: The European Discourse 
 The students from Pushkin School consistently and earnestly speak of 
their identification as European citizens. More than conceptualizing their EU 
citizenship as a means to access Western European spaces of economic wealth 
and education, several of the students perceive it as a marker of their 
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membership in a cross-cultural space of human rights where respecting diversity 
is “the European way” (Pushkin Boy 2). To be sure, the Pushkin School students 
value the rights that they are afforded by their EU citizenship. But these students, 
more so than students from the other three participant schools, specifically 
address the inherent values of learning about other cultures and respecting 
cultural diversity. The Brussels discourses of cooperation, connection, 
integration, and facilitation of communication that are part of the EU’s mantra are 
present in the focus groups, such as O-Pushkin Boy 1’s statement that: 
 
I totally value EU citizenship because, firstly, it’s really cool to be a 
part of something big, and also it connects many people and it’s 
easier to cooperate with different European countries. 
 
 Furthermore, the students from Pushkin School are more apt to embrace 
a European identity. For O-Pushkin Girl 2 being European is a “big part” of her 
identity; Pushkin Boy 3 uses “European” to define himself because he has many 
European heritages in his family lineage; Pushkin Boy 4 states that he would say 
he’s “European. That’s the best.” It is also worth noting that Pushkin Boy 4 
previously held an Alien’s passport and tells me that he applied for Estonian 
citizenship in order to get European citizenship. As such, it can be argued that 
the student participants from Pushkin School not only look favorably upon 
Europe as a “space of rights” but also readily identify as European. 
 Each of these student participants is taught history and civics by Pushkin 
History/Civics 1. In their civics class they are exposed to in-depth lessons and 
activities on the EU, how it functions, what its core values are, and current 
controversial issues including enlargement and financial bailouts. But Pushkin 
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History/Civics 1 goes beyond formal, required curricula and also applies for EU 
education grants and enters his students’ work on EU topics into competitions. 
During a tour of Pushkin School I viewed a large wall mural comprised of 
students’ one-by-one foot paintings depicting their interpretations of the various 
rights outlined by the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
The mural (Figure 4.1) is a product of a Comenius Program4 competition that 
students of Pushkin History/Civics 1’s twelfth level civics had won the year 
before. The school received the funds for students to paint pieces and then to 
construct the mural, which also included large plastic panels featuring the main 
articles of the Charter in Estonian.  
 The schoolscape of Pushkin School, then, is heavily laden with specific 
ideas and messages about these students’ place in a European Estonia. In 
another corridor of the school a display cases features student interpretations—in 
Estonian and English—of a Comenius sponsored in-school project on how 
Europe is changing and Estonia’s role, alongside other member states, in that 
change. Even the in-school and after-school activities, which are a part of a 
cooperative program between Tallinn and Turku schools to promote the health-
and well-being of young people, are financed in part by the EU. For Pushkin 
School students, the social and physical setting in which they learn legitimizes 
the values and ideals of a united, but multicultural, Europe. 
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Figure 4.1. Mind Your Rights EU Project. Pushkin 
School’s mural featuring students’ depictions of the articles 
of the Charter of Fundamental Freedoms of the European 
Union, which is a product of an EU sponsored grant 
competition under the Comenius Program. 
 
 
This mural project is one of many examples of how students at Pushkin 
School encounter EU discourses in their schoolscape. The active engagement 
with EU discourses beyond lectures through hands-on activities, open 
discussions, and grant competitions can be connected to the frequency and 
ardency with which the students from this school speak about EU citizenship and 
identity. But other participant schools in this study also engage in EU sponsored 
learning activities, and the student respondents from those institutions did not 
speak as often or as avidly about their Europeanness. Analysis and comparison 
of the focus group data reveals that the students from Pushkin School, uniquely 
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amongst the student study population, enthusiastically relate multiple stories of 
engaging with EU discourses outside of the space of their classroom. 
 Several of Pushkin School students comment on their travels to Western 
Europe and their engagement with other European cultures. O-Pushkin Boy 1 
and Pushkin Girl 1, for instance, talk about their trip to London for a school 
project and how they enjoyed discussions on different stereotypes that 
Europeans have about each other. Pushkin Boy 4, Pushkin Boy 5, and Pushkin 
Boy 7 enthusiastically recall going to Brussels on an EU-paid trip after “We won a 
competition. We had to make a video about ‘My Home as A Part of Europe’.” 
Other students recount travels to parts of Europe with their families and friends 
that have enticed them to want to return to other parts of Europe to learn more 
about other cultures, practice their language skills, and meet new friends.  
 These narratives of positive experiences with Europe and EU discourses 
in spaces both within and outside of the immediate school environment are 
unique to the students from Pushkin School. This element of their focus groups 
suggests that meaningful experience with European topics in multiple spaces of 
their personal geographies translates into more frequent and more ardent 
espousal of European ideals, citizenship, and identity than the remaining student 
study population. This intimates that significant engagements within and through 
multiple spaces, rather than only the school, may produce greater internalization 
of European discourses on citizenship, identity, and belonging. 
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Koidula School: The Estonian Nationalist Discourse 
The students from Koidula School move within and through a unique 
school space. The history of Koidula School is closely tied with the history of the 
Estonian Republic. This unique feature of Koidula School plays a large part not 
only in formal classroom curricula, but also in the schoolscape via informal 
curricula of teacher attitudes, the school’s landscape, and extracurricular school 
events.  
Estonian history forms a powerfully symbolic part of the fabric of the 
school site at Koidula School. The physical setting of the Koidula schoolscape is 
heavily laden with nationalist materials, such as statues, flags, and photographs 
of past Estonian presidents. One of the most prominent physical features of the 
school’s grounds is a statue, originally created in the 1920’s to commemorate the 
Estonian War of Independence. Several students and one teacher from Koidula 
School died in the War of Independence, and the statue is considered by both 
teacher and student study participants to be an important reminder of Estonia’s 
struggle for freedom and the unique connection that their school has to the War 
of Independence. Soviet officials had the statue removed from the school 
grounds because of its connection to the Estonian War of Independence, an 
action that both the teacher and student study participants cite as evidence of 
Soviet “occupation” rather than “liberation.” Upper-secondary school students at 
Koidula School maintain the statue and the area around it, a job that is seen as 
an honor and privilege by both the teacher and student study participants.   
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The social setting of Koidula School’s schoolscape “officially sanctions” 
and “socially supports” (K. D. Brown 2005, 79) messages, values, and ideals of 
Estonian nationalism and the Koidula School’s role in Estonian history. At in-
school festivals and assemblies that take place throughout the school year, the 
Estonian flag and national folk costumes play prominent roles, as do Estonian 
songs, school traditions, and visits from alumni. O-Koidula Girl 5 remarks that 
“our school, I think we can say it’s a little bit different because our school is very 
patriotic…So we are taught to be more close to each other, and to respect our 
country, traditions, and history. So it’s a little bit different than the so-called 
‘normal’ schools.”  
The students at Koidula School display a pattern of articulating citizenship, 
identity, and belonging in Estonia from a platform of Estonian nationalism which 
demands assimilatory actions on the part of Russophones. Although they do 
address values of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism, there is a distinct 
element of Estonian nation-building discourse in these students’ narratives that 
permeates their broader conceptualizations of belonging and identity in Estonia. 
While Estonian particularisms are not unique to the students at Koidula School, 
these students also verbally construct hard and fast borders between Estonians 
and Russophones in society.  
 These student respondents are almost unanimous in the deep conviction 
that an individual is only Estonian when they speak the Estonian language, and 
that the extension of this identity into the parameters of legal citizenship is not 
only legitimate, but necessary for the preservation of Estonian society: 
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Koidula Girl 3: [It is fair that you have to know Estonian to 
obtain citizenship] because otherwise the Estonian language 
wouldn’t survive. 
 
Koidula Boy 1: The constitution says that one of the main 
goals of the Estonian country, the state, is to protect the Estonian 
language. 
 
Koidula Girl 4: If the person wants to be Estonian, then he 
studies the language, he accepts the rules…But a lot of Russians 
are like, they don’t want to learn the language… to be an Estonian 
[citizen] you actually need to know about Estonia and you actually 
need to know about the culture and language and everything. I 
think it’s the main point to become Estonian. I don’t know how 
difficult the [citizenship] exam is. But I mean, some kind of 
[citizenship] exam, there should definitely be one. 
 
The feeling of these students is that the hegemony of Estonian culture is a crucial 
part of the Estonian nation-building project. That project, moreover, is seen as 
one with historical precedence, cultural and linguistic legitimacy, and democratic 
validity due to the Soviet past (among other remnants of the Russian Empire’s 
influence). As a result, these students’ narratives rather obstinately link the 
extension of citizenship, identity, and belonging to Russophones with the 
Russophones’ acquiescence to the hegemony of Estonian culture. Russophones 
who do not meet such standards are deemed unassimilable and relegated to the 
margins of society. 
Formal and informal displays of Estonian nationalism, then, often abut the 
formal and informal curricula of multicultural discourses. Several of the teachers 
at Koidula School, for instance, relate how they teach tolerance in the classroom 
by “reiterate[ing] that we always look at the different opinions, the different sides 
of an issue, and we try to understand all the different sides” (Koidula History and 
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Civics 1) or by reminding students that “young Russians that we have here now, 
they have not come from Russia” (Koidula Geography 1). But an emphasis on 
the particularisms of Estonian culture as the standards of belonging in Estonian 
society is clear in teacher narratives as well: 
 
Koidula Extracurriculars:  [Estonian] independence is very 
fragile, so [the students] have to remember that and think about 
that for a second, because we have this scary neighbor next door! 
So independence is not self-evident for us. 
 
Koidula Geography 2:  The background of the school is 
very connected to the independence movement. And the population 
of small people who speak Estonian, the number of people is small, 
so the school has a focus of making sure that Estonianness stays 
alive and the language stays alive, and that the students care. 
 
Koidula Estonian Language: I think that in certain ways in the 
current local context it’s perhaps not even politically correct to be so 
proud of your nationality, or it might seem that it’s not politically 
correct. But I think that to really understand the Estonian people 
you have to understand the pride that they have in their resilience 
and in their survival, and the pride that they have in their unique, 
rich culture and how important that is to being an Estonian.  
 
The interviews with teachers in Koidula School are flecked with these nationalist 
narratives of varying subtleties. Moreover, these teacher attitudes are not lost on 
the student respondents who mention that “our history teacher really stresses the 
Estonian history, like, from world history. Estonian is most important” (Koidula 
Girl 3) and that their teacher makes it clear that “when you get marks, the marks 
that you get in Estonian history are more important” (Koidula Girl 1). This 
indicates that in addition to any nationalist undertones in formal civic education 
curricula, these students encounter the informal curricula of a nationalist school 
environment and teacher attitudes that belie the discourses of tolerance and 
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openness that circulate in their classrooms. The space of this school is, to some 
degree, situated within the space of the Estonian nation-building process. 
 The students from Koidula School also relate personal anecdotes from 
their experiences in urban spaces that may contribute to and/or reinforce the 
notion that Estonian culture needs to be protected—mainly from Russophones. 
Many of the students relate their memories of the Bronze Soldier crisis in 2007 
when the abrupt relocation of a Soviet war memorial from the city center to a war 
cemetery caused widespread rioting between Russophones and Estonians in 
Tallinn for two nights. Although the students were 13 or 14 years old when the 
incident occurred, the memories of the television footage (Koidula Girl 2), 
damage to the city center (Koidula Girl 4), and the fear they felt (O-Koidula Girl 5, 
Koidula Girl 3) are associated with the “Russians who were destroying the city” 
(Koidula Boy 1).  
A few students also relate everyday encounters with Russophones as 
evidence that Russophones are “too different” to fit in to Estonian society. 
Koidula Girl 4, for instance, harbors resentment for the Russophones she has 
encountered that do not want to learn Estonian because they’re leaving Estonia 
for good after school, feeling that this proves that they don’t care about or have 
loyalty to the country they’ve grown up in. Koidula Girl 1 tells of how Tallinn’s 
Russophones just “throw garbage everywhere” and have turned the Lasnamäe 
into a trash dump, which to her makes it “seem like they are differently raised and 
don’t have the same values as us.” While these anecdotes of banal encounters 
may seem insignificant, they are indicative of the pervading sense of 
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irreconcilable socio-cultural divisions that these students have between 
themselves and the Russophone community at large.  
The narratives of students from Koidula School suggest that what they 
learn in school is reinforced by what they observe outside of school, and that 
they tend to interpret Russophones and Russophone spaces through a notably 
nationalist lens. The stories, experiences, and encounters in everyday urban 
spaces that these students describe over the course of the focus groups 
illustrates that their formulations and negotiations of identity and belonging are 
situated in multiple spaces of their everyday personal geographies. Young 
people’s understandings of the nature of citizenship are constantly being shaped 
and reshaped by fluid movement within and through multiple spaces rather than 
statically conceived at discrete sites.  
 
Tolstoy School: Discourses of Alienation 
 The responses from the student participants at Tolstoy School illustrate 
the ways in which the discourses that they encounter in school can exacerbate 
and deepen existing feelings of exclusion and alienation developed in other 
spaces, such as their workplaces or leisure spaces. Tolstoy School is located in 
a less socioeconomically affluent part of Lasnamäe, the city district with an 
overwhelmingly Russophone population. As such, the school is situated within 
the wider socio-spatial geography of Lasnamäe that is largely devoid of 
Estonianness in general.  
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The physical setting of the schoolscape features a few displays of cultural 
artifacts and student projects about Russophone and Central Asian cultures, but 
otherwise the atmosphere is rather staid. The Estonian flag does fly near the 
entrance during school hours, but little else in the schoolscape suggests that it is 
an educational space for young people in an actively integrating Estonia. The 
social contexts of the school are, unsurprisingly, largely Russophone because of 
the ethnolinguistic heritage of the vast majority of the teaching staff and student 
body. However, other messages—such as the integration between Estonians 
and Russophones, or the ideals and values of the European Union—are not 
notably part of the social or physical setting of the schoolscape. Thus, the 
schoolscape of Tolstoy School runs counter to, or at least does not provide a 
fostering atmosphere, for official curricula requirements that are dictated and 
tinged with Estonian nationalist overtones.  
The students from Tolstoy School tend to identify more strongly and 
singularly as Russophone, explicitly deny any feelings of Estonianness, and 
harbor overtly anti-Estonian feelings. Much of their feelings of alienation are 
linked to experiences such as encounters with Estonians who “discriminate” 
against them (Tolstoy Girl 3) or their perceptions that Estonians are wealthier 
because they dominate the economy and purposefully exclude Russophones 
from economic and occupational spaces (Pushkin Boy 1, Pushkin Girl 2). Their 
responses also indicate that the students the Bronze Soldier crisis from 2007 
plays a continuing role in their perceptions of belonging and understandings of 
identity in Estonia. The broad consensus amongst the students is that the 
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Estonian government moved the Soviet war monument to deliberately 
discriminate against the Russophones, disrespect Russophone history, and 
make the Russophone community feel like outsiders in Estonia.  
The pattern of disaffected narratives amongst these students is further 
revealed through their accounts of interactions in their school space. These 
students’ take history and civics from Tolstoy History and Civics, whose 
ethnolinguistic heritage is Estonian. By all accounts these students’ relationship 
with Tolstoy History and Civics is antagonistic and serves to deepen their 
feelings of alienation in society. In their history and civics class the formal 
curriculum requirement that this subject must be taught in the Estonian language 
dovetails with the informal curriculum of the teacher’s perceived anti-Russophone 
behavior to intensify the students’ resentment of their treatment at the hands of 
the Estonian nation-building process. This is illustrated by these students’ 
descriptions of Tolstoy History and Civics: 
 
Tolstoy Girl 3: Our history teacher is Estonian and he doesn’t 
really like Russians, and we quarrel a lot about this language topic 
because he knows Russian and he doesn’t want to speak it during 
the lesson. That’s why a lot of things within the topic of history and 
civics remain unclear. 
 
Tolstoy Girl 1: Actually, he [Tolstoy History and Civics] 
doesn’t state his opinion clearly. Sometimes, still, it slips, his 
opinion towards Russians. But still, we are used to his style of 
teaching. He teaches from the textbook.  
 
In the eyes of these student respondents their teacher’s attitude combines with 
the formal curricula of the textbook and language requirement to further 
marginalize them within their educational space. While these students have had 
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Estonian language lessons for several years, by their own admission their 
Estonian language skills are poor and therefore the requirement that 60 percent 
of their curriculum be taught in this language is unfair: 
 
Tammsaare Girl 1: It would be fair if we had had Estonian 
subjects, for example, since the fifth grade. But we have them since 
the tenth grade—and a lot of us choose, still, to do our 
examinations in Russian because we can’t do them in Estonian. 
 
Their lack of language skills combined with the fact that their history and civics 
teacher refuses to help them clarify topics in Russian, means that the students 
“have some things clear and some things remain unclear” (Tolstoy Boy 1). In line 
with these sentiments is Tolstoy Girl 2’s assertion that “the language is very 
difficult, and it’s very difficult to understand the topics. Maybe it’s because of the 
fact that this [history and civics] textbook has been written by Estonians for 
Estonians.”  
 The students from Tolstoy School perceive their teacher’s attitude and the 
formal curriculum as part of a wider, systematic discrimination of Russophones 
by Estonians and the Estonian nation-building project. Their accounts of their 
movements within and through their school space are interspersed with 
descriptions of their everyday geographies outside of the school, indicating that 
the pattern of feelings of exclusion from substantive citizenship and feelings of 
belonging in Estonian society emerge from encounters with discourses of 
exclusion multiple spaces. Analysis of the Tolstoy School student participants’ 
responses suggests that young people can also engage with negative 
discourses, such as discourses of exclusion, and not only with positive 
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discourses of rights and opportunities (e.g. Pushkin School students) or 
discourses privileging their identity over the Other’s (e.g. Koidula School 
students).  
 
Tammsaare School: Discourse in Only One Space 
 Tammsaare School is located in Mustamäe, Tallinn’s second most 
populous district. Tammsaare School is unremarkable in terms of reputation and 
draws its student body from Mustamäe’s middle-class, mostly Estonian 
population. Taamsaare’s School’s schoolscape is rather “averagely” Estonian. 
The students pass the Estonian flag flying in front of their school’s main entrance 
each day and the curricula certainly unfolds in a culturally and linguistically 
Estonian context, but the ideas and messages that are “officially sanctioned and 
socially supported” (K. D. Brown 2005, 79) in the schoolscape at Taamsaare 
school are not undergirded by any particular fervor. The school’s material 
environment is clean, orderly, and neat, but devoid of artwork or special displays 
featuring national, supranational, or multicultural topics. In short, the schoolscape 
of Taamsaare School is a physical and social setting in which the dominant 
Estonian culture is banal and rote, and generally not a setting where issues of 
nationalism, multiculturalism, or supranationalism are critically assessed or 
emphasized often.  
Analyzing the responses of Tammsaare School students revealed a 
pattern in their responses converse to that of the other student participants. The 
narratives of the students from the other three participant schools were more 
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fervent with regards to discourses that they had encountered both in school and 
in other spaces. The narratives of Tammsaare School imply that a discourse only 
meaningfully encountered in school, but not in other spaces, will tend not to 
appear significantly in young people’s narratives, or at least appear much less 
frequently.  
 The discourses of multicultural values and tolerance are present in each of 
the four participants schools via both formal and informal curricula (something 
that is addressed in greater detail in the following section). The interview with 
Taamsaare History and Civics 1 reveals that she embraces a discourse of 
multiculturalism that aims to dismantle prejudices and preconceived notions of 
the Other. She is convinced of the value of respect for diversity and takes great 
care to address the entrenched inequalities in her lessons. This teacher’s in-
class activities regarding controversial history topics are designed to strongly 
encourage critical thinking amongst the students. For instance, one activity 
involves assigning different groups in the class with an unidentified source of 
information, such as a newspaper article or pamphlet, and requiring the group to 
analyze and probe the message in the source and what it can reveal about 
nation-building, historical interpretations, political views, and so on.  
 Taamsaare History and Civics 1 also creates a discursive environment in 
the classroom that allows students to express their opinions and also to be 
questioned by her. For instance, Taamsaare History and Civics 1 relates the 
following account of a discussion on the topic of coexisting respectfully with 
Russophones in Estonia: 
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[Some students] talk about “bad Russians” and “Oh, they steal and 
they are hokum. Sixty to 70 percent of all the people in prison are 
Russians, in Estonia” and all that kind of stuff, and “the Russians 
are like this and that. And then [I say], “look to your left or right. This 
friend [classmate] of yours [who is Russian]—are you speaking 
about him or her? And usually they’re like, “no, no, he’s really ok, 
he’s normal and fun.” And I’m like, “Ok, who are you talking about?” 
I’m saying “you can’t generalize” and that kind of stuff. 
 
This interactive style of classroom discussion was exhibited when I 
observed one of Taamsaare History and Civics 1 class sessions during fieldwork. 
The students’ biases against opinions, peoples, and attitudes that are different 
from their own are evident, but this is something that Taamsaare History and 
Civics 1 is aware of. During the interview, Taamsaare History and Civics 1 
recognizes that the fact that the presence of Russophones in Estonia “is so 
normal and everyday” results in many students not perceiving their home 
country’s diversity as a multicultural space: 
 
When we talk about multiculturalism they are saying about this 
Islamic world coming to Europe and that we have this and that kind 
of people living everywhere and so on… last year [during a 
discussion] it was, I don’t know, a half an hour or something like 
that until someone threw in the Russian minority in Estonia.  
 
Taamsaare History and Civics 1 plans her lessons with the idof combating the 
biases and preconceived notions that her students bring into her classroom. 
However, this teacher states that the discourses the students encounter in their 
home and leisure spaces oftentimes have an impact that school curricula cannot 
overcome.  
 Taamsaare History and Civics 1’s perceptions of the strength of 
discourses in home and other everyday spaces outside of school is supported by 
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the focus group conversations between students from Tammsaare School (each 
of whom is a student of Taamsaare History and Civics 1). Analysis of these 
students’ focus group conversations reveals that, like the other student 
participants, they nominally acknowledge that being tolerant of Others is the 
correct modality of addressing difference. But Tammsaare School students 
speak much more forcefully about the legitimacy of Estonian sociocultural and 
political hegemony than about respecting diversity. This appears to be in spite of 
the fact that there is significant engagement with multicultural discourses in the 
space of their school through their lessons with Taamsaare History and Civics 1. 
 I argue that these students’ narratives of their movements in and through 
everyday spaces away from the school are evidence that they have few, if any, 
significant encounters with discourses of tolerance and/or respect of diversity 
outside of their classroom(s). These examples from focus group conversations 
are illustrative of these students’ prevailing attitudes towards belonging and 
identity in Estonian society: 
 
Tammsaare Girl 4:  My mother is an Estonian language 
teacher in a Russian school, and when she teaches the Estonian 
language, a lot of the Russian students don’t want to learn because 
they say that they don’t think that the Estonian language is 
important, and they fight for that. They don’t have to take exams in 
Estonian, and they don’t want to take classes in Estonian. They, 
like, fight for it. And my mother often comes home and is just 
astonished by the Russian younger demographic. They [her 
students] are [saying] “my grandfather said you Estonians are liars 
and so I think so too, because of his opinion.” So it’s a bit of a 
battle, that when you have a Russian student in your class, they 
maybe you can’t be that liberal about “Oh, Estonia, yay!” 
 
O-Tammsaare Boy 1: There are two types of Russians. One 
type is the bad type, because they’re more like, “It’s still Russia. We 
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came here! We saved Estonia, so they Estonians still owe us!” 
Historical matters [sic]. And they don’t want to learn the language, 
they don’t care about anything—they just live here. So that’s [the 
type of Russians in] Lasnamäe, mostly. 
 
Tammsaare Girl 2:  I think it was ok to move the [Bronze 
Soldier monument] because they [Russophones] can still visit if it’s 
important to them—it didn’t have to sit, like… to Estonians, to the 
older generation, maybe, it’s important that the Soviet thing doesn’t 
sit under your nose all the time. And [the Russophones] can still 
visit it, so I think that it’s ok. 
 
The students’ experiences and negotiations within their home space, Tallinn’s 
urban neighborhoods, and memorialized landscapes interact to produce 
narratives with a distinctly pro-Estonian bent. The responses of the students from 
Tammsaare School suggest that the varied spaces of everyday geographies are 
not discrete containers of action. They also imply that the space of the school is 
one of many significant spaces of young people’s personal lives. While not 
denying the influential power of school sites in young people’s conceptualizations 
and contestations of citizenship, I suggest that the Tammsaare School students’ 
statements reveal that discourses encountered in only one space, however 
meaningfully, may not inform young people’s broader narratives of identity and 
belonging.  
By engaging with student focus group and teacher interview responses, 
this section has argued that the space of the school is a crucial site for 
citizenship formation, but one that is situated amongst other spaces of young 
people’s everyday geographies. Moreover, the analysis has detailed the ways in 
which young people’s movement through and within the multiple spaces of their 
personal geographies inform and are informed by each other rather than existing 
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as discrete, static entities that contain uniform experiences and discourses. 
Giving special attention to the space of the school and the many, sometimes 
competing, discourses that circulate within it has also contributed to the 
argument that the politics of identity and belonging in Estonia are far more 
complex and dynamic than a unilateral discrimination of a minority by the titular 
majority. The remainder of this chapter will explore the students’ chaotic 
deployment of competing multicultural and identity-specific frameworks to 
conceptualize citizenship, identity, and belonging in Estonia.  
 
Student Narratives of Multicultural Citizenship in Contemporary Estonia 
 The previous section demonstrated that the interaction of various political 
discourses that young people encounter in schools is quite complicated. As a 
result, the student respondents are confronted with coexisting narratives of 
nationalism, post-nationalism, and multiculturalism in their classrooms. These 
multiple citizenship discourses are emphasized differently within schools, and 
then are further absorbed and acted upon differently by young people. Youths 
take the varying ideas presented in their complicated school discourses and then 
develop their own interpretations and explanations of multiculturalism and 
“tolerance” within the wider contexts of their daily experiences. Using the 
students’ diverse characterizations of the terms of tolerance in Estonian society, 
the analysis that follows attempts to illustrate that the production of citizenship is 
a disjointed process that takes place at multiple sites. 
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Both Estonian and Russophone students articulate the desire and need 
for a less conflictual co-existence between the two groups in Estonian society. 
Many of the students cleave their generation from their parents’ and 
grandparents’ and claim “tolerance” and “integration” as marks of the younger 
generation that is forward-looking, an attitude that has also been observed in 
young people in Northern Ireland (Leonard 2006, 2010). The influence of 
multiculturalist discourse is evident here because its vocabulary is utilized to 
mark the older generations’ attitudes as relics of an era of intolerance and the 
younger generations’ attitudes as proof of a modern, European Estonia that is 
not marred by historical trauma. The quotes below demonstrate how students 
rate their generation’s ability to reconcile the ethnocultural tensions in Estonian 
society very highly and blame the specter of the Soviet era for the older 
generations’ reluctance to move on.   
 
Tammsaare Girl 5:  For our grandparents, it was more like…  
O-Tammsaare Boy 1: Historical. 
Tammsaare Girl 5:  Yeah, historical. 
Interviewer:   So it matters more to them than it does to you? 
Tammsaare Girl 5:  Yeah. 
O-Tammsaare Boy 1: I think we do get along better… of course, it 
depends on the attitude, but yes, I think that our generations are 
more tolerating each other. 
 
Interviewer:  So there are some Estonians that don’t feel 
anything bad towards you? 
 Pushkin Boy 7: Yes. 
Pushkin Boy 6: Yes. The older generation tends to worry about 
problems between Russians and Estonians. But young Estonians 
are not like that. You can communicate with them. 
 
Pushkin Boy 3:  Today, it [nationality] is not so important, like 
right now, because there’s the process of integration and 
adaptation…But when nationality is taken into consideration…and 
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that’s why you’re making some decisions, only based on nationality, 
it is not right. It means that the person’s living in the past, and today 
the society is different. 
 
These quotes exemplify how the student participants view themselves as the 
standard-bearers of the tolerant, accepting attitudes that will push Estonia further 
into the “good” realm of modern, multicultural societies and further away from the 
days of yore when the divisions between Estonians and Russophones were 
dominant. However, as the next sections will demonstrate, the students’ actions, 
and even their words, contradict their initial avowal of multicultural attitudes. 
These frequent and sundry contradictions corroborate Leonard’s (2006; 2010) 
observations that the complexity of youth geographies in divided societies stem 
largely from young people’s tendencies to both reproduce the prejudices of their 
parents and develop their own ways of knowing the world that are separate from 
that of adults at the same time.  
 
Multiculturalism framed as “Tolerance” 
 The generational divide that the students perceive is framed by Estonia’s 
re-entry into the Western “club” of liberal democratic nation-states, demonstrated 
most notably by its membership in the European Union. Estonia’s place in the 
club of Western liberal democracies is cited as proof by the student respondents 
that their generation is living in a “different” more “tolerant” and “multicultural” 
world that that of their parents and grandparents. “Their” Estonia is one that is 
already exhibiting more tolerance than their parents’ Estonia, and multicultural 
values of Western liberalism will provide a sturdy foundation for the new, 
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improved Estonia that their generation is building. In focus groups, Estonian and 
Russophone students explicitly espouse the values and ideas that Western 
liberal democracies are built on, which, I argue, is indicative of the pervasiveness 
of liberal multicultural paradigm in Estonian society: 
 
Pushkin Boy 3:  I think that in the future when you speak 
Russian, this won’t draw any special attention because this is the 
European way of treating different nationalities, and Estonia is 
getting—trying to get [become] more and more of a European 
country. [emphasis added] 
 
Tammsaare Girl 2:  How to solve the problems [between Estonians 
and Russophones], like, in geography we talk about that. 
Interviewer: And do you think there’s anything you can do, or that 
people can do, to solve the conflict? 
Tammsaare Girl 3: Maybe be open-minded, and accept other 
people… 
Tammsaare Girl 1: Be tolerant. 
Tammsaare Girl 3: Tolerance. 
 
The predominant belief in the students’ narratives about the divide in Estonian 
society, how it should be handled, and how it will be handled in the future is that 
tolerance of difference is a cure-all. The liberal values of acceptance of diversity 
and respect of difference has made its way into the students’ conceptualizations 
of a good, stable society.  
 But the cracks in the multicultural foundations of the students’ narratives 
are revealed as the focus group discussions progress—or fail to progress—into 
how tolerance is or should be performed. The true keyword quality of the 
multiculturalist vocabulary is exposed when the students immediately contradict 
themselves with regards to advocating tolerance. For instance, being “tolerant” 
and open-minded are the go-to fixes for the conflict between Estonians and 
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Russophones. But it’s quickly revealed that, from the perspective of the Estonian 
student respondents, the onus is on the Russophones to facilitate integration. 
What the Estonian students, by and large, characterize as multicultural 
integration is actually an assimilatory demand placed on the Russophones. The 
platform of tolerance is laid upon a foundation of the Estonian language; 
tolerance can only be achieved after a smoothing out of cultural difference. 
Russophone students attempt to paint Estonian society—within the 
younger generations—as already tolerant and accepting. There are assertions 
that there is “no discrimination” between young Estonians and Russophones 
(Pushkin Boy 5, Pushkin Boy 6, and Pushkin Boy 7), and that when they do their 
part to respect the Estonian language and culture, their culture and language 
receive respect in return. But these assertions are countered within minutes with 
stories about how their attempts to tolerate Estonian culture are rejected by 
Estonians, (e.g. when Russophones try to speak Estonian the Estonians “just 
laugh about our accents”). Even in describing how Estonian and Russophone 
young people get along, there are numerous examples put forth by the 
Russophone students about how they are more tolerant, more accepting, and 
more “forward-looking” than their Estonian peers—which in itself speaks to 
persistent practices of Othering. The Estonian young people, the Russophone 
students claim, call on the Soviet past to discriminate against Russophones. 
According to Pushkin Girl 1, “all my [Estonian] friends, for example, they said ‘I 
don’t know why I hate Russians, but it comes with my family…and now I think 
that too.’ But they don’t understand why.” Aside from the incongruent 
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characterization of people who “hate Russians” as her “friends,” Pushkin Girl 1’s 
portrayal of Estonian young people as less tolerant is illustrative of the 
Russophone student population in this study. 
Some student respondents express bewilderment at how they are 
supposed to interact meaningfully with the Other group when there are significant 
obstacles to doing so in Estonian society. For instance, Koidula Girl 3 describes 
a summer camp5 that was designed to give Russophone and Estonian students 
a chance to connect with each other: 
 
Koidula Girl 3:  I’ve been to youth camps, and there was like 
half Estonians and half Russians. But actually, it was meant to 
make us come together and to work together and communicate 
with each other more. But as I was there, still, just Russians were 
just with Russians, and Estonians were just with Estonians. 
Although we had mixed groups and so forth, you still didn’t really 
like, talk to them. 
 
These summer programs, many of which are coordinated by the quasi-
governmental Estonian Integration and Migration Foundation (MEIS), are an 
attempt to foster meaningful communication between young people of different 
backgrounds as part of the Estonian government’s larger, ongoing “Integration 
Programs” detailed in chapter one. Judging from Koidula Girl 3’s experience at 
youth camps, the inherent ambiguity of the ideas of multiculturalism engenders 
anemic attempts by the government to implement them in society. In the absence 
of any firm conviction from the youth camp organizers about how the coexistence 
of Estonian and Russophone identities should be handled, the socio-spatial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The belief amongst policy makers that simply putting young people together in the same setting 
will break down barriers has been observed in other divided societies, such as Northern Ireland 
(Leonard 2010) and Lebanon (Staeheli and Nagel 2013). 
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divisions present in everyday Tallinn society are simply reproduced in the 
microcosm of the youth camp setting, further obscuring the path to achieving 
meaningful inter-cultural dialogue from the youths (if such a path even exists).  
 The socio-spatial division of Estonians and Russophones throughout the 
Estonian nation-state complicates matters for the students as well. As noted 
previously, Harju County (Tallinn) is the only county in Estonia with a relatively 
equal number of both Estonians and Russophones. The rest of the country’s 
demographic makeup is very homogenous, with the other 15 counties either 90+ 
percent Estonian or Russophone. O-Koidula Girl 5 notes that this areal division is 
a barrier to real integration: 
 
I have talked to people, both Russian and Estonian. Russians want 
to communicate and contact with Estonians more. But in their areas 
there is just no possibilities. They don’t have enough Estonians. 
And if you don’t have enough people then how can you practice 
your language [skills]? How can you learn the culture if you are 
surrounded by people like you? And at the same time people from 
the islands, they’re mostly Estonians, and they want to speak with 
Russians, but on the islands there are no Russians.  
 
O-Koidula Girl 5 is touching upon a larger structural deficiency within the policy 
framework of multiculturalism —how will the neatly packaged ideas of respecting 
and accepting cultural difference play out in the real world, where the everyday 
geographies reflect socio-spatial divisions along ethnolinguistic lines? The effects 
of such geographies are not lost on the students who participated in this study. 
Multicultural activity and real integration is not a reality for them because even in 
Tallinn, a city with a fairly equally mixed population, the spaces of the two groups 
are mutually exclusive, preventing meaningful exchanges with young people 
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different than they are. Moreover, as Koidula Girl 3’s experience with the youth 
camp suggests, putting young people together in an attempt to overcome the 
socio-spatial divisions is no guarantee of meaningful interaction either. The 
students’ responses suggest that it can be argued that the socio-spatial division 
is both a cause and a symptom of the politics of identity in Tallinn.  
Given cursory instructions to espouse the Western ideals of equality and 
acceptance but no mechanism to implement them, the students in this study are 
left to muddle through the particularities that abut such universalisms, 
contradicting and confusing themselves along the way. The outcome of this 
chaotic interaction of insufficiently articulated multiculturalist values and strong 
ethnolinguistic identities is a manifestation of what Wendy Brown calls 
“depoliticized tolerance” (W. Brown 2008, 13). Tolerance in Western liberal 
societies, Brown argues, is not the wholehearted universal acceptance of all 
cultures and groups, but instead is an identity-producing process that marks out 
the subjects of tolerance as “inferior, deviant, or marginal vis-à-vis those 
practicing tolerance.” Tolerance becomes “depoliticized” when inferiority or 
inequality is “constructed as either personal and individual in origin, or otherwise 
natural, religious, or cultural and therefore profoundly antithetical to claims for 
equality” (Gill, Johnstone, and Williams 2012, 514). Tolerating difference, then, 
becomes “not simply the withholding of speech or action” against things that are 
distasteful or deviant, but also “the enactment of social, political, religious, and 
cultural norms” (W. Brown 2008, 13).  
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Striations of Belonging: Framing the Particular as Universal  
The student participants acknowledge the conflict in Estonian society, the 
need to eradicate it, and the multiple barriers to its resolution. Their oft-conflicting 
comments and conversations demonstrate the inadequacy of the liberal 
discourses of multiculturalism that they encounter at school, at home, and in 
everyday urban spaces. That multiculturalism is inherently problematic because it 
requires the consideration of equality and cultural difference is exemplified by the 
students’ articulations of highly particular conceptualizations of the ostensibly 
universal space of Estonian citizenship.  
Because the cultural norms of the dominant (Estonian) group are enacted 
as the standard for the ideal universal citizen (Laclau 1992; Young 1989), the 
students are operating within an Estonian dominated framework that is portrayed 
as universal. This allows the Estonian students to “operate from a conceit of 
neutrality” (W. Brown 2008, 7) and forces the Russophone students to appeal to 
universalisms to claim their rights to perform their particular identities while 
maintaining equal status in society. The remainder of the chapter explores the 
student participants’ ideas and opinions on tolerance, acceptance, and belonging 
which they fold into their arguments regarding the definition, discussion, and 
performance of citizenship. The students’ engagements with these three issues 




	   170 
Depoliticized Tolerance in Action: Tolerable vs. Intolerable Behavior 
Both Russophone and Estonian students invoked the concept of tolerance 
in describing their interactions with the Other. The students contend with 
tolerance in terms of identity production and what cultural norms and values are 
enacted, which is symptomatic “depoliticized tolerance”. The depoliticization of 
tolerance involves “construing inequality, subordination, marginalization, and 
social conflict” as “natural, religious, or cultural” phenomena rather than as the 
historical results of power politics (W. Brown 2008, 15–6). Construing difference 
as innate to an individual or group “position[s] the tolerator as a morally superior 
individual” (Gill, Johnstone, and Williams 2012, 514; Dobbernack and Modood 
2011; W. Brown 2008). Unsurprisingly, the Estonian and Russophone students 
employ this depoliticized tolerance in quite different manners. The crucial 
element here is that there are fundamental disagreements between Estonian and 
Russophone students about what needs to be tolerated and how multicultural 
discourses are interpreted. 
For the Estonian students, as part of the titular majority, the Russophones 
are the subjects in need of toleration. In the Estonian students’ narratives, 
discourses of multiculturalism and tolerance become an “impartial practice” when 
in fact the act of tolerance is shot through with power politics that marginalize 
Russophone practices and culture. The Estonian students tend to legitimize the 
Estonian nation-building project by invoking the Soviet era when the Estonians 
and their culture were suppressed in favor of Sovietization and Russification. By 
couching protection of Estonian language as a move to counteract authoritarian 
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Sovietzation policies, these students are mimicking a “decolonization” discourse 
present at the state level in Estonia (Hughes 2005, 748–9). Any effort on the part 
of Russophones to detract from or not fully support the Estonian efforts to 
reestablish their national culture is marked as a disloyalty that is intolerant of the 
Estonian right to “preserve” their culture, and therefore will not be tolerated. 
Some of the Estonian students describe what type of behavior amongst 
Russophones qualifies for tolerance: 
 
Koidula Girl 2:  For me, it depends, for a Russian who is living 
here, on their attitude. Because when they are “yeah, we want to 
rule you” in the same manner as the Russian Federation, then I 
don’t like them. But if they’re like, “Ok, we’re living here, and we’re 
trying to learn” and be more open to our society and community, 
then I am ok with it. 
 
Tammsaare Girl 1:  I think it’s the education thing—that Russians 
should learn Estonian language… it’s a big part of [integration], 
because then we communicate more and understand each other 
more. 
 
Koidula Girl 4: Russian people who are more or less Estonian 
also, I don’t really care about [their Russianness]. 
 
To qualify for tolerance, Russophones have to be open to Estonian society and 
community. Otherwise, they are classified, as Koidula Girl 1 puts it, as people 
who “don’t respect that Estonia exists,” i.e. “intolerant” people that do not belong 
in the “tolerant” liberal democratic society that is the Republic of Estonia. Again, 
the Estonian students’ conversations showcase the convoluted interactions 
between the standard of equality, what person qualifies for that equality, and 
what identity belongs in Estonia.  
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Two common themes running through the Estonian students’ statements 
are that tolerance is deeply valued by free, democratic societies and that the 
people who qualify for tolerance are those who “respect” Estonianness. 
Importantly, these students also believe that the Russophone Other that 
“disrespects” Estonianness by retaining too much Russianness is in fact being 
intolerant of the mainstream values, and therefore does not belong in the 
tolerant, liberal democratic space of Estonia or qualify for tolerance from “true” 
Estonian citizens. 
 The Russophone students invoke tolerance—or access to it—as a way of 
demanding their equal rights as citizens. The overwhelming irony is that, as 
Laclau (1992, 89) noted, minority groups who are asserting their right to both 
equality in a nation-state and the right to maintain their group identity must make 
their demands in terms of the “universal principles that the minority shares with 
the rest of the community.” Simply put, the Russophone students demand their 
rights both to complete access to the space of rights in Estonia and retention of 
their minority identity by appealing to the universal principles that the dominant 
Estonian culture defines.  
 Most often the Russophone students speak in broad terms about what 
should be tolerated. But many of them are open to accepting Estonian cultural 
norms, not because they have a desire to abandon their Russophone heritage, 
but because it is seen as the pathway to being tolerated in return. Here again we 
see a shift in the invocation of tolerance that depends upon positionality within 
the nation-state. The minority group is apparently adhering to the dominant 
	   173 
group’s definition of tolerance because it is a value of wider society that will level 
the playing field for their group. However, what is actually happening is that they 
are acquiescing to the demands of the Estonian nation-building project which are 
framed in terms of “respecting” Estonian culture. Take the following exchange 
between students from Pushkin School: 
 
Pushkin Boy 2:  A lot of people just see your surname and they 
make a decision about you. But lately, I feel that there is more 
tolerance in society. Knowledge is taken into consideration, not only 
[your] language. So I think that you should respect the culture of 
Estonians and the local culture, and then we will be respected also. 
Interviewer:  And then you will be respected in return? 
Pushkin Boy 2:  Yes. 
Pushkin Boy 3:  I think this problem [intolerance] is being 
solved…of course it’s important to learn the state language and to 
respect the laws of the constitution and the traditions of the country, 
and of course tolerance is important. 
 
This exchange is illustrative of a larger assumption amongst many of the 
Russophone students. They have the right to their own culture, but in order to 
have that right respected by Estonians, they must reach out and make an effort 
to learn about the Estonian nation. A good citizen, according to Pushkin Boy 7, is 
“the one who treats other citizens equally. So we are one—all of the citizens, we 
are equal.”  
 At the same time that the Russophone students are calling on the idea of 
performing tolerance as a means to receive toleration, they are also leveraging 
what they perceive as lack of tolerance on the part of the Estonians to accuse 
them of not abiding by the universal principles that unite everyone in Estonia. 
Here we see the history of discrimination and oppression in Estonia brought into 
play again, except the Russophone students describe discrimination in the post-
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Soviet (rather than Soviet) era that has been directed at them by Estonians. 
Several students share the plight of their Russophone grandparents and parents 
in order to establish a pattern of Estonian discrimination, and then follow up with 
stories of their own experiences of it, to paint a comprehensive picture of their 
exclusion from the equality that they are entitled to by law. Tolstoy Girl 3 tells 
how “Estonians are offended when they hear the Russian language” and they 
“hang up the phone” on her when they hear it; Pushkin Boy 2 describes how his 
mother “was on maternity leave, she went to the state department for the 
unemployed, and she was treated very badly there. They didn’t respect her”; 
Pushkin Girl 1 cites the fact that young Estonians parrot the anti-Russian feelings 
of their families even though they “don’t understand why” and “they can’t explain 
it.”  
 The result of this complicated web of asserting their right to retain 
Russophone heritage while at the same time conforming to Estonianness is that 
there is no set pattern of Russophone student attitudes towards performing their 
citizenship. Their particular experiences lead them to different conclusions about 
how to contend with being a Russophone in Estonia, and more often than not 
their statements reveal internal contradictions.  
 For instance, Pushkin Boy 6 claims that he “doesn’t pay attention to such 
minor things” as when he is discriminated against and that young people should 
“look to the future” instead of focusing on identity, but then also laments that “a 
Russian native can’t find a place in the Estonian community.” Tolstoy Girl 3 
states that she “loves this country” because she was born in Estonia, but later 
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says she only has the “feeling of attachment with my family and relatives, and if I 
could take them all and leave from here it would be great.” Tolstoy Boy 1 draws 
on other multicultural nation-states to question the norms of tolerance in Estonia, 
arguing that “in Sweden, they have the second state language as Finnish. Still 
there are not so many Finnish people living there, [but] they [the Swedes] learn 
Finnish. And I don’t understand why we are forced to learn Estonian”.  
 The swirling vortex of invocations, applications, and qualifications of 
tolerance that are revealed in the focus groups with the Russophone students 
speak to the contestedness of the multicultural paradigm. The considerations that 
these young people making in defining membership in the Estonian community 
demonstrate that “tolerance” is central to this multiculturalist framework. The 
student respondents assert and act upon conflicting interpretations of tolerance, 
including what it means to be tolerant and also who is the subject/object of 
tolerance. Legal citizenship is not a guarantor of full access to participation in 
society or acceptance (or tolerance) in Estonian society. Rather, full access to 
the space of rights is predicated upon performance of a national identity—
Estonianness—that is presented as “common to citizens” but that in reality is 
wholly within the bounds of the Estonian nation-building project. What can be 
argued, then, is that multiculturalism does not actually present a viable 
alternative to assimilatory nationalisms. Multiculturalism simply complicates the 
politics of belonging by adding another layer of political discourse about who 
belongs and on what terms. 
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Conclusions 
 This chapter on the conceptualizations of citizenship amongst young 
people in Tallinn highlights the tensions inherent to identity and belonging in a 
national community—tensions that multiply when several different citizenship 
ideals and discourses coexist alongside one another. By addressing themes 
common to all of the student focus groups this analysis exposes the points at 
which competing discourses of national identity, multiculturalism, and belonging 
mediate the students’ negotiations of citizenship. The analysis shows that for this 
generation of wholly post-Soviet young people, historical inter-ethnic tensions in 
Estonia abut Western liberal democratic standards of multiculturalism and form a 
contentious environment in which they have to confront notions of belonging 
exclusion in Estonian society. Informed by identity politics, nationalist and 
multicultural discourses in everyday spaces, Soviet and post-Soviet history, 
stereotypes, and personal experiences with the Other, the students’ 
conceptualizations of citizenship are particular, often contradictory, and in 
continuous flux. 
 All of the student participants contend with notions of citizenship from a 
platform of Estonian nation-building processes. As part of the titular majority, the 
Estonian students tend to define the parameters of citizenship on identity 
markers particular to ethnic Estonians that have been naturalized as traits 
common to all ‘real’ Estonians, allowing them to speak in “universal” terms while 
mediating difference. The Russophone students negotiate their Other status by 
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asserting sameness—via their equal status as citizens—in order to maintain their 
difference.  
Although much of the student narratives on belonging reflect adult 
discourses and can be separated along ethnolinguistic identity lines, the young 
people are neither mirrors of their adult counterparts nor consigned to groupthink. 
The discourses that they encounter in the spaces of their schools are influential 
parts of how they conceptualize citizenship and identity, but that influence is 
situated within the wider contexts of the students’ everyday personal 
geographies. Their acceptance or rejection of the terms of belonging in Estonia is 
mediated by their personal experiences and negotiations of all of their everyday 
spaces rather than one or two particular spaces. A close analysis of the focus 
group conversations reveals that these young people are active agents in 
defining and performing their citizenships at the national level. The students’ 
abilities to contend with belonging and community membership on their own 
terms are also evident as they negotiate citizenship at other-than-national levels. 
The following chapters discuss how students’ negotiate citizenship in everyday 
urban spaces and in the supranational space of Europe. 
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Chapter 5 
Negotiating Citizenship and Belonging in Everyday Spaces 
 
 The previous chapter elaborated on the varying discourses of citizenship 
and identity that this study’s student participants contend with and deploy in their 
narratives of belonging in Estonian society. Recent scholarship illustrates that 
contemporary citizenship is mediated by diverse discourses that exist in multiple 
spaces and that are formulated in different political realms (Secor 2007; Ehrkamp 
and Leitner 2003; Nagel and Staeheli 2004). Young people, especially those in 
divided societies, contend with differentiated discourses of belonging and 
community membership that coexist in their everyday spaces (Skelton 2010; 
Leonard 2010; Cairns 2008). These students actively conceptualize, negotiate, 
and contest citizenship and identity as they encounter varied discourses of 
belonging and citizenship in the socially divided spaces of Tallinn.  
 Young people’s understandings of citizenship and belonging, then, must 
be considered as active processes that are continually being produced and 
reproduced by their actions and reactions in their everyday lives (Sarah L. 
Holloway et al. 2010; Staeheli 2008). The student participants’ narratives reflect 
the ways an individual moves through and within certain everyday spaces
	  
 such as spaces of language, memory, and the urban landscape. This chapter 
builds on this argument, suggesting that the young people in this study encounter 
and participate in spatial strategies of citizenship, which can be understood as 
“process[es] that fix identities, delineate boundaries, and discipline the meanings 
and practices of social space” (Secor 2004, 353). The socio-spatial division of 
Tallinn and Estonian society at large continues to play a central role in these 
students’ understandings, negotiations, and contestations of citizenship and 
identity. Although the students acknowledge discourses of multiculturalism and 
efforts to integrate the Estonian and Russophone communities, their personal 
geographies are still organized through ethnolinguistic, sociocultural, and 
territorial boundaries with varying degrees of permeability. The analysis in this 
chapter focuses on the ways that students’ operate within and through these 
bounded spaces and use and invoke space as a strategy for delineating the 
parameters of citizenship and belonging in Tallinn. 
 This chapter uses data collected in focus groups with the student study 
participation to engage with the students’ narratives of how they describe 
movement within and through certain everyday spaces as indicators of identity 
and belonging. In this chapter, when general patterns appear between students 
in schools of the same language medium the student participants’ responses are 
identified as being from “Estonian-medium school students” or “Russian-medium 
school students.” However, when patterns emerge along ethnolinguistic lines 
rather than school language medium lines, the students’ responses are identified 
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as being from Estonian heritage, Russophone, or “outlier”6 students. For 
example, if an outlier student at Estonian-medium school, such as O-Tammsaare 
Boy 1, who is Russophone, expresses opinions that are similar to students from 
a Russian-medium school, the student responses will be noted by ethnolinguistic 
heritage rather than school language medium in order to highlight that such 
response patterns appear outside the space of the school.  
 The previous chapter illustrated that the tensions between the 
universalisms and particularisms of citizenship are manifested through 
inconsistencies and slippages in the students’ narratives of belonging and 
citizenship in Estonia. This chapter extends that point by analyzing the ways that 
the student participants actively negotiate citizenship and belonging in Tallinn on 
a day-to-day basis. Drawing out the themes that the students consistently deploy 
in focus group conversations about negotiating citizenship, the following sections 
engage with students’ accounts of their movements in and through physical 
spaces of the city. By examining the ways that students actively negotiate 
citizenship this chapter expands upon the argument made in the previous 
chapter that the politics of identity and citizenship in Estonia are complex and 
dynamic, and that the terms of citizenship and belonging are complicated by the 
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Negotiating Citizenship and Belonging Through Language Spaces 
 Language is without a doubt the trait used most often to identify 
belonging in Estonia. Language has always been at the center of post-Soviet 
Estonian politics and socio-cultural relationships. Estonia’s constitution, which 
was written in 1938 and re-instituted in 1992, declares in the preamble that the 
Estonian state will “…guarantee the preservation of the Estonian nation, 
language, and culture throughout the ages…” before going on to establish 
Estonian as the sole national language in Chapter I (Constitution of the Republic 
of Estonia 1992). Moreover, the naturalization process for adults in Estonia 
includes an Estonian language exam component. These formalizations of the 
Estonian language as chief marker of national identity ensured in no uncertain 
terms that it also served as the chief marker of citizenship.  
 Government documents, street signs, history textbooks, and most 
officially sanctioned modes of communication explicitly and implicitly convey that 
Estonian is the only socially, and often legally, legitimate means of 
communication in wider society. Although publically funded pre-K, basic, and 
secondary education in Estonia is offered in Russian to accommodate the large 
Russophone minority, “the use of Russian is interpreted as a major threat to 
national identity and as a tool of ‘Russian imperialism’” (Kolossov 2003, 258). As 
alluded to in the previous chapter, a part of the Estonian government’s 
“Integration Plan: 2007-2012”, Russian-medium secondary schools are required 
to teach 60 percent of the curriculum in Estonian (regardless of the quality of 
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teachers’7 and students’ Estonian language skills). Many students’ perspectives 
on the “60 percent” rule indicate that it actually works to ensure socio-political 
exclusion by guaranteeing that Russophone students can’t learn effectively, 
which will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections. 
 Language in Tallinn, then, must be considered geographically in order 
understand how the built environment interacts with discursive practice. The 
students use language to ascribe identity to people, but also use it to ascribe 
identity to spaces in the city and, subsequently, the people who inhabit those 
spaces. In these young people’s narratives of identity and belonging, it is not only 
whether a language is spoken that is important, but also how the language is 
spoken about in spatial terms. The students’ descriptions of “Russian speaking” 
and “Estonian speaking” spaces in Tallinn speak to Kay Anderson’s assertion 
that discursive practices of cultural norms construct ethnically/racially segregated 
spaces, which give those norms “a concrete referent in the form of” concentrated 
linguistic communities physically present in the city (1987, 589). The students 
organize Tallinn’s districts and places by using language to locate the space of 
the Other, against which they define themselves. Their narratives imply that in 
Tallinn, language has become spatialized through the “recursive relationship” 
between discursive political practices and the “built environment” of the city 
(Farrar 2000, 5). Tallinn’s spaces of belonging and exclusion are constructed 
through the spatialization of language identity, resulting in an urban geography 
coded by language. In this way, the “city explicitly and implicitly reflects and 
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establishes the larger social and political order; in it, a society’s attitudes towards 
difference are codified.” Estonians’ and Russophones’ political subjectivities, and 
the political possibilities available to them, are “forged in and through the spaces 
they inhabit,” and therefore by the space of language. 
 The student respondents have strong opinions not only about the 
Estonian language, but also the Russian language. To these young people, the 
Russian language is just as important as the national language in defining and 
performing Estonian citizenship. Which language an individual chooses to speak 
the most often—and their attitude towards that language—will situate him or her 
in the space of belonging in Estonian society or in the space of the Other. 
 
“It’s Our Country, So Why Don’t You Speak This Language?” 
 As members of the dominant group, the Estonian heritage students tend 
to speak as if they have the authority to decide whether someone is “really 
Estonian” or not. Because the Estonian language is now taught in Russian-
medium schools and is required for adults to gain citizenship, the Estonian 
heritage students have narrowed ascribing full Estonianness down to the Others’ 
attitudes towards learning Estonian. For instance, the quotes below demonstrate 
a clear tendency to measure enthusiasm for the universal language of the 
Estonian citizen: 
 
Koidula Girl 2:  I don’t like the attitude that they [Russophones] 
have, “No, we don’t want to learn Estonian.” But those people of 
Russia, Russian people who come here and try to learn, and at 
least say some words in Estonian, that’s very welcoming and we 
are very open to it. 
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Koidula Girl 4:  If the person actually wants to be Estonian, 
then he studies the language, he accepts the rules or whatever—
but a lot of Russians are like, they don’t want to learn the 
language… 
 
Tammsaare Girl 1:  These Russians who are intelligent and smart 
and more…open minded, they understand Estonian, mostly. 
 
Tammsaare Girl 2:  It’s our country, and you [Russophones] live 
here, so why don’t you speak this language? I don’t understand 
that. 
 
Perhaps even more telling about the way that Estonian heritage students 
conceptualize the “true” Estonian citizen is their characterization of people who 
speak or have a desire to speak Russian. There is a line that people whose 
mother tongue is Russian must cross in order to be fully accepted into the 
Estonian national and civic fold, because their mother tongue is a clear indication 
that they have to work to become Estonian. Anyone who speaks only Russian, or 
appears to use Russian as their preferred language even if they have the ability 
to speak Estonian, is perceived as not legitimately belonging to the Estonian 
nation-state: 
  
Koidula Boy 1:  Fifty percent of Tallinn’s population is non-
Estonians, or… they might consider themselves Estonian, but they 
are speaking Russian. 
 
Tammsaare Girl 1: Why don’t they learn Estonian so they can 
speak with us? It’s our national language, so the Estonian language 
is more important than the Russian. 
 
Tammsaare Girl 6:  We have many, many Russians who don’t 
speak Estonian. So that’s why we get really upset, because they 
live here but they don’t speak a word of Estonian. 
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Koidula Girl 2: Like, when you say “I’m Estonian” but speak 
Russian, then we feel like, no you’re not. You should speak 
Estonian. 
 
Tammsaare Girl 4:  It’s not that uncommon that when you go to a 
store, the cashier speaks to you in Russian. They say privyet 
[informal hello in Russian] and they tell you the sum in Russian 
numbers. And I’m just—I usually stare at them and say, “in 
Estonian please.” So then they moan something out—they really 
don’t know the numbers. And its quite difficult for me. It angers me 
a bit. When you go to a bus driver and you ask, “What is the next 
station?” they don’t understand. They will talk to you in Russian, 
and that upsets me because I think that in my own country I should 
be able to talk to most of the people in my native language—well, 
the country’s native language. 
 
These comments are indicative of the general feeling of the Estonian focus group 
participants. Kolossov notes that “social groups tend to define themselves not by 
reference to their own characteristics, but by exclusion, that is by comparison 
with ‘strangers’” (2003, 257–8), an idea noted elsewhere (Jenkins 2000; Entrikin 
1999). Consequently, what the Estonian heritage students’ comments reveal is 
that they are contesting the notion that full citizenship is available to individuals 
who do not fully conform to the key marker of Estonian national identity: the 
Estonian language.  
 Tammsaare Girl 4’s anecdote about Russophone shop clerks and bus 
drivers makes apparent that language spaces overlap and intersect with other 
everyday urban spaces. With Tammsaare Girl 4’s story, though, it is possible that 
everyday experiences may be used to reinforce or support preexisting 
impressions of the Other (I demonstrate in the next section that Russophone 
students may do this also). I argue this point because of her example of bus 
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drivers. All Tallinn public transport—trams, buses, and ‘trolls’8—have digital signs 
clearly displayed over the driver’s seat that indicate the route’s next stop—in 
Estonian only. Because of the presence of these signs it is unlikely, based on my 
own personal experience navigating the city’s public transport routes, that any 
person would need to ask the driver what the next stop is. Although I don’t doubt 
that Tammsaare Girl 4 actually had this experience on a bus, I find it unlikely that 
she was expecting an answer in Estonian from the driver. 
 The importance of the language issue to how the Estonian heritage 
students demarcate the bounds of the Estonian citizenry cannot be overstated. 
The pronoun “our” is used regularly—at least once during each focus group with 
Estonian heritage students—to describe the Estonian nation-state and the 
language, and to irrevocably link the two. This demonstrates the extent to which 
the space of full citizenship and the space of the Estonian nation-building project 
overlap. The students’ use of “our” is a verbal bordering practice that locates 
non-Estonian speakers and, as I have demonstrated, those who speak Estonian 
but prefer to use other languages, on the outside of the “real” Estonians’ space of 
rights. But because of the students’ concomitant citing of Estonia’s history of 
oppression—particularly relating to the role cultural suppression via language 
use—under Soviet rule, the students act justified in asserting Estonianness via 
laws and norms on “their” language.  
 The Estonian heritage students acknowledge that the language barrier 
between themselves and Russophone young people is the greatest obstacle to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 A ‘troll’ is a bus that is connected to wire leads above the street. 
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integration and a lessening of tensions between the two groups. (This, it should 
be noted, is in contrast to the students’ earlier statements that their generation is 
more integrated than the older generations, and that the language barrier is 
“smaller” among young people.) The solutions suggested for the language barrier 
problem invariably involve Russophone young people learning Estonian rather 
than Estonian young people learning Russian9.  
 The only specific solution that students suggest, (and suggest multiple 
times), is the state-level solution of phasing-out the dual language school system. 
Many Estonian heritage students do not think that this poses a threat to 
Russophone language rights because, as Tammsaare Girl 2 points out, “they can 
speak Russian at home, nobody takes that away from them.” Her relegation of 
the deviant behavior—in this case, spoken Russian—to the home is an attempt 
to confine that which threatens “the orderly functioning of civil society” to the 
private sphere (Marston 1990, 453). In this student’s statement, culture—or at 
least minority culture—becomes a denizen of the private sphere rather than the 
public sphere. The public sphere is very much based upon the dominant cultural 
norms, which have been universalized as the “common concerns” of the people 
(Fraser 1995, 287). Because language skills allow individuals to enter the public 
sphere and benefit from civil, social, and political rights, they are also often 
crucial to obtaining full citizenship (Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003). By advocating for 
an Estonian-medium only school system, the Estonian heritage students are 
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in or around the fifth grade. Tellingly, however, when Koidula Boy 1 pointed out that learning 
Russian is compulsory for them, Koidula Girl 3 responded, “Yeah, but its not that compulsory.” 
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implying that full citizenship can only be obtained on the terms of Estonian 
ethnolinguistic norms and values. 
 For the Estonian heritage students, it is clear that language is one of the 
most, if not single most, important crucial identity marker for an Estonian citizen. 
The majority of these students feel that associating access to substantive 
citizenship with Estonian language skills is key to asserting and preserving 
Estonia’s status both as a sovereign state and as a free nation of people. 
Russophones, then, are perceived as descendants of Soviet interlopers whose 
Otherness is proven by their mother tongue, the language of Russian 
imperialism, and their lack of Estonian skills. The assumption on the part of 
Estonian heritage students is, broadly, that the Estonian nation-state’s right to 
establish the terms of universal citizenship is closely tied to their right to self-
determination and freedom from Soviet oppression. 
 
Language and Class Status within the Politics of Identity 
 The Russophone student participants have much more complex 
engagements with the Estonian and Russian languages and these languages’ 
relationship to substantive citizenship that includes meaningful access to rights. 
The focus groups with Russophone students reveal yet again the paradoxical 
process of harnessing the universal characteristics of the Estonian citizen (which 
almost always overlap with the Estonian nation’s ethnolinguistic markers) in order 
to assert their rights to be a Russophone with access to full citizenship in 
Estonian society.  
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 The general patterns of the Russophone students’ attitudes towards the 
Estonian language suggest that they have rather calmly accepted, or are calmly 
resigned to, the fact that it is a necessary part of life for claiming the political, 
social, and civil rights available to Estonian citizens. But the statements from the 
focus groups reveal that these students’ multiple and varied approaches to 
negotiating citizenship and language stem largely from the diverse personal 
experiences they have had with Estonian speakers and in their everyday spaces. 
Many of them speak about their Estonian language skills in utilitarian terms—a 
means to an end of legal citizenship, secondary school graduation, or basic 
communication with Estonians in everyday contexts. While this utilitarian view of 
the Estonian language doesn’t imply enthusiastic assimilation into the Estonian 
culture, it signals the success of Estonian nationalist policies in restricting access 
to citizenship rights to individuals that acquiesce to the dominant Estonian 
culture.   
 An observable pattern in the Russophone students’ narratives regarding 
the role of language in negotiating belonging in Estonian society is an association 
between class status and experiences with the Other group. One example of this 
class based rhetoric is the Russophone students’ distinction between “bad 
Russians” and “good Russians” in their own ethnolinguistic community. The 
“good” Russians are those who make an attempt to integrate into Estonian 
society, particularly through learning the language. “Bad” Russians are 
characterized by an unwillingness to integrate (Pushkin Boy 4), low levels of 
education (Pushkin Boy 2), and weak civic values such as drunkenness and drug 
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dealing (Tolstoy Girl 3, Tolstoy Girl 2). In particular the students from Pushkin 
School, known for being a ‘progressive’ institution with regards to the integration 
process, have constructed borders within their own community based on 
assimilatory practices: 
 
Pushkin Boy 4: And also there are a lot of Russians who don’t 
want to integrate, and they don’t want to know anything… they are 
very aggressive. 
 Interviewer:  Aggressive towards Estonians? 
 Pushkin Boy 4: Yes. 
Pushkin Boy 7: Some Russians are just thinking that they are 
living in the USSR and they encapsulate themselves in this 
[Russian] society, and they don’t understand what’s happened here 
[in Estonia]. 
 
Pushkin Boy 2: I think that a lot of people who are thinking a lot 
about [the tension between Russians and Estonians] are Russians. 
They have basic education, and maybe they are working as 
welders. But those who are better educated, they don’t treat the 
nationality question the same way. 
 
 When these students speak about integration into Estonian society it is 
commonly understood that the most important act is learning the Estonian 
language. Learning Estonian, according to the students quoted above, is 
associated with higher levels of education, a willingness to meet the Estonians 
half way in the integration process, and indicative of higher class Russophones. 
But the fact that they are basing the “good” or “bad” judgment on Estonian socio-
cultural norms evinces the pervasiveness of Estonian nation-building project in 
these students’ conceptualizations of citizenship.   
 The pattern of class-based rhetoric in discussions of language, identity, 
and belonging also appears in Russophone students’ distinction between 
different classes in the Estonian community. Estonians that demonstrate 
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willingness to communicate with Russophones in Russian, or make a 
compromise between Russian and Estonian, are viewed favorably as a class that 
is forward-looking and progressive and distinct from the elitist Estonian 
nationalist class that is patently anti-Russophone. Pushkin Boy 7, for instance, 
makes a distinction between Estonians and their attitudes towards Russophones: 
 
I think that there are two groups of Estonians: those who are 
belonging to richer classes, they don’t want to communicate with 
Russians. They even joke about it. But also there is another group 
of Estonians who really don’t mind and they communicate with 
Russians. 
 
 Several other Russophone students echo the sentiment of Pushkin Boy 
7’s comments, implying that they associate class status and language skills with 
the politics of identity in Estonian society. The Russophone students tend to 
couch all individuals who are interested in bridging the ethnolinguistic gap in 
similar terms regardless of ethnolinguistic heritage, perhaps unconsciously 
creating a new class status shared between Estonians and Russophones that 
will smooth the waters for integration and cross-cultural communication. For 
Pushkin Boy 3 this shared class status that connects progressively minded 
individuals exists at the supranational level instead of at the national level: 
 
I know one, my friend, an Estonian, who learns Russian. And it may 
feel strange, but it is, it’s happening. I think that in the future when 
you speak Russian, this won’t draw any special attention because 
this is the European way of treating different nationalities, and 
Estonia is trying to get [become] more and more of a European 
country. 
 
 There is a general pattern, then, amongst Russophone students’ 
perceptions of the role that language skills play in belonging and identity in 
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Estonia. But there are divergent comments amongst Russophone students, 
reflecting varying and inconsistent experiences. This shows that young people’s 
experiences are not homogenous, but rather reflect different class positions and 
outlooks. This is apparent in the following discussion between students: 
 
Tolstoy Girl 3:  Estonians often are offended when they hear 
the Russian language, and they don’t want to speak Russian… 
Tolstoy Girl 1: I don’t agree. I worked in an Estonian company 
in the summer. They didn’t speak Russian a lot, and also I don’t 
have a very good knowledge of Estonian. But still, we tried to make 
a compromise. They tried to speak Russian and I also tried to 
speak Estonian as much as I could. 
 Tolstoy Girl 3: I don’t agree though. I think that when I start 
speaking Russian, when I call someone, and Estonians hear my 
Russian, they don’t want to talk to me. They even hang up the 
phone. 
Tolstoy Boy 1: I agree [with Tolstoy Girl 3]. That happens. 
Tolstoy Girl 1: Still, it all depends on the person. 
 
Tolstoy Girl 1 is reluctant to subsume her conclusions about Estonians under her 
classmates’ opinions, which dismantles any presupposition that young people 
uniformly contest and negotiate belonging because they are in the same 
ethnolinguistic group, attend the same school, and have similar positionalities 
within Estonian society. Instead it suggests that they are likely to have different 
strategies for negotiating these identities and power relationships. The differing 
opinions in this conversation are also indicative of the unevenness of feelings of 
belonging in the Russophone community. For instance, although Tolstoy Girl 1 
expresses feelings of socio-political alienation later in the conversation, her 
unwillingness to categorize all Estonians as hostile to the Russian language in 
the above conversation indicates that the parameters of belonging and exclusion 
(and by extension citizenship) are not clear-cut. Even Tolstoy Girl 3, who 
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describes Estonians as “offended” by the Russian language, later mentions that it 
is important to learn Estonian because it facilitates communication with Estonian 
people and gives Russophones an advantage in operating in Estonian society, 
further suggesting that young people’s negotiations of belonging a knotty and 
dynamic process. 
 
Language Norms and Feelings of Alienation Amongst Russophone Students 
 The Russophone students’ narratives reflect perceptions of class status 
when it comes to language as a tool for communicating and integrating. But the 
focus group conversations also reveal that some students view the enforced 
hegemony of the Estonian language as unnecessary at best, and little more than 
cultural barbarism at worst. During the focus groups, these students are 
inconsistent in their assessments of the value of learning the Estonian language. 
For instance, in one of the focus groups I ask Pushkin Boy 5 whether he thinks 
that speaking Estonian is important for his future of living in Estonia, and he 
responds that “I think its more important for Estonians, not for us. It’s important 
for them that we must know their language.” But later in the conversation when I 
ask him if he felt Estonian at all, he answers, “Yes, because I can clearly speak 
the Estonian language. I can use it to communicate with other Estonians.” 
There’s an internal struggle taking place about exactly which side of the 
Estonian/Russophone “fence” he belongs on, and the pivot point for this struggle 
is language. 
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 The Russophone students who are more militant regarding the 
hegemony of Estonian bring geographic elements into the discussion. For 
instance, two boys deploy the social geographies of Estonia and their personal 
lives in their resistance to accede to Estonian cultural-linguistic norms. Tolstoy 
Boy 1 and Tolstoy Boy 2 had the following conversation about mandatory 
Estonian in Russian-medium schools: 
  
Tolstoy Boy 2:  I think that it’s very important to think differently 
about the problem [of language medium in schools], because even 
though some children start to learn Estonian since their young age, 
they still don’t communicate with Estonians. They don’t speak to 
them. They go to work and they still speak Russian with their 
colleagues. It is better to enforce the second state language as 
Russian.  
Tolstoy Boy 1:  I agree. I still don’t understand why we have to 
do that [learn Estonian]. For example, in Sweden, they have the 
second state language as Finnish. Still, there aren’t many Finnish 
people living there. But they [the Finns] are left calm—they [the 
Swedes] learn Finnish. And I don’t understand why we are forced to 
learn Estonian.  
 
 The first geographic element introduced in this conversation is the reality 
of heavy socio-spatial division between Estonians and Russophones, which 
exists both at the urban level in Tallinn and the national level in Estonia as a 
whole. As discussed in chapter one, the social geography of Estonia is clearly 
demarcated between the two groups, with the vast majority of Russophones 
living in the northeastern county of Ida-Virumaa. The only other sizeable group of 
Russophones lives in Tallinn, which itself is remarkably spatially divided. Every 
single student participant in this study identified the city district of Lasnamäe as 
“where the Russians live,” with several also noting that districts of Kopli and 
Õismae are heavily populated with Russophones. Both Russian-medium schools 
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that participated in this project are located in Lasnamäe, and 13 of 15 
Russophone student participants (as well as O-Koidula Girl 5, O-Pushkin Boy 1, 
an O-Pushkin Girl 2) live in Lasnamäe. None of the Estonian student participants 
live in the districts of Lasnamäe, Kopli, or Õismae.  
 From what I observed during my time in the various districts of Tallinn, 
the point that Tolstoy Boy 2 makes about Russophones communicating and 
living in almost entirely Russian language spaces is not hyperbole. There are 
Russian language newspapers, TV stations, radio stations, and bookstores 
available for the Russophone population of Tallinn. When I was in the Lasnamäe 
district, I quickly learned to initiate conversations in what little Russian I knew 
rather than Estonian, because oftentimes the bus drivers and shop clerks would 
either tell me in Estonian that they did not speak Estonian well, or answer 
immediately in Russian. All of this is to say that Tolstoy Boy 2’s point that a 
Russophone doesn’t necessarily have a large need for Estonian in everyday life 
is legitimate, concurrent with previous studies of Estonia’s language geographies 
(Pavlenko 2008; Laitin 1998). With this assertion, Tolstoy Boy 2 is illustrating the 
complex web of urban geographies, language geographies, socio-spatial 
divisions, and identity politics that all young people, not just Russophones, are 
required to negotiate on a daily basis as they contest and contend with 
citizenship in their country. 
 The second geographic element in their conversation is the inclusion of 
another nation-state, in this case Sweden, into the debate. Tolstoy Boy 110 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Boy 1 holds Russian Federation citizenship. He is one of only two of the 29 student 
participants that do not hold Estonian citizenship. This indicates that, although his legal and 
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Tolstoy Boy 2 both agree that Russian should be made the second national 
language. The style of Tolstoy Boy 1’s argument for Russian as the second 
national language of Estonia is compelling. Although his goal is to ensure rights 
for his minority group, he is arguing for that goal by putting the Russophone 
minority on even footing with the Estonian majority. He is arguing for the right to 
be different from the Estonian majority by mobilizing sameness with them—in this 
case, on equal rights to cultural-linguistic expression. Furthermore, he deputizes 
the universality embedded in multicultural discourse into his argument by citing 
Sweden’s “equal treatment” of the Finnish minority. He also underscores his 
argument by emphasizing that the Russophone minority in Estonia is even more 
entitled to use their language than the Finnish minority in Sweden is to use 
Finnish because the Russophone minority in Estonia is substantial, compared to 
the relatively few Finns in Sweden. Essentially, he is constructing a hierarchy of 
entitlement to minority rights even while operating from the base of the 
universality of rights. He is distinguishing between minority groups who are, 
ostensibly, not only equal to majority groups, but also equal to each other.    
 The Russophone student participants’ responses further underline 
language’s role as the chief identity marker that mediates access to the space of 
substantive and formal citizenship in Estonia. While there are a variety of 
attitudes towards the hegemony of the Estonian language amongst the 
Russophone student participants, their negotiating stances all emanate from their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
political citizenship is granted by the Russian Federation, his residence in Tallinn ensures that on 
a day-to-day basis his social, civil, and cultural rights are under the purview of the Republic of 
Estonia. Although he is not a legal citizen of Estonia, he is forced to negotiate his social and civil 
citizenship rights on dominant Estonian terms, once again demonstrating the fraught and 
intertwined nature of universalisms and particularisms in citizenship performances. 
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positionality of Others within the Estonian nation-state. The tension between the 
Estonian and Russian languages is a microcosm of the larger struggle to set the 
specific terms of who Estonian citizenship is universally available to.  
 
Minding the Gap in a Divided Society: the Outlier Students 
 The centrality of language to the co-constitution of substantive and formal 
Estonian citizenship is further demonstrated by the way it functions in the lives of 
the “outlier” students in the study population. Of the four “outlier” student 
participants, three come from mixed heritage backgrounds, and one is a 
Russophone-heritage student who attends Tammsaare School. For these four 
students, their mother tongues, the language of instruction at their school, and 
their fluency (or lack thereof) in Estonian and Russian has great bearing on how 
they negotiate their own citizenship and also how they conceptualize Estonian 
citizenship on a larger basis.  
 Although the four “outlier” students listed their national identities as 
Estonian on intake surveys and hold Estonian citizenship, their performances of 
that citizenship differ highly. The variability of their conceptualizations of 
citizenship indicates that for these students, straddling the Estonian and 
Russophone communities produces a highly conflictual existence. I will also 
argue that these students’ varied familial and personal geographies interact with 
their school spaces to produce diverse performances of Estonian citizenship. 
 Although O-Taamsaare Boy 1 and O-Koidula Girl 5 are both in Estonian-
medium schools, their familial and personal geographies are partially or fully 
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Russophone language spaces. O-Taamsaare Boy 1 comes from a Russophone 
household, and O-Koidula Girl 5 comes from a dual language, mixed heritage 
household. Their narratives reveal that they contest and negotiate their Estonian 
citizenship quite differently. O-Taamsaare Boy 1 negotiates the conflict he feels 
between his Russophone heritage and his Estonian citizenship by constantly 
qualifying his Russophone heritage, disassociating himself from Russophones 
who are not properly integrating into Estonian society by learning the language 
and respecting the culture. O-Koidula Girl 5, meanwhile, is less conflicted about 
associating herself with both the Estonian and Russophone identities, but is very 
concerned about the level of misunderstanding that takes place between the two 
groups. She attempts to resolve this by citing examples of Russophones who are 
eager to learn the Estonian language and Estonians who are eager to learn the 
Russian language.  
 It is my argument that the way that these students’ Estonian-language 
education space interacts with their familial geographies accounts for their 
different methods of negotiating and performing their Estonian citizenship. O-
Koidula Girl 5 has an Estonian parent and counts Estonian as one of her mother 
tongues, which most likely makes her positionality within Koidula School 
relatively unproblematic. This mother tongue and heritage congruency with her 
school language medium may be why she is less concerned with affirming her 
Estonianness and more concerned with reconciling the misunderstandings 
between her two identity groups.  
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 O-Taamsaare Boy 1, in contrast, has two Russophone parents and 
learned to speak Estonian in early basic school, which distinguishes him from the 
majority of his classmates at Tammsaare School. Because he bears some 
identity markers of the Other group, he concentrates on asserting his 
Estonianness by uncoupling his Russophone heritage from Russophones who 
are “disrespecting” their home country by not learning the language. Using these 
two examples as evidence, I posit that the presence or absence of an Estonian 
parent and/or the Estonian language in the home influences the ways that these 
two Estonian-medium school students contest and negotiate their identities and, 
subsequently, citizenships. 
 O-Pushkin Boy 1 and O-Pushkin Girl 2 are further examples of how 
language spaces are central to “outlier” young people’s negotiation and 
performance of citizenship. Both O-Pushkin Boy 1 and O-Pushkin Girl 2 are 
mixed-heritage students that attend a Russian-medium school, but their familial 
and personal geographies complicate the ways that their negotiations of 
citizenship pivot around language. O-Pushkin Girl 2, for instance, grew up 
speaking only Russian and admits that she can barely speak Estonian even 
though she has been studying it in school for years. She laments that she cannot 
attend university in Estonia because her language skills are not nearly good 
enough to complete higher education courses in Estonian. Although she 
considers herself Estonian because she was born in Tallinn and has an Estonian 
parent, she is conflicted by her inability to speak the national language and the 
societal exclusion that results from it. 
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 Contrastingly, O-Pushkin Boy 1 comes from a dual language, mixed 
heritage household and declares that his ability to “speak both languages without 
an accent” is his ticket to moving easily through Estonian society and being “ok 
with both nationalities.” However, he makes contradictory statements during the 
focus group with regard to his apparent comfort with both nationalities. He 
criticizes Estonians for ridiculing Russophones who speak Estonian with an 
accent and notes the disadvantages that the Estonian language’s hegemony 
presents for Russophone Estonian citizens (such as access to jobs and higher 
education).   
 Both O-Pushkin Boy 1 and O-Pushkin Girl 2 contend with their Estonian 
citizenship based largely based on language, but again the varying contours of 
their familial geographies interact differently with their shared educational space. 
O-Pushkin Girl 2’s educational and familial spaces are dominated by the Russian 
language, which has affected her ability to access fully substantive citizenship in 
Estonia. This, in turn, has resulted in the national language not factoring into her 
conceptualization of an Estonian citizen—a position that is unique in the entire 
student participant study population. O-Pushkin Boy 1 shows a certain amount of 
conflict with regards to the preponderance of Estonian and his Estonian heritage, 
which he deflects by commenting on the ways that the national language is used 
as an exclusionary instead of inclusionary tool. His statements, I argue, stem 
from the unease of having Estonian heritage while moving through largely 
Russian-speaking spaces.   
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 The unique set of responses from the four “outlier” students with non-
uniform ethnolinguistic identities suggests three things. First, the growing number 
of young people in Estonia whose personal geographies are neither wholly 
Estonian-speaking nor wholly Russian-speaking spaces will have much more 
complex contestations and negotiations of identity and citizenship in Estonia due 
to the long-standing antagonistic relations between the titular majority and 
Russophone minority. Second, language is not only a central issue in the 
negotiation of their citizenships, but arguably makes those negotiations more 
fraught than their peers’ because of their regular movement through both 
Estonian and Russophone spaces. Last, the highly varied configurations of the 
“outlier” students’ personal geographies is evidence that it is, and will continue to 
be, challenging to make generalizations about the attitudes of other young 
people with similarly complex identities toward and negotiation of citizenship in 
Estonia.  
 The analysis of the focus groups with the student study population 
reflects the central role that language plays in negotiating citizenship and 
belonging in Estonia. The students often deputize the city’s landscape and 
topography into their narratives about language use and how it affects belonging 
and exclusion in Tallinn. This demonstrates that these young people’s 
citizenships are negotiated within and through multiple spaces, and that the 
experiences within the various spaces of their everyday geographies interact 
complexly to inform the ways in which they encounter and navigate the politics of 
identity in their city. The following section explores the role that the urban 
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landscape plays in the student respondents’ negotiation of belonging and 
citizenship in greater detail.  
 
Urban Landscape, Territory, and Belonging 
 The urban landscape of Tallinn is unique among Estonian cities because 
of its large numbers of both ethnic Estonians and Russophones. Elsewhere in 
Estonia, cities are 90+ percent comprised of either the titular majority or 
Russophone minority. Tallinn’s population, by contrast, was 53 percent Estonian 
and 44 percent Russophone in 2012 (Tallinn City Office 2012). As noted earlier, 
the urban geography of Tallinn is very clearly divided on ethnolinguistic lines 
(Figure 5.1), similar to the socio-spatial divisions observed in other contexts 
(Leonard 2006; Kuusisto-Arponen 2002). The marking of territory in urban 
spaces can be accomplished through symbols of banal nationalism (Billig 1995) 
and spatial practices of memorialization (Till 1999; Till 2005; Ehala 2009; Smith 
and Burch 2012), and also through invisible borders such as language use 
(Pavlenko 2008) and mental maps (Kuusisto-Arponen 2002).  
In divided societies, the struggles over identity and citizenship are often 
localized when urban spaces become spatialized as different groups lay claim to 
territory in asserting belonging and performing ethnolinguistic identities (Massey 
1995; Mills 2006; Kuusisto-Arponen 2002; Staeheli 2008). Moreover, urban and 
local boundaries divide not only movement through physical space, but also 
social, economic, political, and cultural practices (Kuusisto-Arponen 2002; Mills 
2005). As such, cities embody citizenship practices and citizenship struggles 
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(Secor 2004). In focus groups, my student participants engage frequently with 
visible and invisible boundaries throughout Tallinn as part of their 
conceptualization and everyday performance of citizenship. Substantiating the 
argument that urban places and landscapes are constantly shifting and have 
different meanings to different groups (Massey 1995; Rodman 1992), the 
Estonian and Russophone students interpret, appropriate, and navigate Tallinn’s 
urban spaces on the terms of their own conceptualization of citizenship. 
 
Figure 5.1 Percent Russophone Population—Tallinn Districts. The 
socio-spatial divisions between Estonians and Russophones are reflected in 
the ethnolinguistic populations of Tallinn’s districts.
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Mental Maps: Ascribing Identities to Tallinn’s Districts 
 Each focus group with the student participants began with a discussion 
about Tallinn and the places where they feel most comfortable. The students 
were given a map of the greater Tallinn area and asked to mark the areas of the 
city that they feel are distinct from others. By working together to agree upon and 
specify the city layout, each of the eight focus groups produced material versions 
of their mental maps, each of which are identical.  
 Mental maps are a form of mental segregation that, as Kuusisto-Arponen 
(2002) argues, can be more influential than actual physical lines in divided 
societies. This is confirmed by the students’ verbal descriptions of the borders 
that they drew on the maps. The invisible border around the Lasnämae district 
drew the most discussion in all of the focus groups. Lasnamäe is a district in the 
eastern part of Tallinn that experienced a housing construction boom during the 
1970’s and early 1980’s under the Soviet regime, and as such is the most 
populated district of Tallinn. Pre-fab concrete block apartment homes were built 
at a fast rate during the construction boom, which gives the district a very 
different architectural feel than most of Tallinn. Moreover, the population of 
Lasnamäe has been overwhelmingly Russophone since the Soviet era and 
continues to be so today, with 68 percent of the district’s population identified as 
Russophone in 2012 (Tallinn City Office 2012).  
 Unsurprisingly, given that both Russian-medium schools that participated 
in this study are located in Lasnamäe, 13 of the 15 students from the Russian-
medium schools hail from this district. Only one of the Estonian-medium school 
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students, O-Koidula Girl 5 (who is of mixed heritage) lives in Lasnamäe. As such, 
although all students’ mental maps of the city are similar, the mental images 
attached to Lasnamäe and its neighborhoods are highly skewed according to 
their ethnolinguistic group. For instance, compare how a sampling of Estonian 
and Russophone students descriptions vary: 
 
Tammsaare Girl 4: They have lots of Russians there [in 
Lasnamägi, a subsdistrict of Lasnamäe], and its really like the 
Soviet Union, you can feel it everywhere. All the buildings are like 
nine stories high, and its really gray and so, its not really 
comfortable to be there. Its really, like… you can feel the Soviet 
Union there. 
 
Pushkin Boy 7: We feel comfortable everywhere, but 
[Lasnamäe] is our district, this is our home, and we feel the best 
there. 
 
Koidula Boy 1: I have really bad feelings about Lasnamäe… 
Russians, and the overall… it doesn’t look very nice, the region. I 
like Põhja-Tallinn because, architecturally, its small wooden 
houses. In this way, its cozy, which couldn’t be said for Lasnamäe, 
which is just concrete blocks. But one thing is the social… well, 
these areas— Põhja-Tallinn and Lasnamäe—you have lower social 
status, I would say, for the region. The people are probably poorer, 
more crime. 
 
Tolstoy Girl 3: I think that we really like the most the district 
where we stay and live. And I was born and I’ve lived all my life in 
Lasnamäe, and I like it the most. 
 
Tammsaare Girl 1: …Lasnamägi— 
Tammsaare Girl 2: And Kopli— 
Tammsaare Girl 1: Are creepy! 
Interviewer: What makes those two places kind of creepy? 
Tammsaare Girl 1: In Lasnamäe, there lives so many Russians. 
 
Pushkin Boy 5: There [Lasnamäe] lives most of our friends 
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This sample of responses reveals the obvious disconnect between Estonian and 
Russophone mental images of Lasnamäe district. While it is agreed that 
Lasnamäe is “where the Russians live,” Estonian heritage students’ unease 
about Lasnamäe is explicitly connected with the presence of a large Russophone 
population. The students associate the district with deep feelings of unease, 
higher crime rates, and architecture of the bygone Soviet era, but more 
importantly tie each of these things to the Russophone population explicitly. A 
few Estonian heritage students, as well as outlier student O-Taamsaare Boy 1, 
went as far as to laughingly label Lasnamäe simply as “Russia” or “USSR.” 
Lasnamäe, because of its perceived Soviet-ness, is a “no-go area” for 
these Estonian heritage students, i.e. mental maps of where the Other is 
(Kuusisto-Arponen 2002). The images that the Estonian heritage students attach 
to these no-go areas—such as Soviet style architecture—are negative, which 
reinforce not only the spatial divisions in the city, but also the sociocultural and 
political divisions within society. The “Russian people” area of the city is by 
default associated with the Russian language, the identity marker that Estonian 
heritage students define as contrary to what an Estonian citizen is. Therefore 
what we see here is the spatiality of the city acting as a delimiter of the 
boundaries of citizenship. Because Lasnamäe is where Russophones and the 
Russian language is located, it is labeled as un-Estonian, and therefore outside 
the space of full, substantive citizenship. Substantive Estonian citizenship and 
the urban spaces of Tallinn form and are formed by each other through a process 
of border drawing and identity-marking.  
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The Russophone students, and three of the “outlier” students who live in 
Lasnamäe, clearly have much more positive feelings towards their home district. 
The two Russophone students who do not live in Lasnamäe11 also speak about 
the district in positive terms because their friends live there. Because these 
students talk about Lasnamäe in terms of community and belonging their 
conversations tend to ethnolinguistically homogenize the area (Secor 2004) even 
though roughly 28 percent of the district’s population is Estonian. These students 
do not mention crime or dull architecture, but instead talk about the comfort that 
they feel because they associate it with family, friends, and the majority of their 
lives.  
The similar mental mapping with differing commentary amongst the 
student study population does not end with Lasnamäe district. Each of the focus 
groups also mention Kopli, a sub-district of Põhja-Tallinn, and Pirita, a district in 
northern Tallinn. Kopli, interestingly, is a district that is noted by both the 
Estonian and Russophone students as an area where drug use, alcohol abuse, 
and crime are common, and where the majority of the population is Russian. 
Given the Estonians students’ mental images of Lasnamäe, it is not surprising 
that they have a very negative mental image of another area with a high 
Russophone population. Again we see a class distinction in these narratives as 
the Russophone students distinguish the of Russophones that live in Kopli: 
 
Pushkin Boy 2: Kopli is—there are living many Russians, bad 
Russians. They drink alcohol…  
Pushkin Boy 3: And use the drugs. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Pushkin Boy 4 and Pushkin Boy 7 live in Maardu, a small town 6 miles from Lasnamäe whose 
population is 70 percent Russophone. 
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Tolstoy Girl 3: The first district I don’t like is Kopli. 
Interviewer: What’s wrong with Kopli? 
Tolstoy Girl 3: I distinguish it from the other districts of Tallinn. 
Tolstoy Girl 2: Its one of the oldest districts, and its not about 
the architecture of something specific about the 
district, but about the people who live there. 
Tolstoy Girl 3: It’s because there are a lot of alcoholics and 
drug dealers, and that’s why its not the best district to 
live in. 
Tolstoy Girl 1: I also don’t like to go to Kopli, and I don’t feel 
comfortable there. 
Tolstoy Girl 2: I know that in Kopli there are mostly Russians, 
there are no Estonians there.  
 
There is a distinction made that the Russophone population in Kopli is deviant. 
This legal and social deviance factors into the Russophone student participants’ 
conceptualization of citizenship because several of them explicitly state that 
following the laws and participating in the betterment of the city is the mark of a 
good citizen. The Russophone students’ mental images of Kopli are associated 
with negative, law-breaking actions such as drug dealing and socially 
irresponsible behavior like excessive alcohol consumption. These responses 
imply that the wider problem of Estonian and Russophone identity is interpreted 
through urban space, and that urban space comes to signify understandings of 
belonging and exclusion. 
These negative mental images not only sub-divide the Russophone 
population in Tallinn, but also identify an Other type of Russophone that lives 
outside the bounds of proper citizenship. In this respect, I argue, the Russophone 
students’ conceptualization of citizenship is working as what Secor (2004, 354) 
calls “a hegemonic strategy” that “defines these groups or localities, to fix the 
power differentials between them.” These perceptions of Kopli and the “bad 
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Russians” that inhabit it demonstrate what Kay Anderson (1987, 584) calls the 
“remarkable social force and material effect” of social imaginings of urban space. 
These students’ social imaginings of Kopli illustrate that the interaction between 
discursive “complexes of meaning” and “specific spatial arrangements” (Farrar 
2000, 4–5) not only work to reinforce unequal social relations between 
ethnolinguistic groups, but also within them. The Russophone population as a 
whole is most often subject to an Estonian hegemonic strategy. But in this 
instance the Russophone community is being sub-divided according to an intra-
group hegemonic strategy defined by the Russophone student participants. This 
further illustrates that the contested nature of citizenship and belonging in 
Estonia is much more complex than a linear discrimination of the Russophone 
minority by the titular majority. The urban spaces of Tallinn, as with the linguistic 
spaces of Tallinn, are tools for negotiating and performing citizenship within the 
Russophone community by excluding those Russophones deemed to be outside 
the bounds of citizenship.   
The other Tallinn district that is frequently mentioned and clearly mentally 
defined by all of the student focus groups is Pirita. Pirita is located in the northern 
area of Tallinn and is separated from Lasnamäe by the Pirita River. Although all 
students have the same mental boundaries for Pirita and speak of it as a safe 
area, the mental images are again skewed according to ethnolinguistic group. 
The Estonian-heritage students, as well as outlier student O-Koidula Girl 
5, talk about Pirita in positive terms, such as being “safe” (Koidula Girl 1), and 
aesthetically pleasing (O-Koidula Girl 5). When the Estonian heritage students’ 
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assertions that the beautiful, safe area of Piritia is filled with Estonians is 
compared to their mental images of the crime ridden, unsafe, and Russophone 
populated district of Lasnamäe, it is clear that they are using the “logics of 
alterity” (Isin 2002, 4) and the “spatialized strategies of differentiation to 
segregate and distinguish cultural difference within the city” (Secor 2004, 358). 
As the Estonian heritage students describe the city of Tallinn as segregated 
along ethnolinguistic lines the urban geography becomes a tool for marking 
where the Estonian, legitimate citizens live and where the Other, illegitimate 
citizens live, thereby reinforcing the socio-spatial boundaries that exclude the 
unassimilable from the space of substantive citizenship.  
Pirita is one of the most prestigious districts of Tallinn, noted for its private 
houses, beach scenes, and yacht club. It is one of the wealthier districts of 
Tallinn, a fact that plays into the Russophone students’ mental maps and images 
of Pirita. These characterizations of a wealthy Pirita are folded into their 
contestations of belonging and exclusion in society: 
 
O-Pushkin Boy 1: Pirita is a part of the city where usually the 
richest people of Tallinn live, because there are some private 
houses, and usually most people who live there are Estonians. 
 
Pushkin Boy 3: This part of Tallinn is— 
Pushkin Boy 2: Estonians. 
Pushkin Boy 3: There is private houses [sic] here where they 
live. 
 
Pushkin Boy 5: The place where we live [Lasnamäe], we feel 
quite comfortable. But in the richest places of Tallinn we can feel a 
little bit uncomfortable because the atmosphere of the richest 
places… 
Interviewer:  There’s an area of the city where rich people 
live? Where? 
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Pushkin Boy 6: Upper Tallinn [pointing to Pirita on the map]. 
Pushkin Boy 5: Upper Tallinn. The ritzy suburb of Tallinn. 
Interviewer:  So the wealthy people—are they Estonian and 
Russian? 
Pushkin Boy 6: Russians and Estonians, but more Estonian 
people. 
Pushkin Boy 5: Yes. There [in Pirita] are living rich Estonians, 
in houses. 
 
Tolstoy Boy 1: Definitely it [Pirita] is more Estonian populated 
[sic], because that’s where there is more expensive housing. There, 
Estonians live. 
 
The Russophone students’ class-based distinction of Pirita as both wealthy and 
almost entirely Estonian is a twist on Secor’s (2004) observation that areas 
described as places of comfort and community become ethnically homogenized. 
In this particular case, these students are ethnically homogenizing a district that 
they do not feel comfortable in and feel excluded from due to their Russophone 
identities (which are associated with lower socio-economic standing, because, 
according Tolstoy Boy 1’s frank appraisal, “This is not a big secret that Estonians 
live better than Russians”).  
While Pirita is heavily dominated by ethnic Estonians (79 percent of the 
population) there is still a significant minority of Russophones (18 percent) 
(Tallinn City Office 2012) that the many of students do not even acknowledge. 
Their attitudes toward Pirita are directly tied to their impressions of discrepancy in 
socioeconomic status between Russophones and Estonians. O-Pushkin Boy 1 
and Pushkin Boy 2, for instance, connect the contours of the city’s 
socioeconomic landscape to language skills and education, pointing out that 
some older Russophones, who never learned Estonian in school, have had 
considerable trouble adapting to the Estonian language environment since the 
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early 1990’s. These older Russophones’ lack of Estonian skills puts limitations on 
what level or style of education they received and, subsequently, what jobs they 
work in. As manual labor and low skill service jobs (which provide few prospects 
for career advancement) are less likely to require Estonian language skills, they 
are often filled by Russophones12. Moreover, because there are Russian-
language dominated spaces of Tallinn, Russophones without Estonian language 
skills are able to move through their everyday spaces easily without great need 
to speak Estonian  
What is revealed in the student participants’ discussions of their mental 
maps and images of Tallinn is the crucial role that the city’s divided landscape 
works to reinforce existing striations in access to full rights and equal opportunity. 
The city’s sociolinguistic and ethnocultural landscapes perpetuate divisions and 
do not incentivize meaningful contact between Estonians and Russophones. In 
fact, the Russophone student respondents seem to view “their” spaces as 
protective, sheltering areas, again suggesting that socio-spatial divisions are both 
a cause and a symptom of the politics of identity in Tallinn. In this regard, the city 
and Estonian citizenship are mutually reinforcing processes that draw lines of 
belonging and exclusion, reify identities, and define the performance of 
citizenship in social spaces (Secor 2004; Painter and Philo 1995; Painter 2006; 
Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In an effort to relax citizenship laws because of pressure from Brussels, Estonia has made 
Estonian-language classes available for free or for very low cost to non-Estonian speakers. 
However, the financial assistance for language classes has not been a great incentive for older 
Russophone populations in Estonia to study Estonian. As a result, the number of Russophones 
without Estonian citizenship remains high in older generations. 
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Kesklinn: The City Center as a “Neutral” Space 
 Tallinn’s city center district, Kesklinn, is spoken of and ascribed positive 
meaning among all of the student focus group participants, regardless of 
background. The city center is a place where the Estonian heritage, 
Russophone, and “outlier” students feel comfortable and enjoy being. Kesklinn is 
always noted directly after the home district as the place where the students’ 
lives are located, and as such, the students’ initial comments on the district are 
quite similar. 
 Kesklinn holds Tallinn’s Old City (a UNESCO heritage site and popular 
tourist attraction), the skyscrapers of the fast-growing business district, the port of 
Tallinn, and the largest shopping malls. The chief leisure space in Kesklinn is the 
Old City, where shops, quaint cafés and restaurants, historical sites and 
museums, and nightclubs are mingled together. The Old City is also where 
multiple nationalities and languages exist side by side on a daily basis, not only 
due to the presence of tourists but also because both Estonians and 
Russophones use it as a space of leisure and entertainment. 
All of the students’ mental images of Kesklinn portray it as a space where 
they can spread their wings, as it were, away from the constraints feel in their 
other everyday geographies. Moreover, the congruency of the students’ feelings 
about Kesklinn confirms that their socio-spatial mental maps of the city as a 
whole are very similar: 
 
Tolstoy Girl 3:  The center of Tallinn inspires me. 
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Koidula Boy 1: Well, [I am] comfortable, I would say, in all 
central Tallinn. 
 
Tolstoy Boy 2: The district I like the most is the center of 
Tallinn, and I think that this is the space where we can feel 
ourselves like “European,” that it is alike to Europe the most. 
 
O-Koidula Girl 5: I like Old Town because it’s bright and there’s 
a lot of people. 
 
Tammsaare Girl 2: [I like] to discover Old Town…Mostly when I 
come to Old Town, I find something new always, like whose house 
was that, or something. Its very interesting. 
 
While the tenor of the students’ responses about the city center are 
positive, it is worth noting the distinctions between the Estonian and Russophone 
students’ perceptions. Estonian students often connect the city center with 
Estonian history and culture as demonstrated by Tammsaare Girl 2’s love of 
“discovering” Old Town. The city center is not only a place where Estonia’s 
heritage is celebrated but also where Estonia’s innate Europeanness is 
emphasized and any Russianness is de-emphasized or removed. Tolstoy Boy 2 
likes the city center because it is where he can “feel European,” folding the 
discourse of Europeanness into his experience of a place that is central to the 
Estonian nation-building process. Paradoxically, he associates Kesklinn with a 
broader pan-European feeling rather than a Europeanness that is attached to 
Estonianness, The varied ways that the students ascribe meaning to the city 
center and, subsequently, how those ascriptions mediate their sense of 
belonging in wider Estonian and European societies illustrate the complex 
coexistence of national and post-national citizenship discourses in their everyday 
geographies. 
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Even though the students have positive mental images and speak about it 
in the focus groups as if it’s an area that’s relatively “mixed” between Estonians, 
Russophones, and foreigners (mostly tourists), a closer look at their comments 
exposes that spatial division in this ostensibly “shared” space. The students’ 
experiences in Kesklinn remain divided by their ethnolinguistic identities. The 
students’ broad initial statements about the universal appeal of Kesklinn are in 
reality underpinned by an ethnolinguistically specific topography. The students’ 
responses are uneven and sometimes contradictory, indicating that social 
divisions are present in the city center: 
 
Interviewer:  And you said everybody in Tallinn goes to the 
city center, is that right?  
Pushkin Boy 7: Yes. 
Pushkin Boy 5: Yes. 
Pushkin Boy 4: There are clubs only for Russians. 
Pushkin Boy 7: No. 
Pushkin Boy 6: No. 
Pushkin Boy 4: There is Russian music in some places. 
Interviewer: There’s Russian music in some places? So [to the 
other boys] were you disagreeing? 
Pushkin Boy 7: I think that if some Estonian wants to go there 
[to the Russian] club he will go. But if he doesn’t want to go he 
won’t go there. But there is no rule that this place is only for 
Russians. 
Interviewer:  There’s no official rule, but do Estonians and 
Russophone young people—do a lot of young people hang out together? 
Pushkin Boy 5: Only in clubs, in nightlife… Estonians prefer some 
little bit expensive clubs. But Russians use such popular clubs which are 
not very expensive. 
 Pushkin Boy 4: Not so expensive. 
 
The young men in this focus group are attempting to smooth out the “shared” 
leisure space of Kesklinn but finding it difficult to reach a consensus. There is, on 
the surface, disagreement over whether there are Russian areas in Kesklinn. For 
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Pushkin Boy 7, at least, the absence of an official or formal rule delimiting 
Russian-only places is his argument for the neutrality of the city center. However, 
it is clear from his classmates’ comments that the unofficial dividing lines that 
separate Estonians and Russophones operate more or less constantly, even in 
Kesklinn.  
 The tension that exists in students’ narrations of their time in the city 
center is not limited to the Russophone students. The Estonian heritage students 
make the same types of general statements about Kesklinn’s appeal to 
everyone. For instance, a few Estonian heritage girls admit that meaningful 
interaction is limited, but they seem uncomfortable with leaving the narrative 
there and instead end on a contradiction: 
 
Interviewer:  So you’re saying that Estonians and Russians 
don’t hang out at the same places? 
Tammsaare Girl 1: They are quite divided. 
Interviewer:   Really? 
Tammsaare Girl 2: Yes. Maybe they hang out at the same place, 
but you won’t go to a stranger and just start talking. “You’re 
Russian, I want to speak with you.” That is weird. 
Tammsaare Girl 1: The Russians are together and the Estonians 
are together. 
Tammsaare Girl 3: Yes. 
Interviewer:  So you might all be at the same club, but the 
Russians congregate and hang out together, and then the 
Estonians hang out together? 
Tammsaare Girl 1: Yeah. 
Tammsaare Girl 2: It’s quite logical, if you think about it. 
 Tammsaare Girl 1: There are some few places which are still 
named Russian, or something, so the Russians go there, and they 
have their own favorite places. [pause] I think it’s quite mixed, 
mostly. 
 
This part of the conversation takes place not long after the girls had described 
the sociocultural contour of Kesklinn as mixed between the two groups, as 
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compared to Lasnamäe or Pirita. Like the conversation between the Russophone 
boys mentioned above, there is a certain amount of chaos in the girls’ narratives 
of Kesklinn. They are describing a socially segregated leisure landscape that is 
“quite logical,” but Tammsaare Girl 1 tops off the conversation by describing the 
Kesklinn nightclub scene as “quite mixed.”  
This seesawing discourse, like the Russophone boys’ conversation, 
demonstrates that even the city center—the one place in Tallinn that the student 
respondents characterize as a shared space of multicultural character—is not 
home to meaningful experience and contact between Estonians and 
Russophones. The students’ propensities to describe Kesklinn as a place where 
everybody goes, yet also where everybody stays with their own culture group, is 
indicative of the limitations of multicultural discourses and policies that have been 
observed elsewhere in Western liberal democratic societies (Wood and Gilbert 
2005). This weak multiculturalism is practiced through superficial contact with 
other groups in urban spaces rather than through interactions that contend with 
entrenched prejudices and stereotypes (although it must be noted that such 
interactions do not always produce positive outcomes). The mere presence of 
more than one cultural group in Kesklinn seems to pass for multiculturalism in the 
students’ minds, which allows them to classify the city center as a shared space 
instead of the microcosm of socio-spatially divided Tallinn that it really is. 
Movement through a space of leisure such as Kesklinn connects in 
important ways with wider negotiations of citizenship rights and reveal patterns of 
identity performance (Desforges, Jones, and Woods 2005). The focus group 
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conversations that I have discussed in this section expose the subtle connections 
between banal identity performances and access to the space of rights within a 
society. The apparently “multicultural” character of Kesklinn covers a larger 
reluctance of Estonians and Russophones to integrate in everyday movements 
through space. This suggests that the everyday politics of citizenship reflect the 
(often uneasy) coexistence of multiple citizenship discourses in wider society. 
The tension between the universalisms and particularisms that exists in national, 
multicultural, and post-national configurations of belonging are played out by 
individual performances of identity in everyday, urban spaces. These students’ 
actual movements through and within Kesklinn, for instance, belie their 
characterization of the city center as a “mixed” and “multicultural” space where 
ethnolinguistic particularisms fade, or are at least ignored. The everyday politics 
of citizenship, then, inform and are informed by everyday spaces and the multi-
scalar discourses that circulate within them.  
 
Places of Memory in the City: The Bronze Soldier Memorial as a Metaphor for 
Who Belongs   
 In 2007 the Estonian government’s decision to relocate the Bronze Soldier 
Memorial, a Red Army WWII memorial, away from central Tallinn, sparked two 
nights of intense protests, riots, and fights between Russophones and Estonians. 
Although the student participants, who are 18 or 19 years of age, were young 
adolescents when the Bronze Solider crisis took place, the event played and 
continues to play a significant role in how they spatially enact and negotiate 
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identity and belonging in Tallinn. Furthermore the students’ recollections and 
negotiations of the Bronze Soldier crisis demonstrate that young people actively 
negotiate and contend with adult discourses of belonging and citizenship rather 
than passively absorbing them. This section examines the students’ passionate 
narratives of the Bronze Soldier crisis and reveals how they use Tallinn’s 
landscapes of public memory to contest, negotiate, and define belonging in 
Estonia. Moreover, their conversations expose the ways that space, power, and 
social memory interact to provide context for the contestation of national identity 
and to mediate access to full and equal citizenship in the nation-state (S. 
Hoelscher and Alderman 2004; Price 2004; Falah 1996; Massey 1995; Mills 
2006). 
As chapter one explains, the immediate post-Soviet years were times of 
intense de-Sovietization and reclamation of national identity, history, and territory 
in Eastern and Central European nation-states. One of the most vigorously 
pursued avenues of identity reassertion by titular majorities was reclaiming the 
national landscape from Sovietized history, and Estonia was no exception. The 
Estonian nationalist discourse of territoriality has been made material through 
myriad processes of place transformation, from re-naming city streets from 
Soviet icon names to more acceptably Estonian ones, removing statues of Soviet 
figures like Vladimir Lenin, and suppressing any spatial representation of Soviet-
Russophone dominance (D. J. Smith and Burch 2012).  
The relocation of the Bronze Soldier memorial is the most recent and 
arguably most controversial alteration to public memory in Estonia. The Estonian 
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government made the decision to remove the Bronze Soldier, a Soviet WWII 
memorial for war dead, in the early morning hours of April 27, 2007 from a 
Kesklinn square called Tõnismägi (Figure 5.2) to the Defense Forces Cemetery 
of Tallinn (Figure 5.3), located several miles from the city center (Figure 5.4).  
The relocation of the statue had been an issue in recent elections, but 
preparations to move the memorial, which began on April 26, were a shock to 
Tallinn. Mass protests between Russophones, who vehemently opposed to the 
move, and Estonians, who strongly supported it, erupted in Kesklinn and shortly 
turned into riots. Two nights of riots led to massive looting, the death of one 
Russophone protester, several arrests, and international media coverage. The 
events, known in Estonia as “The Bronze Night,” intensified inter-ethnic tensions 
between Estonians and Russophones.  
Since 1992, the simultaneous acts of preserving and emphasizing 
Estonian history while ignoring and erasing Soviet Russian history have been a 
key to bolstering Estonian nationalist agendas. An interpretation of history that 
labels the Soviet Union as occupiers of a formerly free Republic, combined with 
factual narratives and evidence of brutal Soviet domination, deportations, exiles, 
executions, and suppression of Estonian culture has coalesced into the framing 
of Estonia’s post-Soviet years as a “decolonization” period (Hughes 2005). After 
roughly five decades of living in and around Soviet performances of history, 
Estonia embarked on a project of re-constructing displays of public memory to 
establish the “correct” version of history. The process of public memory in 
Estonia was and is a crucial part of changing the conception of the nation-state
	  




Figure 5.2: Tõnismägi Square, Kesklinn District, 
Tallinn. The Bronze Soldier Memorial was located in 
Tõnismägi Square until 2007, which has since been 





Figure 5.3: Bronze Soldier Memorial, Defense 
Forces Cemetery of Tallinn. The Bronze Soldier 
Memorial is currently located in the Defense Forces 
Cemetery of Tallinn, two miles from its previous 
location in the city center.
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Figure 5.4 Former and Current Locations of the Bronze Soldier War 
Monument, Tallinn Estonia. In 2007 the Bronze Soldier was moved from 
Tõnismagi Square in Old Town to the Defense Forces Cemetery, several 
miles from the most frequented parts of Tallinn’s city center.  
 
 
from a Russified, Soviet one to an Estonian one (K. Mitchell 2003; Forest, 
Johnson, and Till 2004; D. J. Smith and Burch 2012).  
The ongoing process of changing the landscapes of memory in Tallinn are 
extremely important to my student respondents because the urban spaces that 
are inscribed with (now) Estonian cultural understandings of national history are 
spatial reflections of what it means to be Estonian. For my student participants, 
the Bronze Soldier crisis represents the larger issue of belonging and meaningful 
citizenship in Estonian society. A dominant group’s constructions, 
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deconstructions, and/or changings of monuments, memorials, and museums are 
material actions of remembering specific versions of history (Till 1999; Hay, 
Hughes, and Tutton 2004; K. Mitchell 2003). Importantly, these acts of 
remembering always involve acts of forgetting, which at the national scale will 
emphasize one group identity while ignoring and delegitimizing the 
commemoration of an Other identity (S. Hoelscher and Alderman 2004). It is this 
tension that underscores the passionate feelings of the students throughout the 
focus groups. The issue of how universal Estonia’s national history actually is 
compels my student respondents to couch legitimate citizenship in Estonian 
society in terms of very particular understandings of the country’s history. 
Along with the issue of language, the public expression of social memory 
is central to the student participants’ conceptualization of the terms of citizenship 
in Estonia. Both Estonian and Russophone students use the “correct” version 
and representation of history to Other who do not subscribe to it. The main theme 
that girds the students’ attitudes towards the Bronze Soldier relocation, as well as 
wider social memory in Estonia, is the interpretation of Estonian history during 
the Soviet era. It is during the conversations about the Bronze Soldier that the 
issue of occupation versus liberation enters into their narratives as proof of 
legitimate or illegitimate Russophone presence in Estonian society. 
Each of the 13 Russophone students, as well as three of the four “outlier” 
students, were firmly against the relocation of the Bronze Soldier memorial, even 
several years after the event. The unexpectedness of the removal, as well as the 
disrespect to the soldiers buried with the memorial, caused several students to 
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frame the relocation as a deliberate insult toward Russians and Russophones by 
the Estonian government. These students characterize the relocation of the 
monument as disrespectful to Red Army soldiers who died fighting Nazi forces 
rather than as an attempt to remove a reminder of the harsh realities of the 
Soviet era from a central public place:  
 
Pushkin Boy 3: I think it was an insult, but maybe not for the 
Russians here. But mainly for the Russians whose relatives died 
during the war. 
 
O-Pushkin Girl 2: I think they [the Estonian government] wanted 
to offend Russians.  
 
Tolstoy Boy 3: I am clearly against that decision made by our 
governors. I think that this is immoral to transfer the ancient 
memorial. 
 
Tolstoy Boy 2: It is the right way to show that there is 
discrimination [against Russophones], when something is done like 
that. 
 
Pushkin Boy 4: I think that it was a plan, a provocation. For 
Russians, it was a very important issue because a lot of people lost 
their relatives during the War. For example both of my grandfathers 
died during the War. 
 
O-Taamsaare Boy 1: It [the Bronze Soldier] harmed no one when it 
was there [in Kesklinn]. The whole event was political, actually. Just 
100 percent political. 
 
In these students’ narratives there is a focus on specific moments in 
history (a tactic that Estonian heritage students engage in as well). The 
Russophone students, as well as the “outliers” who disagree with the 
monument’s relocation, draw on the victories of the Red Army against Nazi 
forces to legitimize the right of Soviet history to exist in the urban landscape. 
While there is considerable criticism of the Estonian government’s tactics during 
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the Bronze Soldier crisis, there is no mention or consideration that public displays 
of Soviet history may be deeply troubling to Estonians whose families 
experienced great brutalities at the hands of the Soviet Army. These students’ 
arguments for the appropriation of urban space for Soviet Russian history is 
ultimately grounded in the belief that each group’s historical memory is legitimate 
and has the right to be displayed: 
 
Pushkin Girl 1: We should respect what was in the past, and 
now we can live to see a new future… you can’t go away from [the 
Soviet era], it’s history. 
 
Tolstoy Girl 3: They [the government] should have practiced 
tolerance, and they should respect the people who live here 
[because] maybe they have different opinions.  
 
O-Pushkin Boy 1: Why they [the government] wanted to move it, 
actually, is because, as we know, the city center and the Old Town 
is the center where all foreigners come, tourists and everything. 
Maybe they wanted to move the Russian history a bit away from 
the center of Estonian history. So for them it’s better [for the city 
center] to hold most of the Estonian history, not Russian.  
 
In an effort to give Soviet history the same legitimacy as Estonian history, these 
students are once more appealing to the principles of equality and tolerance that 
put Russophones on an even playing field with Estonians. The students’ 
discussions of the Bronze Soldier and Soviet history in Estonia implies belief that 
their membership in Estonian society entitles them to their own understandings 
and negotiations of the past. Moreover, in maintaining opposition to the removal 
of Soviet history, these students are creating a contested place identity to use as 
a method of resisting what they see as the ideological hegemony (Larsen 2004) 
of the Estonian nation-building project. 
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All but one of the Estonian heritage students (as well as O-Koidula Girl 5) 
engage in a similarly selective reading of history to assess the Bronze Soldier 
crisis and which version of history should be remembered. Not surprisingly, most 
of the Estonian heritage students’ reading of the Bronze Soldier crisis is that any 
legitimacy the Soviet Union may have had by “liberating” Estonia from the Nazis 
was comprehensively dismantled when the Soviets stayed to occupy the country 
for five decades. As such, the Estonian heritage students that agree with the 
government’s decision to relocate the Bronze Soldier deflect any argument that 
the Soviet era is part of Estonian history. By frequently using the phrases “our 
history” and “they were occupiers,” the Estonian heritage students project a 
narrative of territoriality that locates Russophones outside of the nation-building 
project because of their ethnolinguistic association with the illegal occupiers of 
the historical Estonian homeland. Positive material representation of the 
occupation or occupiers is couched as offensive to the Estonian collective 
memory of brutality and repression at the hands of the Soviets. For instance, 
Tammsaare Girl 2 argues that Soviet history should not be prominently and 
publicly displayed in the city center, and Tammsaare Girl 1 notes that “[the 
Bronze Solider] is Estonian history, but it’s not a positive thing to make a 
monument out of that.”  
For the Estonian heritage students the Russophone community’s opinions 
on the Bronze Soldier crisis, both in 2007 and today, are indicative of a wider, 
disturbing Russophone mentality that does not respect the Estonian people and 
their historical right to their homeland. As an example, a part of one focus group 
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with Estonian heritage students uncovers the underlying resentment about 
Russophone attitudes to Estonian history is present: 
 
Koidula Boy 1: What I think about [the Bronze Soldier crisis] 
now is that, well, its… it’s still a little scary because the people—the 
mentality is still here, if not more… 
Interviewer:  What mentality? 
Koidula Boy 1: The mentality—well, the one thing is the все 
находится наши mentality. 
Interviewer:  What is that? 
Koidula Girl 1: Like, “everything is ours”… like they own 
Estonia. 
Koidula Girl 3: They’re the bosses. 
Koidula Girl 1: And they are destroying shops [during the 
riots], and like “everything is ours!” 
 
The Estonian student respondents throughout the study tend to treat the 
Russophone community as a homogenous unit that acts and thinks the same 
way about Estonian history and territoriality and that is, by its very nature, 
domineering, insensitive, disrespectful, and ultimately illegitimate. I argue this in 
spite of the fact that comments are occasionally made about the Russophones’ 
right to their own interpretation of history because even after these comments are 
made the conversation immediately reverts to a consensus that “its just not right” 
to have Soviet history in Estonian spaces, which belies these students’ 
understanding of Russophone identity as fundamentally illegitimate. Through the 
very real urban spaces of memory in Tallinn, the Estonian heritage students are 
conceptualizing spatial parameters of citizenship that coincide with the spatial 
parameters of the Estonian nation’s historical narrative, thereby excluding 
anyone with alternative perceptions of history from equal access to substantive 
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citizenship in society and the sociopolitical and economic resources that 
accompany it. 
 The student participants’ conflicting conceptualizations of which version of 
history is universal to the “ideal” Estonian citizen stems from the refusal to 
recognize the legitimacy of the other group’s historical narrative. Using the 
Bronze Soldier crisis to frame a larger discussion about whose representations of 
history are appropriate, tolerant, and accurate, the student focus groups 
demonstrate that “social memory and social space join together to provide 
context for modern identities and their contestations” (S. Hoelscher and 
Alderman 2004, 349). For my student participants, performing and/or contesting 
Estonian citizenship involves engaging a selective historical narrative that is 
based on competing definitions of justice, oppression, discrimination, and 
marginalization throughout the last 70 years of Estonia’s history.  
 Both Estonian heritage and Russophone students ground their competing 
opinions on the relocation of the Bronze Soldier (and the greater interpretation of 
Estonian history) in terms of what history applies to all Estonian citizens. Again, 
but this time in terms of landscapes of memory, each student group is couching 
the defining traits of the citizen in terms of historical narratives that are ostensibly 
universal to the population at large, but that are actually shot through with 
selective and particular readings of history. The Estonian heritage students 
locate Soviet Russian history as outside the realm of a legitimate citizen’s history 
by characterizing of Russophones—and their Other historical narratives—as 
remnants of an illegal occupation. The Russophone students, by contrast, appeal 
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to the equality-as-sameness discourse of liberal democratic citizenship by 
arguing that their particular readings of history include what is common to all 
Estonian citizens, neglecting to realize that they themselves are insisting upon a 
particular narrative of history.  
It is my argument that in the lives of these young people in Tallinn, the 
intrinsically political historical memory of Estonia is a crucial part of the spatial 
strategy of citizenship. The students’ chaotic negotiations of the Estonian 
citizenry’s history involve Tallinn’s urban landscape and how it should (or should 
not) be utilized to establish the “topography” of the Estonian people (Till 2003, 
294). The students’ strong feelings about the Bronze Soldier indicate that 
Tallinn’s places of memory are crucial sites for their negotiations of the terms of 
belonging and exclusion in Estonian society. For the students, social memory, 
like language, is a both medium of communication and identity performance that 
demarcates the parameters of citizenship. These students are bounding the 
Estonian nation-state, and membership in it, by defining how exactly the nation 
has “stretched through time” (B. Anderson 2006) and how the state should 
embed the nation’s history in the landscape. 
	  
Conclusions 
 This chapter has focused on the ways in which the students in this study 
actively negotiate citizenship and belonging in Tallinn. The narratives analyzed 
illustrate the ways in which students both encounter and use spatial strategies to 
delineate the bounds of meaningful citizenship and belonging in society. The 
	  
	   230 
spaces of language, historical memory, and city life discussed in this chapter are 
analyzed together as a framework within which to uncover the multiple and 
varied ways that these students arbitrate belonging and ascribe identities to 
themselves and to the Other.  
Although general patterns emerge amongst students of different 
ethnolinguistic groups, they do not represent unilateral, fixed modalities of how 
young people produce and reproduce conceptualizations of citizenship. Rather, 
they suggest that while the conceptualizations of citizenship of young people in 
divided societies can and do reflect socio-spatial divisions along ethnocultural 
lines, the diversities of their personal geographies, past experiences, and 
movements in and through everyday spaces will produce varying narratives and 
understandings of belonging. As this chapter has illustrated, the spatial 
delimitations of citizenship and multiple discourses of belonging inform and are 
informed by the ways that the students enact their identities in the city. In this 
sense, young people’s negotiations of citizenship in divided societies cannot be 
compartmentalized into discrete spaces or homogenized across ethnolinguistic 
lines, but must be understood as a constant, active process in which they 
configure and reconfigure their understandings of identities and belonging in 
Tallinn.
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Chapter 6 
Positionality in the Nation-State and Deployment of EU 
Citizenship 
 
I have argued thus far that the universalisms through which citizenship is 
constituted exist in contention with the particularisms through which citizenship is 
equally constituted. This chapter extends that argument by exploring the 
particularisms and universalisms that influence the conception, experience, and 
performance of supranational citizenship. A consideration of supranational 
citizenship is particularly relevant to any discussion of Estonian young people’s 
conceptualizations of belonging, identity, and entitlements because European 
citizenship formally guarantees rights outside the domain of the nation-state and 
provides a layer of identity beyond that of the national community. The student 
respondents’ experiences, negotiations, and performances of European 
citizenship are multi-layered and context dependent. European citizenship can be 
described as multi-layered because youths conceive of it not only in strictly 
politico-legal terms, but also in economic and socio-cultural terms. I characterize 
European citizenship as context dependent because despite its situation at the 
supranational level, it cannot be easily detached from circumstances at national 
level.  European and national citizenships are not discrete, nested entities that 
exist on separate levels of a scalar hierarchy, but rather are institutions that 
interact complexly with multiple notions of identity and belonging. Therefore my
	  
	   232 
 argument here is that students’ conceptions of European citizenship and identity 
are significantly influenced by their positionalities within the Estonian nation.  
The concept of a European citizenship whose meaning shifts according to 
experiences at the national level problematizes two themes that often appear in 
the literature. The first is that contrasting experiences of citizenship by and large 
take place at the national level. Many pieces in citizenship literature focus on 
disparate experiences of national citizenship (Secor 2004; Wemyss 2006; 
Aasland and Flotten 2001; Bollens 2007). The results of my research suggest 
that supranational citizenships are experienced differently as well, and that those 
divergent experiences depend upon a citizen’s positionality within the nation. The 
student responses indicate that conceptions of European citizenship are 
informed by an individual’s positioning in the Estonian nation. The dichotomy in 
attitudes towards European citizenship between Estonian and Russophone 
students, I will demonstrate, is grounded in the socio-spatial divisions between 
the two groups in Estonian society. This runs contrary to what might be expected 
of European citizenship, which is presented as an overarching citizenship and 
identity that supersedes narrower considerations of nationalism (Reed-Danahay 
2007; Delanty 1997). In fact, European citizenship is experienced and mediated 
by social and political dimensions within the nation-state, much the way national 
citizenship is. 
The second assumption problematized by the idea of European 
citizenship is that “being European” has one meaning, and that meaning is 
internalized by all Europeans (Soysal 1997). In the vein of Sidaway’s (2006, 10) 
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assertion that “there is no single, stable, hegemonic understanding of the EU,” I 
argue that there is no single, stable understanding of what it means to be 
European. My student respondents characterize “Europeanness” in widely 
varying terms and levels of enthusiasm, indicating that claims of a homogenous, 
overarching conception of what it means to be European are dubious at best.   
The interaction between supranational and national citizenships produces 
a multi-layered European citizenship that is much more than a singularly defined 
community membership. My student interviewees couch European citizenship 
and Europeanness in politico-legal, economic, and socio-cultural terms, 
indicating that they conceive of their supranational citizenship as a multifaceted 
community membership that offers them the opportunity to acquire multiple types 
of capital. In this discussion, capital is understood to take both monetary and 
nonmonetary forms. As such, human capital is used to denote “nonmonetary… 
sources of power and influence” (Portes 1998, 2) that are perceived to be 
available in the supranational space of Europe and that will enhance the 
students’ ability to succeed in life. 
Furthermore, the manner in which the Estonian and Russophone students 
characterize the benefits of European citizenship vary according to their 
differentiated experiences of it. This supports Kolossov’s (2003, 252) argument 
that “identities are multiple and ‘negotiable,’ and the same individual or the same 
group may privilege one identity over another according to the situation and the 
moment.” These differentiations in experience, as stated above, are dependent 
upon Estonian and Russophone students’ positionalities in national society. 
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Young people in Estonia are included in or excluded from spaces of belonging 
and rights in the national arena on a daily basis through identity politics that 
involve everything from language to school curricula. However, the responses of 
the study population indicate that young people are actively creating their own 
European identities while concurrently negotiating their Estonian identities. 
Drawing on the focus group data collected, this chapter investigates the 
asymmetrical ways that European citizenship is experienced, enacted, and 
characterized by Estonian and Russophone youths in Tallinn. The first section 
briefly discusses the connections between ethnolinguistic identity and 
positionality within Estonia, and how positionality at the national level affects 
conceptions of the supranational. The second section discusses how Estonian 
students’ positionalities within Estonia’s titular majority inform their conceptions of 
European citizenship and the types capital they associate with it. The third 
section discusses how Russophone students’ positionalities in Estonia’s 
Russophone minority affect their conceptions of European citizenship and the 
types of capital they associate with it. The fourth section discusses the uneven 
nature of attitudes towards European citizenship from “outlier” students, those 
students whose heritage, mother tongue, and school language medium do not 
neatly overlap like those of their contemporaries13. The last section addresses 
the potential effects that these students’ conceptions of Europe and European 
citizenship will have on Estonia in the future. These potential ramifications are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Please see Chapter 3: “Methodology” for a detailed explanation of student respondent 
identifiers and labels. 
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addressed by comparing the students’ plans to migrate out of Estonia for study 
and work.  
 
Positionality, the National, and the Supranational 
As discussed in the previous chapters, there is a large overlap between 
the students’ mother tongues, school language mediums, and self-ascribed 
national identities (which I have referred to by the more accurate term of 
ethnolinguistic identity). The following sections discuss student attitudes about 
Europe based on their self-identifications with the Estonian majority or the 
Russophone minority. The responses of the “outlier” student participants resist 
grouping within the Estonian majority or Russophone minority, and are therefore 
addressed in a separate section.  
Feelings of belonging and loyalty to Estonia are markedly higher in 
Estonian students, and subsequently their perceptions of opportunity in the home 
country are positive. In contrast, Russophone students articulate both feelings 
and experiences of exclusion in everyday life in Estonia. By and large, the 
Russophone students expect that their opportunities in Estonia will be limited 
because of their Russian last names or use of the Russian language, and that 
even Russian-accented Estonian will single them out as targets for discriminatory 
practices.  
At first glance an individual’s positionality within their home country’s 
society may seem to have significance only for how he or she moves in and 
negotiates national society. However, the evidence gathered in focus groups 
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indicates that the politics of identity in Estonia enter into students’ conceptions of 
Europe and Europeanness, as well. Also, the student respondents do not present 
identical levels of enthusiasm about the EU or being European, showing that 
European citizens do not think “one way” as a group. But the ways in which the 
students articulate the value of European citizenship, the rights that it affords, 
and how European identity is performed (or not) is shaped by their ethnolinguistic 
identity and, subsequently, their positionality in the Estonian nation. It should be 
noted that the students use “Western Europe” and “Europe” to mean the 
European Union.  
 
Europeanness as Additive to National Identity: Estonian Student 
Perspectives  
The focus groups I conducted uncover a persistent association between 
the Estonian nation-state and the EU by Estonian student respondents. However, 
there is a marked hierarchy to the identities in these students’ responses, with 
Estonian identity generally being privileged over the European identity. Estonian 
student interviewees overwhelmingly characterize the European Union in terms 
of how it strengthens, protects, and legitimizes Estonia, and how Estonia’s EU 
membership confirms that it is not a “Russian” country. Moreover these students 
mobilize their personal European identities (via the opportunities it affords them) 
as a means of supplementing their Estonian identities.  
The primacy of Estonia and Estonianness is evident from the students’ 
responses. The majority of the Estonian students only identify themselves as 
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European after first asserting their Estonian identity. The Estonian students 
describe more than one reason for identifying as Estonians versus Europeans: 
 
Interviewer:   Do you identify as Europeans at all? 
Tammsaare Girl 1:  No, it’s more just geographic… I don’t know if 
it’s like a “big union” and so on.  
Interviewer:   So if someone asks you “Where are you from?” 
do you mention Europe? 
Tammsaare Girl 3:  If they don’t know where Estonia is! 
Tammsaare Girl 2:  Yes! 
 
Interviewer:   Would you identify yourselves as Europeans? 
Koidula Girl 4:  First as an Estonian, for me… I mean, for me, 
it’s [Europe] not important in the way that Estonia is important for 
me. For me, Estonia is more like a close to heart thing. But Europe 
is… when I say that I feel that I am a part of the European Union, or 
Europe—what do I actually mean by it? 
Interviewer:   It’s a bit harder to define? 
Koidula Girl 4:  Yes. 
 
The Estonian students also mention being “patriotic” Estonians and having 
feelings of loyalty to the nation-state. Students see the emphasis on their 
Estonian identity as crucial to preserving an Estonian culture that has been 
historically threatened by various politico-cultural interlopers and to solidifying a 
bond between the Estonian people that is already tenuous because of their small 
numbers. These students by no means classify Europe in malicious terms, but 
neither do they regard it as an institution under which they are willing to subsume 
their Estonian identity.  
Different responses regarding other-than-national identities in the Estonian 
student focus groups came from two boys from Koidula School. Demonstrating 
that students do not think “one way” about Estonia and Europe based on their 
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ethnolinguistic group, the two boys describe the importance of situating oneself 
within the human race or, at the very least, at a level beyond the nation state: 
 
Koidula Boy 1:  I think throughout history, people have started 
to think more of themselves as part of bigger things. Firstly, it was 
“me” or “my family,” then it was the community, then it was the 
country—now its Europe. Someday it’s going to be the world, and 
universe—I hope. 
 
Koidula Boy 2:  For me, it’s of course the planet Earth first—
that we are citizens of the world and everything… I do have a 
cosmopolitan world view, and I feel myself as more a part of that 
[than anything else]. 
 
These students approach the cosmopolitan community as the primary or most 
desirable form of human association. Rather than classifying European 
citizenship as coexisting equally with cosmopolitan citizenship, it is described as 
a stop along the way to the telos of global citizenship (Koidula Boy 2) or at the 
very least a substratum community to be identified with secondarily (Koidula Boy 
1). These responses indicate the influence of cosmopolitan discourses that 
encourage youth to think of themselves as belonging to the “world” and 
demonstrates that the promulgation of those ideals is substantial enough for 
some young people to verbally espouse them. 
What can be gleaned from the Estonian students’ ideas about how and 
when to identify as European—if at all—is that while Estonian students may 
claim a European identity, there is no indication that it supplants national (or 
cosmopolitan) identity as the primary identity. To these students, the significance 
of “being European” derives partially from the added benefits that come with their 
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home country’s membership in the EU. Estonian students ground the importance 
of Estonia’s membership in the European Union in the legitimacy it gives to 
Estonia as a “European” (read: not Russian) nation and the support that will 
come from the EU if Estonia faces trouble. For instance, this exchange between 
students from Tammsaare School indicates the importance of Estonia being 
recognized as European: 
 
Tammsaare Girl 4:  …and since we’re in the EU, I think that 
Estonia gets a lot of… support. 
Tammsaare Girl 5:  We want to move more to the Western side. 
We don’t want to be next to Russia. And every time people talk 
about Estonia, they’re like, “Oh yes, the little country next to Russia. 
It was in Russia,” and so on. We don’t want to be focused on only 
that part. We want to be the modern country with good technology, 
and move a little but more to the Western side. 
Interviewer:   To have a Western European style? 
Tammsaare Girl 5:  Yes.  
 
The students also characterize the significance of Estonia’s European 
identity as a kind of “back up plan” if Estonia cannot get itself out of a 
troublesome situation. Koidula Girl 1 expresses comfort in the economic safety 
net of Europe, noting, “the economy—we’ll get help like Greece, maybe if 
someday we will be in a bad situation.” However, eight out of the 14 Estonian-
medium school students interviewed explicitly stated that the military/security 
support that Estonia would receive in defending itself from Russian aggression is 
the most important type of European assistance: 
 
Interviewer:   So the EU makes you feel secure? 
Tammsaare Girl 4: Yeah! 
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Tammsaare Girl 5: Yes. 
Tammsaare Girl 6:  Yeah! 
Interviewer:   Whom do you feel the need to be protected 
from? 
Tammsaare Girl 5:  Russia. 
Tammsaare Girl 6:  Terrorists. 
Interviewer:   Terrorists—what kind of terrorists? 
Tammsaare Girl 6:  Everyone. 
Interviewer:   Do you still see the Russian Federation as a 
threat? 
Tammsaare Girl 6:  Yes. 
Tammsaare Girl 5:  …after what happened with [the Republic of] 
Georgia in 2008—that was the moment when I realized that a war 
actually could happen to us, too. That Russia really is an 
aggressive country and they really could attack us. 
 
Interviewer:   Do you think being part of the EU is a good 
thing? 
Tammsaare Girl 2:  Probably, because Russia is on the other side, 
very close, and better in the EU than in Russia. And you see what’s 
going on in Russia right now. Its good to be in Europe. 
Interviewer:   So maybe the EU gives you a little feeling of 
security? 
Tammsaare Girl 1: Yes. 
Tammsaare Girl 2:  Yes. 
Tammsaare Girl 3:  Yes. 
 
Interviewer:   Does being an [EU citizen] matter to you? 
Koidula Girl 1: It makes me feel safer, [because Estonia is] so 
close to the big Russia. 
 
These conversations signify that protecting the Estonian space from non-
European aggression is a pronounced concern for these students. They explicitly 
categorize the importance of Europeanness in terms of the security and 
protection that it adds to Estonianness. Rather than replacing or supplanting the 
identity of their home country, (or of themselves as citizens), the Estonian 
students describe the “supranational European” trait as independent from but 
additive to Estonianness. Moreover, the students’ responses reveal that Estonian 
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space is seen as also being European space when the security—whether 
economic or military—of that space is threatened. These responses depict the 
nature of the relationship between supranational and national citizenships as fluid 
and side-by-side rather than fixed and nested. 
The data gathered shows that the majority of the students who explicitly 
identified the EU as a guarantor of security from Russian threats are from 
Tammsaare School. However, when interviewing the teachers from Tammsaare 
School and learning about its background, there were no indicators that the 
‘threat of Russia’ was a discourse that the students would encounter. The 
emphasis on the EU’s potential contribution to Estonian national security by 
students of a school that does not take pains to stress a Russian threat suggests 
that the school is not the only space where young people encounter and 
negotiate discourses of the politics of identity. The argument here is that young 
people are not solely influenced by discourses they encounter in school. Parents 
and peers are also significant actors outside of the school that affect the ways 
that youths negotiate, synthesize, and internalize discourses of belonging, 
identity, and citizenship. The consequences of the multiple discourses that young 
people negotiate may be narratives that do not harmoniously align with the ideas 
advanced in their school curricula. 
 
Adding a European Dimension to Estonianness 
 The presence of extra-scholastic influences in shaping young people’s 
biographies becomes very clear when the Estonian students describe their 
	  
	   242 
conceptualizations of Europeanness on a personal level. The Estonian students 
define the meaning of their personal European identity in the context of the space 
of rights afforded to all EU citizens. The primary value of European citizenship to 
these students is the access to opportunity that will help them write their own 
successful biographies. Many of the students connected a successful or enriched 
life to the acquisition of not only economic capital, but also human capital. 
Europe is seen as a place to acquire economic and human capital that is not 
available in Estonia, but that will enrich their national identities by adding the 
“developed” and “modern” traits of Europe while retaining traditional, patently 
Estonian traits. 
 These students often spoke of the value of being European in utilitarian 
terms devoid of romantic notions of membership in a pan-European community. 
Many of the interviewees spoke plainly about using their rights as Europeans for 
gain without expressing hopes that the opportunities could forge deeper ties with 
other Europeans. But their European citizenship is certainly seen as the vehicle 
for accessing the opportunities to acquire capital that may not be available in 
Estonia. For instance: 
 
 Interviewer:   Is your EU citizenship important to you? 
Koidula Girl 6:  Yeah, it gives us a lot more opportunities. 
Koidula Boy 2:  Yes, it’s very useful. I have to admit that I do 
think that it’s useful even though I may not think that the EU is such 
a great institution… but I would say that having an EU passport is 
really useful. Working opportunities, travelling opportunities and 
what have you—everything. 
Koidula Girl 6: I mean, for me, it’s not important in the way 
that Estonia is important for me. But yeah, exactly what [Koidula 
Boy 2] said—it’s useful. 
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Interviewer:   You’re EU citizens. Is that something important 
to you? Do you identify as Europeans? 
Tammsaare Girl 1:  No, it’s more just geographic… I don’t know if 
it’s like a “big union” and so on. It’s all about money, euros. Nothing 
else. 
 
Koidula Boy 1:  I like the economic union. I kind of like the 
euro, the currency. I like that there’s not much borders and we can 
do business in this way—the economical [sic] union. But I don’t like 
political union… 
 
There is a tenor of pragmatism and instrumentalism to the initial discourse about 
the EU from the students. The students speak of the economic opportunities first 
and as if they are obvious, demonstrating that the union of Europe is often 
couched in terms of being a means to occupational and, subsequently, financial 
security. According to Tammsaare Girl 3, “many people think that living abroad” 
in Western Europe is better because it is “quite developed…in the economic 
sense.” The pervasiveness of this impression is demonstrated throughout the 
focus groups, such as when Tammsaare Girl 6 states “I think that it’s just easier 
to be successful” in Western Europe, prompting Tammsaare Girl 5 to agree that 
the job opportunities in Western Europe are much more plentiful. 
As the conversations progress past basic value assessments about 
Europe and into exactly why European opportunities are better than Estonian 
ones, these students’ responses take on more nuanced appraisals of those 
opportunities. My Estonian interviewees distinguished European education as 
higher quality and on-the-job training and experience as more available. The 
acquisition of European education and jobs can therefore be classified as both 
economic/career-related and human forms of capital. Furthermore, many of 
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these students want opportunities to experience other cultures and “see how 
other people live” before returning to Estonia. Cultural experience in Europe is 
seen as a type of human capital that is not ubiquitous in Estonia.  
An interesting reason given by a few students as to why European 
opportunities are valuable is that Western Europe is a space of tolerance, human 
rights, and democratic ideals. Given the sharp contrast between levels of 
freedom and human rights in Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe and democratic 
Western Europe, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Estonian students perceive 
Western Europe as a place where one can live and experience democratic 
ideals. Even if the students seem to be unable to articulate the exact nature of 
the “high ideals” that are held in Europe, there is still a general sense: 
 
Koidula Girl 2:  For me, I like to travel, its easier—and also, 
more good comes from there. 
Interviewer:   More good comes from Western Europe and 
the European Union? 
Koidula Girl 3:  Yeah, something like that. 
Koidula Boy 1:  The Western ideals— 
Koidula Girl 3:  Yeah, yes. 
Koidula Boy 1:  The democracy— 
 Koidula Girl 1:  And the freedom and the— 
Koidula Boy 1:  Yeah, the human rights. They are more 
respected in the West than in The East. 
Koidula Girl 3:  Yes, that’s right. 
 
From this exchange it is evident that these students identify the European space 
as a repository of progressive, democratic ideals and that moving through this 
space is an opportunity to acquire the cultural capital of having lived in a 
“tolerant” place. Through interviews with teachers and NGO officials and study of 
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EU policy documents I learned that discourses of the “Western” ideals of 
tolerance and open-mindedness are present in the Estonia’s education curricula. 
I would suggest that these discourses of “Western” or “European” ideals in the 
classroom are discursively associated with economic and material development 
in Europe, which may explain why these students are eager to gain the cultural 
capital of living in a tolerant European space. These Estonian students perceive 
that the social hallmark of economically successful European member-states is 
the acceptance of democratic ideals and liberal value of tolerance.  
 Furthermore, this conversation intimates that the students understand the 
espousal of human rights and tolerance to be part and parcel of European 
citizenship. But while the discourses of tolerance and respect are present, my 
observation is that they are used in an instrumental way to demonstrate a proper 
appreciation of what it means to be European rather than meaningfully applied in 
the students’ everyday lives. For instance, several of Estonian students convey 
interest and excitement in the opportunities to learn about and experience other 
cultures in Europe, and express no anxiety about potential threats to their 
national identity or the identities of the peoples whose cultures they want to 
experience. But there is a tacit understanding that the cultures to be explored, 
respected, and tolerated are not Russophone. As demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, there is little evidence in the Estonian students’ focus group 
conversations that they perceive Russophone culture in Estonia as worthy 
subjects of the “European” respect for tolerance.  
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 This section has evaluated the perceptions of Europeanness and 
European citizenship in Estonian students. These students’ attachments to 
Estonia and their Estonian identities are apparent from their comments about 
where their national identities rank in comparison to their supranational identities. 
This is demonstrative of two key points. First, the simultaneous but independent 
existence of the supranational European identity and the national Estonian 
identity is demonstrated by the students’ use of one identity to define or 
contextualize the other, i.e. “I’ll identify myself as European if someone doesn’t 
know where Estonia is,” or “since we’re in the EU, people notice Estonia.”  
Second, their loyalty, attachment, and sense of belonging to the Estonian 
nation-state informs the perception that European identity and citizenship—and 
the opportunities it affords—are avenues through which to augment their 
Estonian identity. This “additive” quality of European citizenship and the desire to 
enhance Estonian identity is being articulated by students who are part of the 
titular majority, and therefore are on the dominant side of the politics of identity in 
Estonia. This positive positionality in national society influences the conceptions 
of supranational citizenship and identity in Estonian students.  
 
Europeanness as an Alternative to “Otherness” in Estonia: Russophone 
Student Perspectives  
 All but two of the Russophone student participants hold Estonian and 
European citizenships. The Russophone students’ experiences of citizenship and 
identity in Estonian society affect their conceptions of Europeanness and EU 
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citizenship, just as with Estonian students. However, conceptions of 
Europeanness and the value of the opportunities afforded by EU citizenship 
contrast starkly between Estonian and Russophone students because of the 
differences between the two groups’ positionalities in Estonian society.  
Despite the fact that the vast majority of Russophone students hold formal 
Estonian citizenship, they repeatedly articulate feelings of unease or 
displacement (if not outright exclusion) in Estonia, which they attribute to actual 
or de facto discrimination because of their Russophone identity. The 
Russophone students’ positionalities in Estonia are ones of “outsider,” effecting 
feelings of various degrees of exclusion. As a result, these students characterize 
Europeanness and the opportunities afforded by their European citizenship as 
viable alternatives to their identity as the “Other” in Estonian society.  
 
The Russophone Identity and European Identity 
Chapter Four discussed Russophone students’ awareness of their position 
as part of the unwelcome “Other” in Estonia. The disenfranchisement of these 
Russophone students at the national level is crucial to understanding why 
supranational European identity is often seen as a viable alternative to these 
students’ identities at the national level. Due to the socio-political alienation that 
the Russophone students feel in Estonia, Europe primarily becomes a space 
where they can re-classify themselves. Some Russophone students view Europe 
as a space where they can claim a European identity and access rights and 
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opportunities. Others view Europe as a space where they can reject associations 
with Estonia and access rights and opportunities.  
It is important to note is that the students who enthusiastically claim a 
European identity and the rights afforded to them by being European citizens are 
all students at Pushkin School. This school is an active participant in EU-
sponsored projects and grant competitions. Several of the student participants 
from Pushkin School bring up their experiences on school trips to Western 
Europe for EU projects, participation in competitions for recognition and funding, 
and in-class engagement with EU policies, values, and ideals. These positive 
experiences with EU topics, combined with their self-awareness of being part of 
the Other group in Estonia, explain the propensity for these students in particular 
to eagerly claim Europeanness as an alternative to an Estonian Russophone 
identity: 
 
Interviewer:   What do you think about national identity? How 
do you identify yourself? 
Pushkin Boy 2:  I’m European. 
Pushkin Boy 3:  I’m also European, because I have different 
nationalities in my history. 
 
Interviewer:   If someone asked you, “Who are you?” what 
would you say? Would you say, “I am Estonian,” “I am Russian,” or 
a mix of those? 
Pushkin Boy 6:  I would say that I’m European. That’s the best. 
 
Students at Tolstoy School exhibit fewer tendencies to assert a 
Europeanness of any kind. One student (Tolstoy Girl 2) jokingly points out that it 
was hard to feel European while living in Estonia because “according to the 
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documents [Estonia is part of Europe], but really it’s like the third world.” The 
responses from Tolstoy School students are consistent with Pushkin School 
students, however, in identifying multiple possible definitions of Russophone and 
in failing to constitute being “Estonian” beyond legal citizenship: 
 
Tolstoy Girl 2:  I can say that I am mostly Russian. I don’t have 
any Estonians in my family, and we have also some members of 
the family who are from Kazakhstan. 
Tolstoy Girl 1: I am also mixed. I have my father’s family from 
Ukraine and my mother’s family from Ukraine and Russia. 
Tolstoy Girl 3:  For me it’s a very difficult question, because I 
have two different fathers, and also have grandmothers from 
different places. But I am Russian. I can clearly state it. 
Tolstoy Boy 1:  I can clearly say that I’m not Estonian. I don’t 
have any family members who are Estonians. I have some relatives 
from Russia, from Ukraine, from Poland, and even from Mongolia.  
 
These students reject an Estonian national identity but do not eagerly emphasize 
a distinct Europeanness. However it does not automatically follow that their lack 
of eagerness to identify as European means that they do not interpret being 
European as an attractive alternative to being Russophone in Estonia. The 
students from Tolstoy School explicitly expressed a desire to use their European 
citizenship to harness opportunities outside of Estonia. For the students at 
Tolstoy School, performing and experiencing Europeanness through the exercise 
of the rights afforded by EU citizenship is regarded as a legitimate and welcome 
alternative from performing and experiencing Estonian citizenship, even if they 
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Practicing European Citizenship as an Alternative to Estonian Citizenship 
 The Russophone student interviewees actively view the value of European 
citizenship in terms of their right to access European (read: non-Estonian) 
spaces of opportunity. This is apparent regardless of whether the student 
espouses an explicitly European identity or not. Like Estonian students, they are 
interested in gaining economic and human capital via the rights afforded to them 
by European citizenship. But the types of human capital that Russophone 
students allude to are different than that spoken of by Estonian students. I argue 
that this results from the Russophone students’ positionalities as the Other in 
Estonia. 
 The Russophone students with Estonian/EU citizenship are unsurprisingly 
concerned with their future financial successes, which influences much of their 
plans to practice European citizenship via the right to move for work and study. 
They largely perceive Europe as a place of opportunities to acquire more 
economic capital and financial security than Estonia: 
 
Tolstoy Girl 1:  The economies are more developed there.  
 
Tolstoy Boy 3:  Conditions for future life in our country are, 
roughly speaking, terrible. Small wages, high prices and so on—it 
just drives you away from here. 
 
Interviewer:   So you think Estonia is less developed than 
[Western Europe]? 
Pushkin Boy 4:  Of course. 
Pushkin Boy 6:  Yes. 
Pushkin Boy 7:  I also think this. 
Pushkin Boy 5: Let’s just say Estonia is not the richest country 
of the European Union. 
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Comparing these responses to those of the Estonian students, it appears that 
young people, regardless of ethnolinguistic identity, make the assumption that 
economic and human capital is more readily available in Western Europe in 
general. This is a worthwhile observation to make because it calls attention to the 
fact that while many of the student respondents’ perceptions are dependent upon 
their ethnolinguistic group (and positionality in Estonian society), there are 
assessments of the EU that are common across ethnic boundaries. The 
increased opportunity for financial and economic success in Europe is one such 
perception.  
Russophone students also perceive Europe as a space in which to attain 
human capital because of the variety of educational opportunities in European 
institutions, high level of societal development, a “prestige” associated with 
Europeanness, and the low(er) cost of tuition. For example:  
  
Pushkin Boy 3:  I think its good to be a European citizen 
because it gives the possibility to study in the EU. 
 
Pushkin Boy 2:  When I was in the Ukraine this summer, I just 
told everyone, “Oh, you know, I’m a European citizen.” I boasted a 
little…and I think, for example, if you go to Ukraine or Russia you 
would get better opportunities with a European diploma… 
 
Pushkin Boy 7:  I want to go to Denmark to university. 
 
Tolstoy Girl 1:  I have already tried to enter into university in 
Western Europe. I still have options here [in Estonia] as well, but 
still, I want to go abroad. 
 
While there are similarities in Russophone and Estonian students’ 
conceptions of European citizenship as a path to accumulating human capital, 
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the subtle difference between how the students plan to use such capital is an 
important element in this discussion. The Russophone students do not classify 
the value of European human capital in terms of how they can use it upon their 
return to Estonia, or to improve Estonian society upon returning home. This 
distinction and its implications will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter’s 
section regarding migration. 
 Significantly, Russophone students speak about acquiring a type of 
human capital that Estonian students never mention. Russophone students 
speak explicitly about performing and experiencing their European citizenship as 
a means to escape the discrimination and/or disadvantages they encounter in 
Estonia. The Russophone students’ perception that opportunities to succeed in 
Europe are not limited because of Russophone identity reveals that there is a 
human capital available to them in Europe that is not available in Estonia. The 
perception is that this human capital available to them in Europe will allow them 
to circumvent the politics of identity in Estonia that put them in a disadvantaged 
position in the nation. This is demonstrated by their characterization of life in 
Estonia versus life in Europe: 
 
Tolstoy Girl 3:  It’s valuable to me that I have European 
citizenship. That means that I can leave Estonia at any time… I 
want to leave here and I want to live in another country. I think we 
[Russophones] can only vacation in Estonia. But we can’t really 
study or work here. It’s still very different from Europe. 
 
Pushkin Boy 6:  We are Europeans. If you compare the living 
conditions [in Estonia], for example, to France or Germany, you 
maybe want to go there because it is now like one big country, the 
European Union. 
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Tolstoy Girl 1:  We [Russophones] don’t have any prospects 
here. We can study, but we don’t have a really clear future. We can 
study here, but we can’t find any work…when I leave Estonia, I 
won’t miss this country. I will only miss my family and friends. 
 
Pushkin Boy 3:  …[Estonia] is still some kind of post-Soviet 
society. It’s only developing into the European way, and you have 
[learn] to survive here.  
 
The Russophone students do not speak about encountering ethnic identity based 
barriers in Europe. They speak about going to Finland, or to Denmark, or to the 
UK, and they do so without any reservation about the prospects for their success. 
Several of the students state how “many,” “most,” or “almost everyone” in the 
Russophone minority thinks about or plans to go abroad, indicating that (to the 
students at least) the general wisdom in Tallinn’s Russophone community is that 
Europe holds the opportunities for a successful future. Pushkin Boy 5, who was 
formerly stateless, frankly describes the magnitude of Europe’s appeal for him: 
“For me [being European] is important. And that’s why I applied for Estonian 
citizenship: to go to Europe.” 
The ability to access and move through the European space of rights 
without being hampered by the identity politics in Estonia is thus transformed into 
a unique type of human capital for these Russophone students: European 
identity and citizenship is a viable, legitimate, and prestigious alternative to 
Estonian citizenship and the unstable identity of “Russophone in Estonia.” Again, 
we see how conceptions of the national affect conceptions of the supranational in 
the preceding instance by a Russophone student’s use of national citizenship as 
a means to the ultimate end of accessing European citizenship rather than as a 
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vehicle to participate in Estonian society. The utility of the unique human capital 
of Europeanness as alternative to Estonianness is useful to, and therefore 
desired by, Russophone students because of their marginalized position at the 
national level.  
 As with the Estonian students, the Russophone students’ positionalities 
within Estonian society have a great impact on how they perceive and conceive 
of Europeanness and European citizenship. Importantly, however, the 
Russophone students’ perspectives produce radically different characterizations 
of Europe in focus groups. Russophone students candidly describe their chances 
for advancement in Estonia as limited at best, and make no mention of loyalty to 
the Estonian nation-state or attachment to the “Estonianness” of their national 
citizenships.  
Consequently, this data indicates that the dynamics operating between 
Estonian and Russophone students’ national and supranational citizenships differ 
based on their positionalities within Estonian society. Furthermore, these 
Russophone students’ experiences in and movement through Estonian society 
have affected multi-layered characterizations of European citizenship in 
economic, social, and cultural terms. Russophone students recognize and speak 
to the greater economic development of Europe and the subsequent financial 
success that can be derived from that space. But there is no conveyance of 
loyalty to Estonia or desire to better the nation-state with economic and human 
capital acquired in Europe. Because European citizenship grants them access to 
greater economic, educational, and socio-cultural opportunities than they would 
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have access to in Estonia, it is couched as an attractive alternative to Estonian 
citizenship and its limited opportunities.  
 
 “Outlier” Students’ Views of Europe 
 The “outlier” student respondents have perspectives on and experiences 
in Estonian society that are distinct from young people situated wholly within the 
ethnic Estonian or Russophone communities, which in turn affects their 
perceptions about Europeanness and the value of European citizenship. It is 
necessary to specifically address these students’ perceptions of Europeanness 
and European citizenship because although their numbers are few, they 
represent a growing segment of Tallinn, Estonia’s youth population.  
 As discussed in Chapter Four, the outlier students’ positionalities at the 
national level are unique because they cannot be put into neat associations 
between mother tongue, school language medium, and ethnolinguistic identity. 
Given the unevenness of their positionalities in Estonian society, it is unsurprising 
that each of the “outlier” students speaks about Europe and their European 
citizenships in ways that are distinct from each other. Furthermore, these 
students’ responses about European citizenship do not necessarily match the 
tenor of the responses of Estonian-only students, who view Europeanness as 
additive to Estonianness, or Russophone-only students, who view Europeanness 
as an alternative to Estonianness.  
Like the other student respondents, the “outlier” students speak about 
European citizenship in terms of opportunity to enhance economic mobility 
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through educational attainment and the acquisition of cultural capital. The 
“outlier” students value higher education in Europe is because it provides a more 
well-rounded study course and the economies are better developed and offer 
more opportunities for career advancement. But the “outlier” students each 
articulated interest in a different type of human capital that could be acquired in 
Europe. For instance, O-Pushkin Boy 1 notes that, in addition to having access to 
higher salaries and good work experience from European jobs, he values his EU 
citizenship because “it’s really cool to be a part of something so big, and also it 
connects many people and it’s easier to cooperate with different European 
countries.” 
O-Pushkin Boy 1 demonstrates an affinity for the pan-European 
atmosphere and identity that Brussels has tried so hard to engender. This 
attitude is similar to some of his classmates at Pushkin School. However, O-
Pushkin Boy 1 also decisively states that he plans to return to Estonia after 
gaining some work experience in Europe because “I love my country… Estonia 
will stay in my heart forever,” which is an attitude that only students at Estonian-
medium schools A and B exhibit.  
O-Koidula Girl 5’s responses also have unique elements, some of which 
are voiced by her ethnic Estonian classmates at Koidula School, others of which 
are voiced by Russophone students at Russian-medium schools. For instance, 
O-Koidula Girl 5 speaks in the following manner about how her identity, 
citizenships, and opportunities in Europe are bound up together: 
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When somebody asks me what nationality I am, I say Estonian, but 
half Russian as well. But when I am approached, and somebody 
asks who I am, I say Estonian, and Russian, and a little but 
German, and a little bit Polish… Ok, it has affected me a lot that I 
have lived in Estonia, and for three weeks in Russia every year. But 
still, I have an [Estonian] national identity. At the same time, I would 
say that I am a European as well. I like how it has given me many 
opportunities, and I know that I will use them a lot. For example, in 
the next year I want to go abroad… But I want to go abroad and 
stay there. Because in Estonia, there are not so many opportunities 
for me—Estonia is too small for me. I want to get connections and I 
want to live somewhere else. I will travel to Estonia to see my 
friends and family and so on, but I don’t want to live here. 
 
Her identification as an Estonian and explicit espousal of an Estonian national 
identity echo the views of her Estonian classmates. But her low assessment of 
Estonian opportunities and intentions to perform her supranational identity by 
living in Europe rather that in Estonia are more in line with those of Russophone 
students.  
 For these two students, the language medium of the school they attend 
and their self-identification as Estonian are not accurate indicators of their 
perceptions and conceptions of Europeanness. O-Koidula Girl 5 and O-Pushkin 
Boy 1’s responses indicate unique positionalities within Estonian society that are 
neither wholly characterized by the assured confidence of the ethnic Estonian 
students or the political and social alienation of the Russophone students. This 
demonstrates the complex interaction of their positions in both Estonian and 
Russophone spaces and how that complexity extends to their conceptualizations 
of supranational citizenship.  
However the situation is again different for O-Pushkin Girl 2. She identifies 
as Estonian although her mother tongue is Russian and her poor Estonian 
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language skills affect her positionality in Estonian society. Subsequently, this 
affects her characterization of the principle value of European citizenship, 
particularly with regards to educational opportunities. As of 2012, the higher 
education instruction in state-funded Estonian universities is no longer offered in 
Russian. As such, O-Pushkin Girl 2 interprets her educational opportunities in 
Estonia to be next to nothing because of her language skills and plans to use the 
right to movement within Europe to go to a university in Finland where programs 
are available in English:  
 
From this year, all [higher] education would be transferred to the 
Estonian language… my mother thinks that we should study in 
Estonian in university. But she knows that I don’t learn [speak] 
Estonian…I want to go to Finland [for university] because English, 
for me, it’s more easier to speak than Estonian. 
 
Her attitude towards studying in an Estonian university is pessimistic because of 
the difficulty she has with the Estonian language. That being said, her tone and 
general countenance denotes a socio-cultural alienation stemming from the lack 
of educational opportunities for someone without high quality Estonian skills. Her 
European citizenship thus becomes a vehicle for circumnavigating a 
disadvantaged position in her home nation.  
 O-Taamsaare Boy 1, whose marked conflictedness about his identity 
within Estonian society was discussed in the previous chapter, speaks about his 
European citizenship in terms of the opportunity it gives him to find where he truly 
belongs. Interestingly, he does not tie his feelings of unease regarding his 
position in Estonian society to discrimination, as do the Russophone students. 
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But neither does he express feelings of belonging or attachment to Estonia like 
the Estonian students. This lack of attachment, however, is 
 
 not because my parents are Russian. It’s just I have never really 
felt like I’m… not that I’m not welcome here. But I’ve not really felt 
like I belong here. I don’t think that I belong in Russia, either, or the 
Ukraine. I just think that’s not my place. [Estonia] isn’t my place 
either. I need to find my place. 
 
O-Taamsaare Boy 1 has set his sights not only on Western Europe, but also the 
USA, for his future prospects. This analysis of his responses indicates that his 
uneasy positionality in Estonia, which results from having Estonian and 
Russophone spaces as part of his daily personal geographies, affects a 
conceptualization of European citizenship as a means to discover a place of 
belonging.  
 The responses of the “outlier” student respondents show that a students’ 
positionality within the nation affects their conceptions of their supranational 
citizenship, which is consistent with the conclusions drawn from the responses of 
the Estonian and Russophone students. The interactions between these 
students’ national and supranational citizenships are unique because “outlier” 
students’ positionalities in Estonian society are uneven—their mother tongue, 
school language medium, and ethnolinguistic identity do not form neat 
associations. Because of these uneven positionalities in Estonian society, their 
conceptualizations of European citizenship may echo those of both their Estonian 
and Russophone peers. As such, the “outlier” students’ responses show both 
additive and alternative ideas about their European citizenship, but the additive 
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or alternative conceptions do not line up clearly with their school language 
medium as they do with their peers who have uniform Estonian or Russophone 
heritages.  
O-Pushkin Boy 1 embraces both a pan-European identity and a love for 
Estonia, which is not exhibited by any other student respondent. O-Pushkin Girl 2 
says that she feels Estonian, like the students in Estonian-language schools, but 
values her European citizenship because it provides opportunities for her to 
circumvent the linguistic challenges she faces in Estonia, like the students in the 
Russian-medium schools. O-Koidula Girl 5 specifically states that she is 
Estonian, Russophone, and European, which is not stated by any other student 
respondent. But she also views European citizenship as a tool for 
circumnavigating the limited opportunities she perceives to be in Estonia, an 
attitude expressed by the students in Russian-medium schools. O-Taamsaare 
Boy 1 describes his desires to go to Western Europe as a means to find his place 
of belonging, like many Russophone students, but does not cite instances of 
discrimination or marginalization in his responses as the Russophone students 
do.  
My observation from analyzing the responses of the “outlier” students is 
that it is difficult to make generalizations about the attitudes Europeanness and 
European citizenship because these students’ responses do not exhibit clear 
patterns of thinking in the way that responses of Estonian or Russophone 
students do. The results of my analysis suggest that while there may be broad 
patterns in the dynamics between national and European citizenship within 
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ethnolinguistic groups, there are many more variations in the dynamics amongst 
young people with less stable, more heterogeneous identities. This observation 
further supports the argument that the oscillations between national and 
European citizenships hinge upon postitionalities within the nation. European 
citizenship must be understood as a highly contextual institution that may have 
been intended to foster a pan-European community that transcends 
nationalisms, but that in reality is engaged with within the framework of national 
considerations. 
 
Impact of Student Perceptions of Europe in the Real World: Youths’ 
Intentions to Migrate  
 The European integration process is on a timeline of increasing mobility. 
In its earliest days of the post-World War II era, European integration focused on 
increasing the ease and flow of the mobility of goods and services across 
borders. In the decades since the mobility of workers in an integrated Europe has 
been an increasingly significant issue. While the elimination of impediments to 
physical mobility across borders has been successful, the issue of worker 
mobility remains a contentious topic. Globalization and the westward 
enlargement of the EU have fostered critical changes in the philosophy of EU 
governmentality, specifically in the centralization of neoliberal ideals “premised 
on a mantra of market rationality and on the active encouragement of laissez-
faire economic systems” (K. Mitchell 2006b, 389; Favell 2008; Favell and Hansen 
2002). For “ordinary” Europeans, cross-border mobility is the marker of EU 
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citizenship. The preponderance of labor mobility is evinced by the codification of 
the free movement of persons as a fundamental part of the European fabric 
(Treaty on European Union 1992).  
In the past two decades in particular, successive EU treaties, policy 
frameworks, and initiatives have situated the future of Europe within the global 
economic markets and equated a successful, peaceful, and cohesive Europe 
with citizens who have the “occupational mobility… skills, and adaptability ” 
necessary to compete in globally competitive markets (“European Year of 
Worker’s Mobility” 2006; European Commission 2013). Intra-European migration 
is seen as an indispensable process for both ensuring the EU’s place in the 
global markets and providing economic security within the EU (Favell 2008). 
Therefore, mobility plays a key role in the imaginings of EU citizenship because 
worker adaptability and the ability to operate profitably in multiple environments is 
“implicitly associated with successful citizenship” (K. Mitchell 2006b, 397).  
As is evident from the tenor of the vast majority of EU policies and 
discourses, mobility is understood primarily through the lens of employment and 
wage markets. To be sure, the economic disparities between the EU’s Eastern 
and Western member states have precipitated observable East to West labor 
migration flows due to wage levels. But data from this project reveals 
nonmonetary motivations and noneconomic dynamics are also components that 
set intra-EU mobility in motion, suggesting that understanding mobility requires 
looking beyond employment and wage markets. Furthermore, the evidence 
suggests that mobility can signify not only increased opportunities for economic 
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advancement, but also increased opportunities for the negotiation of identity, 
belonging, and socio-cultural enrichment.  
This section explores the potential real-world impact of students’ varying 
attitudes toward Estonian and European citizenships in the context of students’ 
intentions to migrate out of Estonia for study and work. Exploring the students’ 
intentions to be mobile in the European space is important because it shows how 
their positionalities within Estonian society can affect real changes in the 
Estonian nation-state and the European Union through east-to-west migration. 
The students’ perceptions that the high quality educational, career, and social 
opportunities are in Western Europe mean that they are going to migrate out of 
Estonia to access them. Mobility therefore becomes an asset to young people 
(Cairns 2008) because they value their ability to move freely within Europe for 
the access it gives them to better education, better jobs, higher wages, and 
prestigious human capital.  
The previous sections demonstrate that Estonian and Russophone 
students conceptualize European citizenship in very different ways based largely 
on their positionalities as part of the titular majority or Russophone minority. 
Although all student respondents view European citizenship as a vehicle for 
accessing better education, career, and economic opportunities, the Estonian 
students describe the human capital to be gained from European citizenship in 
very different ways than the Russophone students do. This distinction becomes 
even clearer when the students’ conceptions of European citizenship are 
compared to their plans to migrate to Europe for school and work.  
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This analysis is not aimed at making actual predictions of the student 
participants’ mobility. Rather, it is aimed at evaluating how their desires to 
migrate reflect varying notions of belonging in Estonia and in the EU. Just as 
there is a difference between whether the students view European citizenship as 
an additive or alternative to national citizenship, there is a difference in students’ 
plans to migrate for work and school. The Estonian students, who position 
themselves positively in Estonian society, and Russophone students, who 
position themselves negatively in Estonian society, describe their migration plans 
in very different ways. The remainder of this section analyzes these differences.  
 
Intentions to Migrate 
 The student respondents’ intentions to study and work abroad are broken 
down by school language medium because, as previously demonstrated, there is 
a high correlation between students’ ethnolinguistic identification with the titular 
majority or Russophone minority and the language of instruction at their schools. 
The data in Table 6.1 shows that the intentions to migrate do not vary between 
the students at Estonian-medium and Russian-medium schools. This finding is 
consistent with the perception by all of my interviewees that high quality 
educational and career-related opportunities exist outside of Estonia.  
The other characteristic that does not vary highly between the Estonian-
medium and Russian-medium school students is intended destination. The 
evidence in Table 6.2 shows that the vast majority of my student participants 
specify Western Europe as their intended destination. While this can be argued 
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as a function of geographic proximity, relative location cannot wholly explain the 
prevalence of Europe-oriented aspirations, especially in world where 
advancements in transportation technology have compressed space-time. The 
significant changes in political geography effected by the creation of the 
supranational space of the EU have introduced convenience, ease, expanded 
labor rights, and increased accessibility into the mobility equation for European 
youths via European citizenship.  
 
Table 6.1. Intentions to Study and Work Abroad by School Language Medium 
 
	  	  
Intentions	  to	  Study	  and	  Work	  Abroad,	  
Raw	  Number	  (%)	  
	  	   Yes	   Maybe	   No	  
School	  Language	  Medium	  
	   	  
	  	  
Estonian	   12	  (86%)	   2	  (14%)	   0	  (0%)	  
Russian	   12	  (80%)	   2	  (13%)	   1	  (7%)	  
Total	   24	  (83%)	   4	  (14%)	   1	  (3%)	  
 
 
Table 6.2. Intended Destination Abroad by School Language Medium 
 
	  	   Intended	  Destination,	  Raw	  Number	  (%)	  
	  	   Western	  Europe	   World	   Undecided	  
School	  Language	  Medium	  
	   	  
	  	  
Estonian	   13	  (93%)	   1	  (7%)	   0	  (0%)	  
Russian	   10	  (71.5%)	   3	  (21.5%)	   1	  (7%)	  
Total	   23	  (82%)	   4	  (14%)	   1	  (4%)	  
 
 
Length of Stay  
The divergence in my student participants’ migration plans appears when 
lengths of stay and reasons for lengths of stay are interrogated. Although it must 
be acknowledged that intention to go and stay abroad (or not) is different from 
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actual movement (Cairns 2008), students’ responses demonstrate that most plan 
to leave Estonia with a timeline for their stay in mind. Whether students actually 
move in the future is not entirely relevant because this analysis is interested in 
how the students’ senses of belonging or exclusion in Estonia relate to their 
stated intentions to be mobile.  My research yielded evidence that among the 
student interviewees planned length of stay varies between the students in 
Russian-medium schools and those in Estonian-medium schools.  
As shown in Table 6.3, half (7 of 14) of the students from Russian-medium 
schools plan long term stays abroad, compared to the students from Estonian-
medium schools, among whom only three out of 14 plan long term stays. This 
comparison becomes even more significant when the students’ reasons for long-
term departure are examined. The students from Estonian-medium schools 
spoke about the value of long-term stays abroad in terms of diversity of choice, 
personal growth, and stability that could be gained from Western Europe’s 
opportunities. The students from Russian-medium schools, however, spoke 
about the value of long-term stays abroad in terms of escape from Estonia, a 
place where they had little or no opportunities because of their ethnolinguistic 
identity, as evidenced by the following exchange: 
 
Interviewer:   Do you think there’s less discrimination there 
[in Western Europe] and that’s why you want to go get a job or go 
to school? Or do you think there’s more money there and that’s why 
you want to go? 
Tolstoy Girl 2:  I think its both, discrimination and money. 
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Tolstoy Girl 1:  We [Russians] don’t have any prospects 
here… we don’t have a really clear future… we can’t find any work. 
When I leave Estonia, I won’t miss this country….  
 
Interviewer:   You can’t find work here? Why? 
Tolstoy Boy 2:  This is not a big secret that Estonians live 
better than Russians. 
 
This pattern amongst the responses speaks to James Hughes’ (Hughes 
2005, 742–3) theory that “an ethnic minority that out-migrates because of 
opposition to a discriminatory ethnic hegemony, from a state where they have 
weak historical roots, and where they are not wanted by the majority, are not 
likely to return if they can find better prospects elsewhere, even if discrimination 
stops.” The Russophone students’ responses reflect the multiple and cross-
cutting concerns that influence intentions to migrate. Moreover, their responses 
show how the act of migration—or the act of talking about migration—is 
mobilized by Russophone youths as a vehicle for negotiating the politics of 
identity and citizenship in Estonia.  
 
Table 6.3. Intended Length of Stay by School Language Medium 
 
	  	   Intended	  Length	  of	  Stay,	  Raw	  Number	  (%)	  
	  	   Long	  Term	   Short	  Term	   Undecided	  
School	  Language	  Medium	  
	   	  
	  	  
Estonian	   3	  (21%)	   11	  (79%)	   0	  (0%)	  
Russian	   7	  (54%)	   7	  (46%)	   0	  (0%)	  
Total	   10	  (36%)	   18	  (64%)	   0	  (0%)	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Table 6.4. Intended Destination and Length of Stay by School Language Medium 
 
	  	   Destination,	  Raw	  Number	  (%)	  
	  	   Western	  Europe	   World	   Undecided	  
Russian-­‐Medium	   10	  (71.5%)	   3	  (21.5%)	   1	  (7%)	  
Long	  Term	   5	   2	   0	  
Short	  Term	   5	   1	   1	  
Estonian-­‐Medium	   13	  (93%)	   1	  (7%)	   0	  (0%)	  
Long	  Term	   2	   1	   0	  
Short	  Term	   11	   0	   0	  
Total	   23	  (82%)	   4	  (14%)	   1	  (4%)	  
 
 
Table 6.3 also shows that the number of students intending to return to 
Estonia after short term stays abroad was much higher in Estonian-medium 
schools. While 11 of the 14 students from Estonian-medium schools indicated 
they wished to return to Estonia, seven of the 14 students from Russian-medium 
schools planned to return. All of the student respondents who planned short-term 
stays abroad mentioned the importance of family and friends as a key factor in 
wanting to return to Estonia. But there is a deviation in some of the reasonings 
for planned short-term migration based on responses, or lack thereof, about 
patriotic feelings towards Estonia.  
Estonia is spoken of in neutral terms, if spoken of at all, by 13 of the 14 
Russian-medium school students who plan to go abroad. (The only student from 
a Russian-medium school that articulated nationalist feelings as part of his desire 
to return to Estonia was O-Pushkin Boy 1, who is of mixed heritage.) But 
students in Estonian-medium schools who are planning short-term stays abroad 
frequently cite patriotic reasons for wanting to return as well as for family and 
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friends. For instance, these students from Estonian-medium schools speak about 
a deep connection to their homeland: 
 
Tammsaare Girl 4: I’m a patriotic person, and I’d really like to 
[return to] Estonia.  
 
Tammsaare Girl 2: I want to travel just to see how people live 
elsewhere and you can bring it back to Estonia and make things 
here better.  
 
Koidula Girl 4: For me, Estonia is like… a close to heart thing.  
 
These responses indicate that nationalist politics are also interwoven into 
Estonian students’ intended mobility practices in the EU, but in a starkly different 
manner than in Russophone students’ motivations. The act of migration is 
certainly bound up with the politics of identity for ethnic Estonian students, but is 
cast as a contribution to the vitality of their Estonian citizenship rather than a 
means to reject Estonian citizenship.  
Russophone students’ responses, in contrast, indicate that feelings of 
exclusion and a lack of connection to Estonia underlie their motivations for 
migration: 
 
Tolstoy Girl 3:  I feel independent… I will leave here and I 
won’t miss it—this country—a lot. 
 
Pushkin Girl 1: …for Estonian people, I’m Russian. But my 
friends from Russia, they say that I am Estonian. For me, I don’t 
know who I am… I’d like go study [abroad], and then maybe, who 
knows? 
 
Pushkin Boy 7: Since my childhood I really couldn’t define who I am 
[nationally], and maybe that’s why I want to go [abroad]. 
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Tolstoy Girl 2: When I leave Estonia, I won’t miss this country. 
I will only miss my family and friends. 
 
These responses intimate that the politics of identity at work in the lives of the 
Russophone students operate to alienate rather than validate. These politics 
have worked unevenly, demonstrated by the fact that in some cases students’ 
identities are defined by an explicit sense of discloation from Estonia, while 
others’ express nebulous and uncertain identities that will achieve solidity and 
definition outside of Estonia. Regardless, mobility’s link to the politics of identity 
for Russophone students is assembled within the context of rejecting Estonian 
space.    
This discussion of the differences in driving forces behind intentions to 
return to Estonia reveals the political and socio-cultural motivations that animate 
student migrants in Tallinn. I argue that the lack of national pride or connection to 
the homeland in Russian-medium school students could make them more likely 
to be influenced by experiences abroad to stay out of Estonia for a longer period 
of time. A planned short-term migrant youth may be more likely to become an 
actual long-term migrant youth as a result of the interplay between multiple 
determinants, such as national identity politics and economic desires. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has presented evidence that national and supranational 
citizenships relate to each other in varying ways because an individual’s 
positionality at the national level will directly affect his or her conceptions of 
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supranational citizenship. Estonian and Russophone students’ experiences of 
European citizenships are different because their experiences in Estonian society 
are different.  
The contrasting positionalities of Estonian and Russophone students 
result in highly differentiated conceptualizations of Europeanness and European 
citizenship. The Estonian students view being European and having European 
citizenship as attributes that are additive to their Estonian national citizenship that 
enhance their Estonianness. The Russophone students, however, articulate 
Europeanness and European citizenship as alternatives to an Estonian national 
citizenship, and as tools for circumnavigating the disadvantages that they 
encounter because of their minority membership.  
 The analysis of the data gathered from the student participants indicate 
that national and European citizenships exist simultaneously but independently 
and interact complexly. The complexity of this interaction is subject to the 
vagaries of the students’ positionalities at the national level. The focus group 
conversations suggest that European citizenship is not a monolithic, static 
modality of belonging, but one of diverse conceptualizations of inclusion and 
exclusion that emerge from varying experiences at the national level. 
Consequently the meaning of and potential for mobility, a core tenet of European 
citizenship traditionally cast as an economically motivated act, varies across this 
group of students. The Russophone students, who have negative positionalities 
in Estonia, tend to plan to long-term stays abroad, whereas the Estonian 
students, who have positive postitionalities, tend to plan short-term stays abroad. 
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Significantly, this demonstrates that students’ European citizenships are multi-
layered because it is not only economic considerations that are affecting the 
students’ plans for short-term or long-term stays abroad, but also socio-cultural 
considerations stemming from the politics of identity in Estonia. As such, for the 
young people in this study, there is no one definition of “Europeanness” and what 
it means to be a European citizen.  
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Chapter 7 
Discussion 
	   This dissertation has explored the ways in which young people in a 
divided society conceptualize, negotiate, and contest citizenship, identity, and 
belonging in national, post-national, and urban spaces. Using focus groups from 
students in their final year of secondary school in Tallinn, Estonia and in-depth 
interviews with their teachers, this study has illustrated the ways in which young 
people contend with and mediate varying discourses of citizenship and identity 
within and through everyday spaces, particularly the space of the school. While 
this study is not large enough to be generalizable to all young people in divided 
societies, its value is its ability to engage with and interrogate theoretical 
approaches to citizenship, identity, and belonging and to explore the political 
agency of young people in the context of their everyday geographies. 
 This study has focused specifically on examining the key spaces of young 
people’s personal geographies, including the school and the urban landscape, in 
order to illustrate the complex ways that young people encounter multiple and 
sometimes competing discourses of citizenship and identity in national and post-
national communities. By focusing on how young people negotiate different 
citizenship discourses, this study has attempted to show that although the liberal 
democratic discourses of “universal” citizenship in Western nation-states extend 
formal citizenship to all members of society, substantive citizenship is delineated
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 by the particularisms of the dominant group, leaving some individuals and 
groups socio-politically marginalized.  
 In addressing the complexities of youth narratives of belonging and 
identity, this dissertation has suggested that approaching various citizenship 
discourses as separate entities fails to produce a comprehensive understanding 
of the ways that individuals conceptualize and experience citizenships at different 
scales. Current discussions of citizenship focus on particular elements of 
citizenship transformations—for instance, the decoupling of ethnicity and 
citizenship or the decoupling of rights from citizenship (Wylie 2004; Hahn 1998; 
Marston 1990; Soysal 1997; Soysal 2000; Delanty 1997). In focusing on 
particular kinds of transformations, these literatures often fail to account for the 
simultaneity of citizenship modalities in contemporary nation-states.  Post-
national citizenship, for instance, has not replaced or superseded national 
citizenship; rather, it interacts with national citizenship, creating overlapping 
systems of rights, responsibilities, privileges, identities, and exclusions. What has 
not been thoroughly examined, however, is how citizenship discourses coexist 
and interact and, therefore, inform and are informed by each other. Considering 
the simultaneity of multi-scalar discourses allows citizenships to be viewed as 
amalgamations of political identities, relationships, and experiences that are 
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Citizenship Discourses: Simultaneity and Interaction 
This study addressed multiple modalities of citizenship and the scales at 
which their discourses are encountered, negotiated, and understood. Rather than 
rejecting any specific theorizations of citizenships in contemporary scholarship, 
this study has considered citizenships as institutions that incorporate practices 
and processes addressed by many different citizenship theories. This approach 
involves refocusing the discussion of citizenship away from narrow assessments 
of separate discourses, instead interrogating the ways that multiple discourses 
interact and influence each other and, subsequently, conceptualizations of 
citizenships.  
The findings in this study suggest that the tensions between the 
universalisms that define the ideal liberal democratic citizenship and the 
particularisms that ultimately delineate societal belonging undergird the complex 
coexistence and interaction between multiple citizenship discourses. For 
instance, the students in this study negotiate belonging and citizenship in Estonia 
by contending with both the particularisms of the Estonian nation-building project 
and the universality of liberal democratic citizenship. This tension is particularly 
acute in divided societies, such as Estonia, that remain socio-spatially polarized 
along ethnocultural lines. As discussed in Chapter 4, both Estonian and 
Russophone students attempt to reconcile the tension between nationalist 
particularisms and liberal democratic universalisms by incorporating discourses 
of multicultural and post-national citizenship into their narratives of belonging in 
Estonia.  
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Multicultural and post-national citizenship discourses aim to address 
cultural diversity and alleviate tensions between majority and minority groups. 
But the narratives of the student participants illustrate that the particularisms that 
delineate belonging and citizenship are actually complicated and multiplied by 
multicultural and post-national discourses. The students often frame the terms of 
belonging in Estonia within multiculturalist rhetoric that permeates both Estonian 
national and European post-national discourses. Both Estonian and Russophone 
students deputize “tolerance” of cultural difference and diversity into their 
narratives of citizenship. A common theme running through the student 
narratives of citizenship is that being “tolerant” of cultural difference in Estonia is 
important because it is the “European” way of treating nationalities or because it 
is how different groups in a democracy make integration a “two-way street.” The 
students’ references to multicultural, non-assimilatory integration practices and 
“Europeanness” in their narratives about national citizenship demonstrate that 
their conceptualizations of citizenship at one scale intersect with the discourses 
of citizenship at other scales. 
The coexistence and interaction of multi-scalar citizenship discourses was 
also demonstrated by the student participants’ conceptualizations of their 
European citizenships. Patterns emerged amongst how students perceived EU 
citizenship based on their positionality in the Estonian majority or Russophone 
minority. The students’ experiences of and encounters with citizenship, identity, 
and belonging in the national community affected the ways in which they 
engaged with their Europeanness and the opportunities afforded to them by EU 
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citizenship. The Russophone students, for instance, tended to understand 
European citizenship as an alternative to Estonian citizenship that offered them 
better opportunities and a freedom from the social marginalization and political 
alienation they experience in Estonia. Estonian students, in contrast, were more 
apt to conceptualize European citizenship in additive terms—i.e. a useful, but 
secondary, citizenship that augments their Estonian citizenship. These students’ 
broadly differing perceptions of European space suggest that Sidaway's (2006) 
reflections on the diverse understandings of the EU at the macro level could also 
apply to young people’s understandings of it. 
The complex interaction of national and post-national citizenship 
discourses is evident in the ways that the students used national identity politics 
to narrate and negotiate their European citizenships. So while Soysal’s (1997) 
observations of a shift in the nature of claims-making and narratives of belonging 
is valid, addressing citizenships as discrete entities that exist on different levels 
of a scalar hierarchy will yield a fragmentary account of how individuals and 
groups conceptualize, negotiate, and contest them. Considering the coexistence 
and interaction of various modalities of citizenship will render a more complete 
understanding of how individuals and groups conceptualize belonging and 
citizenship. 
Further analysis of the students’ narratives of belonging revealed that in 
spite of their espousals of the values of tolerance and acceptance of cultural 
diversity, the politics of identity are still central to the way that these young 
people experience, negotiate, and practice their citizenships. In fact, the post-
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national and multicultural discourses that are aimed at alleviating conflicts 
between majority and minority groups actually serve to complicate and multiply 
the identities that the students ascribe to legitimate citizens and those deemed 
“unassimilable.” The narratives of the Estonian and Russophone students 
exposed a fundamental disagreement on what identities and practices should be 
tolerated, which is indicative of a wider conflict over what multiculturalism actually 
is and how it should be practiced. The students’ varying opinions on what 
qualifies for tolerance and how cultural difference should be addressed reflect 
ongoing debates in academic and political circles. The lack of consensus in 
theoretical and policy discussions about whether multiculturalism is best 
practiced by recognizing difference (Kymlicka 2007) or emphasizing commonality 
(Balint 2010) seems to have trickled down into the ways that cultural diversity is 
talked about on an everyday basis.  
A holistic assessment of the students’ narratives of their citizenship 
practices ultimately revealed that “tolerance” is a mere keyword used to mask 
exclusionary conceptualizations of belonging with a multicultural citizenship ideal 
that they perceive as the “correct” way to address cultural difference in a liberal 
democratic, European Estonia. The varying ways that the students mobilize 
tolerance in their narratives further demonstrates the pervasiveness of the 
tensions between the universalisms and particularisms that are used to define 
citizenship. For instance, the Estonian students tended to tolerate Russophone 
identity up to a certain point as long as the Russophone individual in question 
made efforts to assimilate and adopt Estonian cultural norms. The Russophone 
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student participants, in contrast, conceived of tolerance as way to maintain 
and/or assert their Russophone identities. Some Russophone students spoke of 
the importance of tolerating Estonian culture as a means to acquire the 
Estonians’ tolerance of their Russophone culture. Other Russophone students 
mobilized tolerance as a means of classifying themselves as properly respectful 
of cultural diversity and Estonians as intolerant and, subsequently, not 
multicultural enough.  
This finding indicates that the mobilization of tolerance in discourses of 
citizenship merits further study. Examinations of tolerance and its uses in 
contemporary liberal democratic societies should build on the works of Brown 
(2008), Forst (2003), Dobbernack and Modood (2011), and Gill, Johnstone, and 
Williams (2012), interrogating the ways in which “multicultural” ideals and values 
are deployed in everyday spaces. Divided societies that are situated within liberal 
democratic frameworks, such as Estonia and Northern Ireland, could provide 
particularly fertile ground for researching the ways in which tolerance has 
become depoliticized and, subsequently, used as a means for legitimizing the 
exclusion of individuals and groups deemed “too different” from the dominant 
cultural norm.  
 
Youth Conceptualizations of Citizenship: Encountering, Experiencing, and 
Navigating Spaces of Belonging 
The narratives of the student study population revealed that young people 
encounter, negotiate, and navigate multiple discourses of citizenship on a daily 
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basis in the everyday spaces of their personal geographies. As expected, the 
school was a key site where the young people encountered and contended with 
varying ideas about citizenship, identity, and belonging. By comparing the data 
gathered from student focus groups and teacher interviews I found that teacher 
attitudes and classroom climate served to mediate the manner in which 
discourses of nationalism, multiculturalism, and post-nationalism are presented 
to young people. Although the teachers in this study operate with the same 
formal curricula objectives their personal narratives and attitudes had noticeable 
impact on how the formal curricula relating to citizenship and identity circulated in 
the classroom, a circumstance that has been observed elsewhere (E. Doyle 
Stevick 2007; McGlynn et al. 2004; Michaels and Stevick 2009). These findings 
indicate that the narratives that circulate within and through the space of the 
school are subject to the politics of identity and citizenship in wider society 
through the attitudes and teaching styles of teachers.  
 The results of this study suggest that the school, although a crucial space 
in which these young people develop understandings of citizenship and identity, 
is simply one space among many in youths’ everyday, personal geographies 
where they encounter citizenship discourses and practices. This finding supports 
Holloway and Valentine’s (2000) argument that young people’s geographies are 
complex and that the school should be viewed as one space situated within a 
larger network of spaces that youths’ move through and within on a daily basis. 
The discourses and experiences that young people encounter in their everyday 
personal geographies, such as homes, neighborhoods, and city landscapes are 
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equally influential to their conceptualizations of citizenship and the terms of 
belonging.   
 Urban space was found to be particularly significant to the student 
participants’ delineations of belonging, identity, and citizenship in Tallinn. The 
findings in this study suggest that young people’s daily citizenship practices work 
to inform and are informed by the various discourses of belonging and identity 
that they are exposed to in the everyday spaces of the city. Estonia’s socio-
spatial divisions reflect and are reflected by Tallinn’s landscapes and the way 
that these young people navigate urban spaces. The student respondents 
consistently ascribed meanings to particular parts of the city and used these 
“mental maps” to locate particular identities within certain urban spaces. The 
students’ ascriptions of meanings to particular neighborhoods tended to 
perpetuate and mediate the projection of hegemonic narratives and identities and 
the marginalization of minority narratives and identities. Contestations over 
Tallinn’s Bronze Solider memorial, for instance, revealed that the students used 
the city’s memorialized landscapes to conceptualize citizenship through the 
“correct” retelling of history, and to legitimate the exclusion of individuals and 
groups that subscribed to the “wrong” version of history. 
The young people in this study also negotiated and contested the terms of 
citizenship and belonging by navigating language spaces in Tallinn. The 
students’ descriptions of the city indicated that language usage was a common 
means of determining the identities and meanings ascribed to particular 
neighborhoods of Tallinn, a practice that featured heavily in their 
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conceptualizations of citizenship. Estonian student respondents tended to view 
spaces where Russian was spoken most often as representative of the 
Russophone community’s disloyalty towards Estonia and their unwillingness to 
integrate properly into Estonian society. Furthermore, the Estonian students 
conceptualized meaningful access to the space rights as something available 
only to individuals who speak Estonian, and that those without proper Estonian 
language skills are, in fact, excluding themselves from substantive citizenship 
because of their intolerance of Estonia’s national language. Conversely, the 
Russophone students described Tallinn’s Russian-speaking neighborhoods as 
comfortable, safe spaces where Russophones were simply claiming the human 
right to identity. This finding indicates that future research on how language 
becomes spatialized in the city and subsequently folded into the spatial 
strategies of citizenship may deepen our understandings of how citizenship is 
practiced on a daily basis.  
 
Implications for Future Research 
 This study has been instructive in explaining how young people 
understand, conceptualize, and negotiate multiple discourses of citizenship, 
identity, and belonging. Although the findings in this study are not generalizable 
across large populations, their engagements with theoretical concepts produce 
important questions about the way that scholars conceptualize the complex 
interactions of citizenship modalities and the politics of identity and how those 
interactions are spatialized on an everyday basis. The most important 
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implications of this study suggest several research pathways for future research 
that may deepen our understanding of youth geographies, citizenship, and 
divided societies.  
One of the most significant implications of this finding is that the complex 
interaction of multiple citizenship discourses (re)produces multiple 
understandings of identities, belongings, and citizenships. Post-national and 
multicultural discourses of citizenship, for instance, are aimed at addressing 
cultural diversity and alleviating the tensions between the universalisms of liberal 
democratic citizenship and the particularisms of nation building projects. 
However, the results of this study imply that these discourses only serve to 
reinforce the particularisms that delineate belonging in society, thereby 
reproducing the ethnonational and ethnocultural boundaries in society. 
  The implication of this finding is particularly important for how we view 
divided societies at a broader level. Post-national and multicultural discourses 
aim to destabilize the boundaries that divide societies. But this research has 
demonstrated that they serve to reinforce those boundaries. What requires 
further investigation is the extent to which societal divisions can be destabilized 
at all and how the boundaries acquire fixity despite very conscious efforts to 
destabilize them. It’s important not to naturalize group boundaries or to fall upon 
notions of deep, inherent, age-old differences while also recognizing that it’s not 
easy to fully undermine entrenched differences. There’s fluidity, but there’s also 
fixity, and the question for those studying divided societies is how, and under 
what conditions, one seems to overtake the other.  
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 This study also revealed the importance of everyday, lived geographies 
and urban spaces to young people’s experiences, negotiations, and 
understandings of belonging and citizenship in Estonia. This finding is important 
because it suggests that active processes of citizenship formation at national and 
post-national levels take place in spaces and places that are distinctly mundane, 
and therefore may not seem relevant to citizenship research at first glance. Such 
everyday, mundane spaces of young people’s personal geographies can play 
central roles in future research by revealing the seemingly banal ways in which 
the particularisms that delineate citizenship and belonging are reinforced and or 
reinterpreted, thereby giving a more comprehensive understanding of the 
processes and practices of contemporary modalities of citizenship.  
The methodological limitations of this study present opportunities for future 
research to explore whether the findings here are consistent across larger 
populations of young people in Estonia. Because of the relatively small study 
population this project’s analysis contains gaps and absences that can be 
addressed by increasing the number of participants and study sites involved in 
the research. Future research projects that expand the study population control 
for variables such as gender and class will increase the reliability of the data and 
validity of results. Furthermore, increasing the number of study participants and 
study sites will provide the opportunity to apply quantitative research techniques 
to investigate the statistical significance and implications of youths’ responses 
and identity traits such as mother tongue, ethnolinguistic heritage, and legal 
citizenship status. Employing qualitative and quantitative techniques will provide 
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the opportunity to deepen the richness of the analysis and perhaps to increase 
the generalizability of the study results not only within Estonia, but also to other 
divided societies. 
 In sum, the findings of this study suggest that, at the broadest level, 
scholars need to examine how multi-scalar discourses of citizenship coexist and 
interact and how everyday spaces and places implicate and are implicated in 
those processes. If citizenships are amalgamations of multiple political identities 
and relationships, scholars will need to develop more nuanced understandings of 
how multiple citizenship discourse circulate within and through everyday spaces 
to influence the way that individuals interpret and assemble those multiple 
political identities and relationships. Conceptualizing citizenships as dynamic, 
multi-sited processes will allow scholars to better understand how individuals and 
groups delineate the boundaries of spaces of belonging and mediate access to 
spaces of rights.  
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APPENDIX A – STUDENT PARTICIPANT INTAKE SURVEY 
 
Name: _______________________________ 
Age:    ____________ 
 
Please circle your answers to the following questions: 
1. Are you male or female? Male Female 
2. Are you a citizen of Estonia? Yes No 
 If ‘no’, what is your legal status in Estonia?  _____________________ 
3. What is your nationality? Estonian Russian 
4. What is your mother tongue?  Estonian Russian English 
5. What other languages do you speak? (circle all that apply) 
 None  Estonian Russian English Other: __________ 
 
Please answer the following questions: 
6. Where were you born?  
 City and country: ________________________ 
7. Where were your parents born? 
 Mother’s city and country of birth: ________________________________ 
Father’s city of and country of birth: ______________________________  
8. Where were your grandparents born? 
Mother’s parents’ places of birth:  
Grandmother: __________________________________ 
Grandfather: __________________________________ 
Father’s parents’ places of birth:  
Grandmother: _________________________________  
Grandfather: _________________________ 
9. How long have you lived in Tallinn? _________________________________ 
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APPENDIX B – FOCUS GROUP QUESTION TEMPLATE 
 
1. As a geographer, I’m interested in the ways people use cities.  Could you 
tell me about the parts of Tallinn where you feel comfortable, or not very 
comfortable?  
a. Are there parts of Tallinn that are “Russian” and other parts of the 
city that are “Estonian”? What are those places? 
b. Are there parts of Tallinn that are “neutral,” where everyone hangs 
out? 
2. How are Russian-speakers and Estonians different? How are Russian-
speakers and Estonians similar? 
a. Do you have many Estonian friends? 
3. What makes someone “Estonian”? 
a. Is it possible for a Russian-speaker to be Estonian? 
4. What is your national identity—do you feel Estonian? Why or why not?  
a. If you do not feel “Estonian,” what country do you identify with? 
5. Do you learn about Tallinn’s national landmarks, memorials, and 
museums in school? Did you visit them on school trips? 
a. Have you ever visited the Museum of Occupations? Do you agree 
that Estonia was “occupied” by the Soviet Union? 
6. When the Bronze Soldier statue was moved 5 years ago, it was covered 
heavily in the newspapers and on TV. How did/do you feel about the 
Bronze Soldier controversy? Do you think that the monument should have 
been moved from the park to the war cemetery? Why or why not?  
7. Estonian joined the EU 7 years ago, when you were about 11 or 12. Does 
being “European” matter to you now? Do you think of yourself as 
Estonian, or European, or something else? 
8. What do you learn about national identity in your school classes? What do 
you learn about citizenship? Have your classes influenced how you think 
about your identity, or does your life outside of school matter more to who 
you are? 
9. When Estonia regained independence in 1991, not everyone who lived in 
the country was given citizenship—a lot of Russian-speakers were left 
without any citizenship, and had to pass Estonian language and history 
exams in order to get citizenship. Do you think this was fair, or do you 
think that everyone who lived in Estonia in 1991 should have automatically 
gained citizenship? Why do you feel that way?  
10. Should people in Estonia all speak the same language and have the same 
culture?  
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APPENDIX C – INTERVIEW QUESTION TEMPLATES 
 
A. History and Civics Teacher 
1. Please tell me about the subject(s) that you teach. Do you have only 
Russian-speaking students, or only Estonians? Or both? 
2. What would an Estonian say as the most important event(s) in Estonia’s 
history? What would Russian speakers say?  
3. What is the greatest challenge in teaching your students about Estonia’s 
history?  
4. How do you teach your students what national identity is? About what it 
means to be a citizen? 
5. What does it mean to be an Estonian? 
6. What does the city of Tallinn mean to an Estonian? Is it different for an 
Russian-speaker living in Tallinn? 
7. What is a patriotic person? Are Estonians patriotic? Are Russians? 
8. How are Estonians and Russian speakers similar? How are they different? 
9. Do your students ask many questions about sensitive topics, such as 
Estonia’s Soviet historical legacy and/or the social divisions between 
Estonians and Russians? If so, how do you address their questions? 
10. What do you think the students should learn from their civic education 
curriculum, i.e. when they graduate from secondary school, what should 
they know about themselves as residents of Estonia? As citizens (or not) 
of Estonia? What should they think about living alongside other 
ethnicities? 
11. What parts of your classes interest your students the most? What do you 
do to make the curriculum interesting and important to your students? 
12. If you could change things about the civic education curriculum, what 
would you add and what would you take away? 
13. What kinds of European Union educational topics do you teach in your 
class?  
14. Do you make it a priority to address civic education topics that come from 
the EU?  
a. If so, how do you balance it with the Estonian civic education 
curriculum?  
b. If not, why? 
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B. Geography Teacher 
1. What types of geography do you teach during the school year—is it only 
physical geography, or do you also talk about human geography? 
2. What makes Estonia unique? How do you teach that to your students? 
3. What role does the land play in Estonians’ lives? When you think of a 
typically Estonian place, what is it? 
4. What does the city of Tallinn mean to Estonians? To Russian speakers? 
What does the city of Narva mean to Estonians? To Russians? 
5. How do you describe Estonia’s place in the world to your students—is it a 
European country? A Nordic country? An “Eastern European” country? 
6. What topics does the Ministry of Education require to be part of the 
geography curriculum? 
7. What is the greatest challenge in teaching your students about the 
human/political geography of Estonia, and how it has changed in the past 
100 yearsDo your students ask many questions about sensitive topics, 
such as Estonia’s Soviet historical legacy and/or the social divisions 
between Estonians and Russians? If so, how do you address their 
questions? 
8. Why do your main goal in teaching your geography classes? 
9. What do you think the students should learn from their geography lessons, 
i.e. when they graduate from secondary school, what should they know 
about Estonia’s place in the world? What should they know about the 
human geography of Estonia, i.e. the different ethnic groups that live 
here? 
10. Which geography lessons interest your students the most? What do you 
do to make the curriculum interesting and important to your students? 
11. What kinds of European Union educational topics do you teach in your 
class?  
 
C. Language Arts Teacher 
1. Please tell me about the subject(s) that you teach. 
2. What is the importance of teaching students about the [Estonian/Russian] 
language? Do you also discuss literature? 
3. Do you think that language is an important part of identity?  
4. Do your students think that [Estonian/Russian] language is an important 
part of their identity and who they are? 
5. What is the greatest challenge in teaching your students about citizenship 
and national identity issues? Why? 
6. How important do you think school classes are to teaching young people 
about their identity? Why? 
7. What do you want students should learn from this language class, i.e. 
what is the most important thing that they should know after finishing this 
class? 
8.  What parts of your class interests your students the most? What do you 
do to make the curriculum interesting and important to your students? 
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9. How do you feel about the Integration Laws that require 65% of school 
classes to be taught in Estonian? 
10. What topics are required by the national curriculum that is set by the 
government?  
a. What lessons would you add to the curriculum for your class? 
b. What lessons would you take away from the curriculum? 
11. Do your students ask many questions about sensitive topics, such as 
Estonia’s Soviet historical legacy and/or the social divisions between 
Estonians and Russians? If so, how do you address their questions? 
12. Do you think it is important to observe Mother Tongue Day? Why or why 
not? How do you observe Mother Tongue Day in your class? 
 
